We have developed a new dynamical theory that describes deterministic phenomena of very large scale of matter and the seemingly indeterministic experimental results on very small scale of matter in equal footing. This is done by introducing a new non-local ontological quantity, namely matter's knowledge on its own local position-beable. The matter's knowledge is given uniquely by a new non-local beable called "imaginability". The latter is an ontological concept giving a degree of imagination that the matter "could have" state than it actually has, replacing the conventional epistemological concept of probability. The classical objective notion of trajectories are given a new spirit. The classical mechanics turns out to its special case, whereas the Schrodinger's equation is recovered by neglecting sub-quantum fluctuations of the order of $\\hbar^2$. All the quantum mechanical results on spectrum of energy is confirmed. Furthermore, the Dirac-Von Newmann projection postulate is given a physical objective mechanism in term of a single experiment, and the Born's probability rule is given a derivation. Finally we show that our dynamical theory can be considered as a combination between the classical mechanics and the thermodynamics had it applies to a single particle.
We have developed a new dynamical theory that describes deterministic phenomena of very large scale of matter and the seemingly indeterministic experimental results on very small scale of matter in equal footing. This is done by introducing a new non-local ontological quantity, namely matter's knowledge on its own local position-beable. The matter's knowledge is given uniquely by a new non-local beable called "imaginability". The latter is an ontological concept giving a degree of imagination that the matter "could have" state than it actually has, replacing the conventional epistemological concept of probability. The classical objective notion of trajectories are given a new spirit. The classical mechanics turns out to its special case, whereas the Schrodinger's equation is recovered by neglecting sub-quantum fluctuations of the order of hbar2. All the quantum mechanical results on spectrum of energy is confirmed. Furthermore, the Dirac-Von Newmann projection postulate is given a physical objective mechanism in term of a single experiment, and the Born's probability rule is given a derivation. Finally we show that our dynamical theory can be considered as a combination between the classical mechanics and the thermodynamics had it applies to a single particle.
In this paper we shall develop a hidden-beable theory which not only reproduce all the predictions of quantum mechanics but also gives an objective-ontological derivations to all postulates that give the foundation of the quantum mechanics. This is done by assuming that the state of a single system can be described completely by two complementary irreducible primitive realities: First is system's position and orientation which serve as local and explicit beables, and second is a new, hidden and global beable named "system's imaginability". System's imaginability is defined as degree of imagination attached to the system that it "could have" other states than it actually has. It is thus of ontological nature which refers to a single system, replacing the conventional epistemological concept of probability which tells the relative frequency of occurrence of various events in an ensemble of systems. We then derive a dynamical equation from which neglecting subquantum fluctuations of the order of \\hbar^2 will lead to the Schrodinger equation in configuration space. An objective measurement theory without observer is then developed, by introducing a new notion of "a controllable apparatus". The superposition principle, Dirac-von Neumann projection postulate and Born's probability rule will be given an objective derivation. Finally we shall prove that the new dynamics fits Einstein's locality postulate in a very simple manner.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
A history of the discovery of quantum mechanics and paradoxes of its interpretation is reconsidered from the modern point of view of quantum stochastics and information. It is argued that in the orthodox quantum mechanics there is no place for quantum phenomenology such as events. The development of quantum measurement theory, initiated by von Neumann, and Bell's conceptual critics of hidden variable theories indicated a possibility for resolution of this crisis. This can be done by divorcing the algebra of the dynamical generators and an extended algebra of the potential (quantum) and the actual (classical) observables. The latter, called beables, form the center of the algebra of all observables, as the only visible (macroscopic) observables must be compatible with any hidden (microscopic) observable. It is shown that within this approach quantum causality can be rehabilitated within an extended quantum mechanics (eventum mechanics) in the form of a superselection rule for compatibility of the consistent histories with the statistically predictable future. The application of this rule in the form of the nondemolition principle leads to the statistical inference of the von Neumann projection postulate, and also to the more general quantum information dynamics for instantaneous events, spontaneous localizations (i.e. quantum jumps), and state diffusions (i.e. continuous trajectories). This gives a dynamical solution, in the form of a Dirac boundary value problem and reduced filtering equations, of the notorious decoherence and measurement problems which was tackled unsuccessfully by many famous mathematicians and physicists starting with von Neumann, Schroedinger and Bohr.
