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Bulletin of the American Physical Society

The Ironic Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Theory

Matthew Leifer

Published Mar 7, 2018• 0 citations
OpenAlex

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Infinite Mirror Hypothesis v1.0

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The Infinite Mirror Hypothesis questions the collapse of self-identity that occurs when the logic of the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI)—which claims that "all possibilities are realized"—is taken to its ultimate conclusion. In the Many-Worlds Interpretation, the universe branches infinitely at every choice and every moment. As a result, the existence of "I" is infinitely duplicated, reflecting endlessly like images in a mirror. Starting from the simple question "Why don't time travelers from the future come to us?", this hypothesis points out that while the Many-Worlds Interpretation is "a theory that affirms everything," it is actually "a theory that can specify nothing." Keywords: Many-Worlds Interpretation, Self-Identity, Time Travel, Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, Philosophy

•Nov 6, 2025•0 citations
This thesis takes a look at the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) and discusses if it can become the leading interpretation of quantum mechanics. Firstly the Copenhagen interpretation is outlined and its issues relating to the measurement problem are discussed while taking recent insights in decoherence theory into account. Establishing that wave-function collapse still yields interpretational issues, I discuss the ideas of Hugh Everett, who proposed the many-worlds interpretation, and David Wallace who is a prominent advocate of the MWI. In particular I discuss and review Wallace's arguments in favor of viewing the wave-function and the many worlds realistically. The next part shortly focuses on the testability of the many-worlds interpretation and the philosophical and theoretical issues relating to probability in the MWI. I end by concluding that the no-collapse interpretations are preferable to the Copenhagen interpretation, and I argue in favor of a realistic view towards all of the worlds. Furthermore, I conclude that standard textbooks on quantum mechanics should be updated to introduce students to the insight that wave-function collapse isn't needed in forming a complete theory of quantum mechanics.
The Infinite Mirror Hypothesis questions the collapse of self-identity that occurs when the logic of the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI)—which claims that "all possibilities are realized"—is taken to its ultimate conclusion. In the Many-Worlds Interpretation, the universe branches infinitely at every choice and every moment. As a result, the existence of "I" is infinitely duplicated, reflecting endlessly like images in a mirror. Starting from the simple question "Why don't time travelers from the future come to us?", this hypothesis points out that while the Many-Worlds Interpretation is "a theory that affirms everything," it is actually "a theory that can specify nothing." Keywords: Many-Worlds Interpretation, Self-Identity, Time Travel, Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, Philosophy