In the history of quantum physics several no-go theorems have been proved, and many of them have played a central role in the development of the theory, such as Bell's or the Kochen-Specker theorem. A recent paper by F. Laudisa has raised reasonable doubts concerning the strategy followed in proving some of these results, since they rely on the standard framework of quantum mechanics, a theory that presents several ontological problems. The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, I intend to reinforce Laudisa's methodological point by critically discussing Malament's theorem in the context of the philosophical foundation of Quantum Field Theory; secondly, I rehabilitate Gisin's theorem showing that Laudisa's concerns do not apply to it.
I argue that our judgements regarding the locally causal models which are compatible with a given quantum no-go theorem implicitly depend, in part, on the context of inquiry. It follows from this that certain no-go theorems, which are particularly striking in the traditional foundational context, have no force when the context switches to a discussion of the physical systems we are capable of building with the aim of classically reproducing quantum statistics. I close with a general discussion of the possible implications of this for our understanding of the limits of classical description, and for our understanding of the fundamental aim of physical investigation. 1
We review a series of recent no-go theorems that extend the methodological and conceptual framework introduced by Bell's theorem to more sophisticated operational scenarios involving independent sources, quantum networks, joint measurements, and multiple observers. Many of these results were originally developed within quantum information science and are scattered across the literature, where their technical and application-driven success has partly obscured their broader foundational significance. We organize them around a common Bell-inspired methodology that extends beyond quantum nonlocality, and emphasize how increasingly rich operational structures change which physical assumptions can be tested.
I argue that our judgements regarding the locally causal models that are compatible with a given constraint implicitly depend, in part, on the context of inquiry. It follows from this that certain quantum no-go theorems, which are particularly striking in the traditional foundational context, have no force when the context switches to a discussion of the physical systems we are capable of building with the aim of classically reproducing quantum statistics. I close with a general discussion of the possible implications of this for our understanding of the limits of classical description, and for our understanding of the fundamental aim of physical investigation. 1 Introduction2 No-Go Results 2.1 The CHSH inequality 2.2 The GHZ equality3 Classically Simulating Quantum Statistics 3.1 GHZ statistics 3.2 Singlet statistics4 What Is a Classical Computer Simulation?5 Comparing the All-or-Nothing GHZ with Statistical (In)equalities6 General Discussion7 Conclusion