Suppose that three boys and three girls attend a party. Each boy and girl have a crush on exactly one of the three girls and three boys, respectively. The following dilemma arises: On one hand, each person thinks that if there is a mutual affection between a girl and boy, the couple should go on a date the next day. On the other hand, everyone wants to avoid the possible embarrassing situation in which their heart is broken "publicly." In this paper, we solve the dilemma using novel cards called triangle cards. The number of cards required is only six, which is minimal in the case where each player commits their input at the beginning of the protocol. We also construct multiplication and addition protocols based on triangle cards. Combining these protocols, we can securely compute any function f: {0,1,2}^n --> {0,1,2}.
Suppose that three boys and three girls attend a party. Each boy and girl have a crush on exactly one of the three girls and three boys, respectively. The following dilemma arises: On one hand, each person thinks that if there is a mutual affection between a girl and boy, the couple should go on a date the next day. On the other hand, everyone wants to avoid the possible embarrassing situation in which their heart is broken "publicly." In this paper, we solve the dilemma using novel cards called triangle cards. The number of cards required is only six, which is minimal in the case where each player commits their input at the beginning of the protocol. We also construct multiplication and addition protocols based on triangle cards. Combining these protocols, we can securely compute any function f: {0,1,2}^n --> {0,1,2}.
Abstract Card-based cryptography is a secure computation protocol realized by using physical cards. There are two models on card-based cryptography: public and private models. We adopt private one that allows players to handle cards privately. While much of the existing works for card-based cryptography use two-colored cards, it is also a vital task to construct an efficient protocol with playing cards. In the public model, 2n cards are necessary for any n-bit input protocol since at least two cards are required to express a Boolean value. It holds true for both two-colored and playing-card settings. On the other hand, the private model enables us to construct a protocol with fewer than 2n cards. However, all existing protocols that achieve such properties are only in the two-colored setting. This paper shows that the private model enables us to construct a protocol with fewer than 2n cards using the playing cards. We first show two-bit input protocols with fewer than four cards for logical operations, AND, OR, and XOR. Furthermore, we show a three-input majority voting protocol using only three cards, which is constructed by combining our AND and OR protocols. Notably, our proposed protocols require no randomness. All operations are deterministic and depend only on players’ private inputs.
Abstract Card-based cryptography is a variant of multi-party computation using physical cards like playing cards. There are two models on card-based cryptography, called public and private models. The public model assumes that all operations are executed publicly, while the private model allows the players private operations called private permutations (PP, for short). Much of the existing card-based protocols were developed under the public model. Under the public model, 2ncards are necessary for every protocol withn-bit input since at least two cards are required to express a bit. In this paper, we proposen-bit input protocols with fewer than 2ncards by utilizing PP, which shows the power of PP. In particular, we show that a protocol for (n-bit input) threshold function can be realized with only n+1 n+1 cards by reducing the threshold function to the majority voting. Toward this end, we first offer that two-bit input protocols for logic gates can be realized with fewer than four cards. Furthermore, we construct a new protocol for three-input majority voting with only four cards by observing the relationship between AND/OR operations. This protocol can be easily extended to more participants, and to the protocol for threshold functions.
It is known that, using just a deck of cards, an arbitrary number of parties with private inputs can securely compute the output of any function of their inputs. In 2009, Mizuki and Sone constructed a six-card COPY protocol, a four-card XOR protocol, and a six-card AND protocol, based on a commonly used encoding scheme in which each input bit is encoded using two cards. However, up until now, there are no known results to construct a set of COPY, XOR, and AND protocols based on a two-card-per-bit encoding scheme, which all can be implemented using only four cards. In this paper, we show that it is possible to construct four-card COPY, XOR, and AND protocols using polarizing plates as cards and a corresponding two-card-per-bit encoding scheme. Our protocols use a minimum number of cards in the setting of two-card-per-bit encoding schemes since four cards are always required to encode the inputs. Moreover, we show that it is possible to construct two-card COPY, two-card XOR, and three-card AND protocols based on a one-card-per-bit encoding scheme using a common reference polarizer which is a polarizing material accessible to all parties.
We consider a problem, which we call secure grouping, of dividing a number of parties into some subsets (groups) in the following manner: Each party has to know the other members of his/her group, while he/she may not know anything about how the remaining parties are divided (except for certain public predetermined constraints, such as the number of parties in each group). In this paper, we construct an information-theoretically secure protocol using a deck of physical cards to solve the problem, which is jointly executable by the parties themselves without a trusted third party. Despite the non-triviality and the potential usefulness of the secure grouping, our proposed protocol is fairly simple to describe and execute. Our protocol is based on algebraic properties of conjugate permutations. A key ingredient of our protocol is our new techniques to apply multiplication and inverse operations to hidden permutations (i.e., those encoded by using face-down cards), which would be of independent interest and would have various potential applications.
Consider a group of people who want to know the “rich list” among them, namely the ranking in terms of their total assets, without revealing any information about the actual value of their assets. This can be achieved by a “secure ranking computation,” which was first considered by Jiang and Gong (2006) [2]; they constructed a secure ranking computation protocol based on a public-key cryptosystem. In this paper, instead of using a public-key cryptosystem, we use a deck of physical cards to provide secure ranking computation protocols. Therefore, our card-based protocols do not rely on computers, and they are simple and easy for humans to implement. Specifically, we design four protocols considering tradeoffs between the number of cards and the number of shuffles required to execute the protocols. We also present a guide to choose an appropriate protocol according to the number of people participating in the protocol and the size of the input range. To be precise, whereas our protocols make all players know the rich list, the Jiang–Gong scheme makes each player know his/her rank only; to achieve the same task (as the Jiang–Gong scheme) using a deck of cards is an intriguing open problem.
In card-based cryptography, a commitment to a Boolean value is usually represented by two face-down cards of different colors or numbers, whose order specifies the one-bit value (namely, 0 or 1). One of the most important primitives in card-based cryptography is a "copy protocol," which is supposed to make two identical copies of a given commitment. In the literature, there are several copy protocols, which can be categorized by kinds of shuffles they use; this paper focuses on those using only the so-called random cut, which is the simplest shuffle, and we propose two copy protocols that are more efficient than the existing ones. Specifically, we first work on a standard deck of cards and design a six-card copy protocol using three random cuts (on average). Since the previous protocol needs 5.5 random cuts, our protocol improves upon it. Next, we shift our attention to the case of a two-colored deck of cards, and construct a six-card copy protocol using three random cuts (on average). Because the previous protocol requires eight cards, our protocol uses two cards fewer than the previous one (although it uses one more shuffle). In addition, going back to the standard-deck setting, we provide a four-card XOR protocol using only one random cut for the first time.