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Cambridge University Press eBooks

Ontology for Relativistic Collapse Theories

Wayne C. Myrvold

Published Apr 11, 2019• 9 citations
Publisher

Abstract

If some sort of dynamical collapse theory is correct, what might the world be like? Can a theory of that sort be a quantum state monist theory, or must such theories supplement the quantum state ontology with additional beables? In a previous work (Myrvold 2018), I defended quantum state monism, with a distributional ontology along the lines advocated by Philip Pearle. In this chapter the account is extended to collapse theories in relativistic spacetimes.

DOI
10.1017/9781108562218.003

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If some sort of dynamical collapse theory is correct, what might the world be like? Can a theory of that sort be a quantum state monist theory, or must such theories supplement the quantum state ontology with additional beables? In a previous work (Myrvold 2018), I defended quantum state monism, with a distributional ontology along the lines advocated by Philip Pearle. In this chapter the account is extended to collapse theories in relativistic spacetimes.
In this chapter, I will discuss what it takes for a dynamical collapse theory to provide a reasonable description of the actual world. I will start with discussions of what is required, in general, of the ontology of a physical theory, and then apply it to the quantum case. One issue of interest is whether a collapse theory can be a quantum state monist theory, adding nothing to the quantum state and changing only its dynamics. Although this was one of the motivations for advancing such theories, its viability has been questioned, and it has been argued that, in order to provide an account of the world, a collapse theory must supplement the quantum state with additional ontology, making such theories more like hidden-variables theories than would first appear. I will make a case for quantum state monism as an adequate ontology, and, indeed, the only sensible ontology for collapse theories. This will involve taking dynamical variables to possess, not sharp values, as in classical physics, but distributions of values.
Nonrelativistic quantum mechanics is conceptually and mathematically simpler, and does, after all, work very well in a low-energy regime. Any solution of the measurement problem, or any account of the ontology of quantum theory, must yield sensible results in this regime, and so nonrelativistic quantum mechanics can serve as a testing ground for the viability of interpretations. On any approach, empirical adequacy requires recovery of at least an approximation to the quantum probabilities for outcomes of experiments, insofar as these have been verified by experiment. A quantum-mechanical theory is what results when one subjects a classical theory of a system with finitely many degrees of freedom to quantization. The task of extending additional beables theories to the context of quantum field theories remains a work in progress. A dynamical collapse theory modifies the evolution of the quantum state. Standard quantum theory predicts correlations between outcomes of spacelike separated experiments that violate Bell inequalities.
This chapter, from the Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Physics (Eleanor Knox and Alastair Wilson, eds., 2021), is an overview of the constraints that relativity places on interpretations of quantum theory. It focuses on four main avenues of approach: (i) additional beables theories, which include "hidden-variables" theories and modal interpretations, (ii) dynamical collapse theories, (iii) Everettian, or "many-worlds" interpretations, and (iv) non-realist interpretations, which deny that quantum states represent anything in physical reality independent of considerations of agents and their beliefs.
Spontaneous collapse theories provide a promising solution to the measurement problem. But they also introduce a number of problems of their own concerning dimensionality, vagueness, and locality. In response to these problems, advocates of collapse theories have proposed various accounts of the primitive ontology of collapse theories—postulated underlying entities governed by the collapse theory and underwriting our observations. The most prominent of these are a mass density distribution over three-dimensional space, and a set of discrete “flash” events at space-time points. My argument here is that these primitive ontologies are redundant, in the sense that the structures exhibited by the primitive ontologies that allow them to solve the problems facing spontaneous collapse theories are also present in the wave function. But redundancy is not nonexistence; indeed, the fact that the relevant structures are already there in the wave function shows that the mass density ontology and the flash ontology exist whether they are explicitly postulated or not. By the same token, there is no need to decide between a wave function ontology, a mass density ontology and a flash ontology.
Collapse theories are versions of quantum mechanics according to which the collapse of the wave function is a real physical process. They propose precise mathematical laws to govern this process and to replace the vague conventional prescription that a collapse occurs whenever an "observer" makes a "measurement." The "primitive ontology" of a theory (more or less what Bell called the "local beables") are the variables in the theory that represent matter in space-time. There is no consensus about whether collapse theories need to introduce a primitive ontology as part of their definition. I make some remarks on this question and point out that certain paradoxes about collapse theories are absent if a primitive ontology is introduced.
A picture of dynamical collapse of the wave function which is relativistic and time symmetric is presented. The part of the model which exhibits these features is the set of collapse outcomes. These play the role of matter distributed in space and time. It is argued that the dynamically collapsing quantum state, which is both foliation dependent and follows a time-asymmetric dynamics, is not fundamental: it represents a state of information about the past matter distribution for the purpose of estimating the future matter distribution. It is also argued from the point of view of collapse models that both special and general relativistic considerations point towards a discrete spacetime structure and that gravity may not need to be quantised to give a theory that is consistent with quantum matter.