An interpretation of quantum mechanics in terms of classical concepts, ``beables,'' due to de Broglie, Bohm, and Bell (BBB) is generalized and further developed. By assuming that all physical quantities take discrete values on sufficiently small scales, we can use this interpretation to give trajectories for all possible quantities, including the position of a particle, its spin, etc. When applied to position, it is shown that, in the continuum limit, this interpretation reduces to the causal one of Bohm. As an illustration, the BBB trajectories are computed explicitly in two simple models.
A history of the discovery of `new' quantum mechanics and the paradoxes of its probabilistic interpretation are briefly reviewed from the modern point of view of quantum probability and information. Modern quantum theory, which has been developed during the last 20 years for the treatment of quantum open systems including quantum noise, decoherence, quantum diffusions and spontaneous jumps occurring under continuous in time observation, is not yet a part of the standard curriculum of quantum physics. It is argued that the conventional formalism of quantum mechanics is insufficient for the description of quantum events, such as spontaneous decays say, and the new experimental phenomena related to individual quantum measurements, but they have all received an adequate mathematical treatment in quantum stochastics of open systems. Moreover, the only reasonable probabilistic interpretation of quantum mechanics put forward by Max Born was, in fact, in irreconcilable contradiction with traditional mechanical reality and causality. This led to numerous quantum paradoxes, some of them due to the great inventors of quantum theory such as Einstein and Schrödinger. They are reconsidered in this paper from the modern point of view of quantum stochastics and information. The development of quantum measurement theory, initiated by von Neumann, indicated a possibility for resolution of this interpretational crisis by divorcing the algebra of the dynamical generators and the algebra of the actual observables, or Bell's be ables. It is shown that within this approach quantum causality can be rehabilitated in the form of a superselection rule for compatibility of the actual histories with the potential future. This rule, together with the self-compatibility of the measurements ensuring the consistency of the histories, is called the nondemolition, or causality principle in modern quantum theory. The application of this rule in the form of dynamical commutation relations leads to the derivation of the von Neumann projection postulate, and also to the more general reductions, instantaneous, spontaneous, and even continuous in time. This gives a dynamical solution, in the form of the quantum stochastic filtering equations, of the notorious measurement problem which was tackled unsuccessfully by many famous physicists starting with Schrödinger and Bohr. It has been recently proved that the quantum stochastic model for the continuous in time measurements is equivalent to a Dirac type boundary-value problem for the secondary quantized input `offer waves from future' in one extra dimension, and to a reduction of the algebra of the consistent histories of past events to an Abelian subalgebra for the `trajectories of the output particles'. This supports the corpuscular-wave duality in the form of the thesis that everything in the future are quantized waves, while everything in the past are trajectories of the recorded particles.
The contemporary scientific and technological progress has been given fully by the results of classical mechanics from the 19th century when the so called European values were accepted practically by the whole educated world. The given results and conclusions were gained on the basis of causal ontological approach proposed in principle by Socrates and developed further by Aristotle. This approach has been, however, fully extruded by phenomenological approach (causality not required) in the 20th century, which has disallowed practically any further actual scientific progress. Three very different theories have been applied to physical reality: classical mechanics in standard macroscopic region, Copenhagen quantum mechanics in microscopic region, and special theory of reality (STR) in both the regions in the case of systems consisting of objects having high velocity values. Any explanation or description of transitions between different regions and between different theories have not been provided until now. The situation has been complicated when the existence of inertial mass increase with rising velocity (predicted by STR) was affirmed in the first half of the past century, while any more detailed comparison with experiment data has not been presented. In this paper this knowledge evolution in the modern period will be described. It will be shown, too, that some mistaking assumptions and statements contradicting to the earlier successful causal ontological approach have existed in the contemporary scientific system. It will be then demonstrated that practically all known knowledge pieces may be described by one common theory based on slightly generalized Hamilton equations for all regions of reality. All known observed characteristics of physical reality may be described in such a case on the basis of the causal ontological approach.