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Princeton University Press eBooks

The Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Published Mar 25, 2025• 12 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.2307/jj.28248892

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This thesis takes a look at the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) and discusses if it can become the leading interpretation of quantum mechanics. Firstly the Copenhagen interpretation is outlined and its issues relating to the measurement problem are discussed while taking recent insights in decoherence theory into account. Establishing that wave-function collapse still yields interpretational issues, I discuss the ideas of Hugh Everett, who proposed the many-worlds interpretation, and David Wallace who is a prominent advocate of the MWI. In particular I discuss and review Wallace's arguments in favor of viewing the wave-function and the many worlds realistically. The next part shortly focuses on the testability of the many-worlds interpretation and the philosophical and theoretical issues relating to probability in the MWI. I end by concluding that the no-collapse interpretations are preferable to the Copenhagen interpretation, and I argue in favor of a realistic view towards all of the worlds. Furthermore, I conclude that standard textbooks on quantum mechanics should be updated to introduce students to the insight that wave-function collapse isn't needed in forming a complete theory of quantum mechanics.

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The relative states and many-world interpretations of quantum mechanics and the EPR problem

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The basic contributions to the concept of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics are analysed. It is found necessary to divide them into two classes corresponding to (a) the relative-states interpretation (RSI), which avoids problems of measurement, but is found generally unconvincing, and (b) the many-worlds interpretation (MWI), which is more comprehensible, but has all the problems of the von Neumann scheme. The EPR problem is tackled using each interpretation. The RSI finds no problem, while the MWI meets the same difficulties as conventional interpretations.

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This thesis takes a look at the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) and discusses if it can become the leading interpretation of quantum mechanics. Firstly the Copenhagen interpretation is outlined and its issues relating to the measurement problem are discussed while taking recent insights in decoherence theory into account. Establishing that wave-function collapse still yields interpretational issues, I discuss the ideas of Hugh Everett, who proposed the many-worlds interpretation, and David Wallace who is a prominent advocate of the MWI. In particular I discuss and review Wallace's arguments in favor of viewing the wave-function and the many worlds realistically. The next part shortly focuses on the testability of the many-worlds interpretation and the philosophical and theoretical issues relating to probability in the MWI. I end by concluding that the no-collapse interpretations are preferable to the Copenhagen interpretation, and I argue in favor of a realistic view towards all of the worlds. Furthermore, I conclude that standard textbooks on quantum mechanics should be updated to introduce students to the insight that wave-function collapse isn't needed in forming a complete theory of quantum mechanics.
The basic contributions to the concept of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics are analysed. It is found necessary to divide them into two classes corresponding to (a) the relative-states interpretation (RSI), which avoids problems of measurement, but is found generally unconvincing, and (b) the many-worlds interpretation (MWI), which is more comprehensible, but has all the problems of the von Neumann scheme. The EPR problem is tackled using each interpretation. The RSI finds no problem, while the MWI meets the same difficulties as conventional interpretations.