I argue that our judgements regarding the locally causal models that are compatible with a given constraint implicitly depend, in part, on the context of inquiry. It follows from this that certain quantum no-go theorems, which are particularly striking in the traditional foundational context, have no force when the context switches to a discussion of the physical systems we are capable of building with the aim of classically reproducing quantum statistics. I close with a general discussion of the possible implications of this for our understanding of the limits of classical description, and for our understanding of the fundamental aim of physical investigation. 1 Introduction2 No-Go Results 2.1 The CHSH inequality 2.2 The GHZ equality3 Classically Simulating Quantum Statistics 3.1 GHZ statistics 3.2 Singlet statistics4 What Is a Classical Computer Simulation?5 Comparing the All-or-Nothing GHZ with Statistical (In)equalities6 General Discussion7 Conclusion
I argue that our judgements regarding the locally causal models that are compatible with a given constraint implicitly depend, in part, on the context of inquiry. It follows from this that certain quantum no-go theorems, which are particularly striking in the traditional foundational context, have no force when the context switches to a discussion of the physical systems we are capable of building with the aim of classically reproducing quantum statistics. I close with a general discussion of the possible implications of this for our understanding of the limits of classical description, and for our understanding of the fundamental aim of physical investigation. 1 Introduction2 No-Go Results 2.1 The CHSH inequality 2.2 The GHZ equality3 Classically Simulating Quantum Statistics 3.1 GHZ statistics 3.2 Singlet statistics4 What Is a Classical Computer Simulation?5 Comparing the All-or-Nothing GHZ with Statistical (In)equalities6 General Discussion7 Conclusion
I argue that our judgements regarding the locally causal models which are compatible with a given quantum no-go theorem implicitly depend, in part, on the context of inquiry. It follows from this that certain no-go theorems, which are particularly striking in the traditional foundational context, have no force when the context switches to a discussion of the physical systems we are capable of building with the aim of classically reproducing quantum statistics. I close with a general discussion of the possible implications of this for our understanding of the limits of classical description, and for our understanding of the fundamental aim of physical investigation. 1
In the area of the foundations of quantummechanics a true industry appears to have developed in the last decades, with the aim of proving as many results as possible concerning what there cannot be in the quantum realm. In principle, the significance of proving ‘no-go’ results should consist in clarifying the fundamental structure of the theory, by pointing out a class of basic constraints that the theory itself is supposed to satisfy. In the present paper I will discuss some more recent no-go claims and I will argue against the deep significance of these results, with a two-fold strategy. First, I will consider three results concerning respectively local realism, quantum covariance and predictive power in quantum mechanics, and I will try to show how controversial the main conditions of the negative theorem turn out to be—something that strongly undermines the general relevance of these theorems. Second, I will try to discuss what I take to be a common feature of these theoretical enterprises, namely that of aiming at establishing negative results for quantum mechanics in absence of a deeper understanding of the overall ontological content and structure of the theory. I will argue that the only way toward such an understanding may be to cast in advance the problems in a clear and well-defined interpretational framework—which in my viewmeans primarily to specify the ontology that quantum theory is supposed to be about—and after to wonder whether problems that seemed worth pursuing still are so in the framework.
Bell's theorem is popularly stated as the inconsistency of quantum theory with local realism. Realism is here formalized by the ontological models framework, where elements of reality are points of a measurable space and probabilities obey the Kolmogorov axioms. In the Bell scenario, locally causal ontological models posit a common cause supporting a global valuation, a joint assignment of outcomes to all measurements at once, across incompatible contexts. Within this notion of realism, Bell's theorem makes any realist explanation of the quantum predictions conspiratorial: any mechanism, whether superluminal, superdeterministic, or retrocausal, must be finely tuned so as never to manifest operationally. We redefine realism through a new ontological framework that generalizes the standard one. The elements of reality, which we call records, are no longer points but relational parts of a point-free generalization of a topological space (sublocales of a locale). A record shared by two incompatible contexts establishes the sameness of a measurement across them, without such pairwise identities composing into a global valuation, and the common cause is then a web of such records. Within this framework, Bell's no-go theorem becomes a go theorem: local causality, restated for records, is no longer at odds with the quantum statistics. This is possible because modularity, the inclusion-exclusion law of classical probability, fails across incompatible contexts, so that the probability theory generalizes Kolmogorov's. We exhibit explicit models reproducing several quantum strategies, including the optimal CHSH violation. More broadly, locally causal models of this kind attain every Bell-CHSH value up to the algebraic maximum. A realist explanation of the quantum predictions need not be conspiratorial; every causal influence posited by these models is reflected in the operational predictions.
