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IEICE Transactions on Information and Systems

Secure Key Transfer Protocol Based on Secret Sharing for Group Communications

Chia‐Yin Lee, Zhihui Wang, Lein Harn, Chin‐Chen Chang

Published Jan 1, 2011• 24 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Group key establishment is an important mechanism to construct a common session key for group communications. Conventional group key establishment protocols use an on-line trusted key generation center (KGC) to transfer the group key for each participant in each session. However, this approach requires that a trusted server be set up, and it incurs communication overhead costs. In this article, we address some security problems and drawbacks associated with existing group key establishment protocols. Besides, we use the concept of secret sharing scheme to propose a secure key transfer protocol to exclude impersonators from accessing the group communication. Our protocol can resist potential attacks and also reduce the overhead of system implementation. In addition, comparisons of the security analysis and functionality of our proposed protocol with some recent protocols are included in this article.

DOI
10.1587/transinf.e94.d.2069

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IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Computing and Intelligent Systems (ICIS)•Nov 1, 2009•1 citation
Group key establishment is an important mechanism to construct a common session key for group communications. Conventional group key establishment protocols use an on-line trusted key generation center (KGC) to transfer the group key for each participant in each session. However, this approach requires that a trusted server be set up, and it incurs communication overhead costs. In this article, we address some security problems and drawbacks associated with existing group key establishment protocols. Besides, we use the concept of secret sharing scheme to propose a secure key transfer protocol to exclude impersonators from accessing the group communication. Our protocol can resist potential attacks and also reduce the overhead of system implementation. In addition, comparisons of the security analysis and functionality of our proposed protocol with some recent protocols are included in this article.
Group Key Transfer (GKT) protocols allow multiple parties to share a common secret key: a trusted Key Generation Center (KGC) selects a uniformly random value that has never been used before and securely distributes it to the legitimate principals. The paper restricts to GKT based on secret sharing; it briefly reviews the security goals and the existing formal security models. We motivate our work by the lack of GKT protocols based on secret sharing that are proved secure in a formal security model. Most of the recent proposals only provide informal and incomplete arguments to claim security, which makes them susceptible to known vulnerabilities. We support our affirmation by exemplifying with three different types of attacks (replay attack, insider attack and known key attack) mounted against protocols published within the last three years. We emphasize that none of these attacks would have been possible against a GKT protocol proved secure in a usual formal security model.
For a secure communication through the public network, cryptographic encryption must be applied. The key establishment issue is the most important part in cryptographic encryption. Only the legitimate principals who have the key can encrypt messages and decrypt cryptograms. A secure multi-party communication held through the public network can only take place after a multi-party key establishment protocol has been executed. The multi-party key establishment protocol is designed so that the principals can receive a common key and use it to securely exchange the messages.\nIn this thesis, the secure multi-party key establishment protocols are discussed. W e start from investigating properties of two-party key establishment protocols such as motivation of using session key, adversaries in the protocols, attacks of the protocol and security analysis of the protocol. Then we give the requirements of a multi-party key establishment protocol and summarize about what should be considered in designing a multi-party key establishment protocol. After that we review some of the previous proposed multi-party key establishment protocol. The existing multi-party key establishment protocols are either impractical ( not efficient enough) or missing some important security goals such as authentication of principals. Three new protocols are proposed in this thesis. The first protocol addresses how to hold a conference for members of two hierarchical groups in an efficient way. The message broadcasting is used to reduce the cost of secure message transport.\nThe second and the third protocols manage the authentication problem by using a secret sharing scheme. We replace the principal authentication with the group authentication so that the computational overhead and communication overhead will be reduced especially in reuse of the protocol for new communication. Again, message broadcasting is used for replacing the expansive secure communication channel.\nPart of this thesis appeared in ACSC'99(Australian Computer Science Conference) and ACISP'99(Australian Conference of Information Security and Privacy).
Group key exchange (GKE) is one of the basic building blocks in securing group communication. A number of solutions to GKE problem have been proposed, but most of them are not scalable and require a number of rounds linear with the number of group members. We present a method of constructing constant-round and identity-based protocol via secret sharing for GKE within universally composability (UC) framework. The resultant protocol focuses on round efficiency and three rounds of communication are required. The protocol allows the batch verification of messages signed by all other group participants. Moreover, compared with other identity-based protocols, the key generation center (KGC) in our protocol is not always online.
A recent primitive known as asymmetric group key agreement allows a group of users to negotiate a common encryption key which is accessible to any entities while each user holds her respective secret decryption key. This concept not only enables confidential communications among group users but also permits any outsider to send encrypted messages to the group. The existing instantiation is only secure against passive adversaries. In this paper, we first propose an authenticated asymmetric group key agreement protocol which captures the practical security properties against active attacks. Based on our protocol, we then propose a broadcast encryption system without relying on a trusted dealer to distribute the secret keys to the users. Our system has also short ciphertexts. Furthermore, the proposal is equipped with the perfect forward security property.
Through the analysis of the certificate-less authenticated key agreement protocol with security issue of key-compromise impersonation and invalid authentication, this paper proposes an efficient protocol based on Discrete Logarithm Problem and Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem assumptions to solve the security issue and reduce the overhead. During the conversation, the two entities each have three secret values, namely, the partial private key from Key Generate Center (KGC), the long-term private key from the entity itself, and the temporary private key for each conversation generated by the entity itself. Through the theoretical analysis, this scheme provides mutual authentication, forward security and key compromise impersonation, preventing MITM attack and keeping the session key secure as long as the communication parties with a secret value is not disclosed.
In modern collaborative and distributed applications, authenticated group key agreement (AGKA) is one of the important issues. In this paper, we present that one existing certificateless AGKA protocol has some security drawbacks and does not satisfy some security attributes required for AGKA protocols. To overcome its drawbacks, we propose a secure and efficient protocol upon the initial one and a signature scheme proved secure in the random oracle model. The security analysis shows that our improved protocol can achieve Explicit key authentication, Known session key security, Known ephemeral secrets security, Perfect forward security, No key compromise impersonation, No key control and No unknown key share. With respect to efficiency, our protocol only needs three communication rounds. In each protocol run, only three pairing computations are involved for each participant.