Refutation of the Heisenberg Principle as a no-go Axiom, and Its Trivial Replacement Theorem

Colin James

Joy Christian

I identify a number of errors in Richard Gill's purported refutation (arXiv:1203.1504) of my disproof of Bell's theorem. In particular, I point out that his central argument is based, not only on a rather trivial misreading of my counterexample to Bell's theorem, but also on a simple oversight of a freedom of choice in the orientation of a Clifford algebra. What is innovative and original in my counterexample is thus mistaken for an error, at the expense of the professed universality and generality of Bell's theorem.

Horandstrasse, Jever, Germany, Ilija Barukčić

oday the so-called Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics dominated description of the physical world still denies the possibility to assign exact simultaneous values to (all) physical quantities. A prime example is claimed to be the fundamental and universal relationship between position and momentum of a particle. According to Heisenberg's quantum mechanical uncertainty principle for position and momentum, the more precisely the momentum (position) of a particle is given, the less precisely can one say what its position (momentum) is and vice versa.\nThe purpose of this publication is to provide a mathematical proof that Heisenberg's uncertainty principle for position and momentum is refuted under any circumstances. As we shall see, accept Heisenberg's uncertainty principle as valid then you must accept too that +0 = +1, which is a logical contradiction. Thus far, it is possible to derive a logical contradiction out of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle is refuted.

Andréa Oldofredi

K. Hess, Walter Philipp

We show that Mermin's reasoning against our refutation of his non-technical proof for Bell-type inequalities is of limited significance or contains mathematical inconsistencies that, when taken into account, do not permit his proof to go forward. Our refutation therefore stands.