This paper discusses a possible resolution of the nonobjectivity-nonlocality dilemma in quantum mechanics in 'the light of experimental tests of the Bell inequality for two entangled photons and a Bell-like inequality for a single neutron. My conclusion is that these experiments show that quantum mechanics is nonobjective: that is, the values of physical observables cannot be assigned to a system before measurement. Bell's assumption of nonlocality has to be rejected as having no direct experimental confirmation, at least thus far. I also consider the relationships between nonobjectivity and contextuality. Specifically, I analyze the impact of the Kochen-Specker theorem on the problem of contextuality of quantum observables. I argue that, just as von Neumann's "no-go" theorem, the Kochen-Specker theorem is based on assumptions that do not correspond to the real physical situation. Finally, I present a theory of measurement based on a classical, purely wave model (pre-quantum classical statistical field theory), a model that reproduces quantum probabilities. In this model continuous fields are transformed into discrete clicks of detectors. While this model is classical, it is nonobjective. In this case, nonobjectivity is the result of the dependence of experimental outcomes on the context of measurement, in accordance with Bohr's view.
Among the various "no-go theorems" in the foundations of quantum mechanics, Bell inequalities are among the few, which do not implicitly rely on the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics. Instead, Bell inequalities are commonly understood to rest on Kolmogorov's theory of probability and a "locality" assumption. Physical evidence supporting their violation is hence taken as evidence against at least one of these two assumptions.
This work provides a comprehensive analysis of the physical debate on Bell inequalities from the point of view of Kolmogorov's theory of probability, focusing on the Bell-Clauser-Horn-Shimony-Holt inequality (BCHSH inequality). The central contribution is the motivation and mathematical study of the notion of contextuality in Bell experiments: in so-called contextual Bell models the detectors themselves behave randomly and the distribution of the random detector parameters depends on the chosen detector settings. It is shown how even "classical" Bell experiments motivate such a description. The need to account for contextuality was pointed out before by de la Peña, Cetto, Brody, Lochak, Bohm, Hiley and others. A broad class of contextual models is proven to satisfy the BCHSH inequality, thereby generalizing a previous result by Gill and Lambare. Nonetheless, even under strong locality requirements, contextual Bell models may violate the BCHSH inequality: based on work by Popescu and Rohrlich, we consider a "proof of concept" example exhibiting the maximum possible violation.
Contrary to the much debated "loopholes" in empirical tests of Bell inequalities, contextuality thus reveals a conceptual misunderstanding in the physical conclusions commonly drawn from Bell inequality violations.
Understanding the interface between quantum and relativistic theories is crucial for fundamental and practical advances, especially given that key physical concepts such as causality take different forms in these theories. Bell's no-go theorem reveals limits on classical processes, arising from relativistic causality principles. Considering whether similar fundamental limits exist on quantum processes, we derive no-go theorems for quantum experiments realizable in classical background spacetimes. We account for general processes allowed by quantum theory, including those with indefinite causal order (ICO), which have also been the subject of recent experiments. Our first theorem implies that realizations of ICO processes that do not violate relativistic causality must involve the nonlocalization of systems in spacetime. The second theorem shows that for any such realization of an ICO process, there exists a more fine-grained description in terms of a definite and acyclic causal order process. This enables a general reconciliation of quantum and relativistic notions of causality and, in particular, applies to experimental realizations of the quantum switch, a prominent ICO process. By showing what is impossible to achieve in classical spacetimes, these no-go results also offer insights into how causality and information processing may differ in future quantum experiments in relativistic regimes beyond classical spacetimes.