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Lecture notes in computer science

Topology-Hiding Computation Beyond Semi-Honest Adversaries

Rio LaVigne, Chen-Da Liu-Zhang, Ueli M. Maurer, Tal Moran, Marta Mularczyk, Daniel Tschudi

Published Jan 1, 2018• 13 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-03810-6_1

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Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC) is one of the foundational achievements of modern cryptog-raphy, allowing multiple, distrusting, parties to jointly compute a function of their inputs, while revealing nothing but the output of the function. Following the seminal works of Yao and Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson and Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson, the study of MPC has expanded to consider a wide variety of questions, including variants in the attack model, underlying assumptions, complexity and composability of the resulting protocols. One question that appears to have received very little attention, however, is that of MPC over an underlying communication network whose structure is, in itself, sensitive information. This question, in addition to being of pure theoretical interest, arises naturally in many contexts: designing privacy-preserving social-networks, private peer-to-peer computations, vehicle-to-vehicle networks and the “in-ternet of things ” are some of the examples. In this paper, we initiate the study of “topology-hiding computation ” in the computational setting. We give formal definitions in both simulation-based and indistinguishability-based flavors. We show that, even for fail-stop adversaries, there are some strong impossibility results. Despite this, we show that protocols for topology-hiding computation can be constructed in the semi-honest and fail-stop models, if we somewhat restrict the set of nodes the adversary may corrupt.

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A Note on the Relation between the Definitions of Security for Semi-Honest and Malicious Adversaries.

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In secure computation, a set of parties wish to jointly compute some function of their private inputs while preserving security properties like privacy, correctness and more. The two main adversary models that have been considered are semi-honest adversaries who follow the prescribed protocol but try to glean more information than allowed from the protocol transcript, and malicious adversaries who can run any efficient strategy in order to carry out their attack. As such they can deviate at will from the prescribed protocol. One would naturally expect that any protocol that is secure in the presence of malicious adversaries will automatically be secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries. However, due to a technicality in the definition, this is not necessarily true. In this brief note, we explain why this is the case, and show that a slight modification to the definition of semi-honest adversaries (specifically, allowing a semi-honest adversary to change its received input) suffices for fixing this anomaly. Our aim in publishing this note is to make this curious fact more known to the wider cryptographic community. 1 Malicious Versus Semi-honest Adversaries

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Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC) is one of the foundational achievements of modern cryptog-raphy, allowing multiple, distrusting, parties to jointly compute a function of their inputs, while revealing nothing but the output of the function. Following the seminal works of Yao and Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson and Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson, the study of MPC has expanded to consider a wide variety of questions, including variants in the attack model, underlying assumptions, complexity and composability of the resulting protocols. One question that appears to have received very little attention, however, is that of MPC over an underlying communication network whose structure is, in itself, sensitive information. This question, in addition to being of pure theoretical interest, arises naturally in many contexts: designing privacy-preserving social-networks, private peer-to-peer computations, vehicle-to-vehicle networks and the “in-ternet of things ” are some of the examples. In this paper, we initiate the study of “topology-hiding computation ” in the computational setting. We give formal definitions in both simulation-based and indistinguishability-based flavors. We show that, even for fail-stop adversaries, there are some strong impossibility results. Despite this, we show that protocols for topology-hiding computation can be constructed in the semi-honest and fail-stop models, if we somewhat restrict the set of nodes the adversary may corrupt.
In secure computation, a set of parties wish to jointly compute some function of their private inputs while preserving security properties like privacy, correctness and more. The two main adversary models that have been considered are semi-honest adversaries who follow the prescribed protocol but try to glean more information than allowed from the protocol transcript, and malicious adversaries who can run any efficient strategy in order to carry out their attack. As such they can deviate at will from the prescribed protocol. One would naturally expect that any protocol that is secure in the presence of malicious adversaries will automatically be secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries. However, due to a technicality in the definition, this is not necessarily true. In this brief note, we explain why this is the case, and show that a slight modification to the definition of semi-honest adversaries (specifically, allowing a semi-honest adversary to change its received input) suffices for fixing this anomaly. Our aim in publishing this note is to make this curious fact more known to the wider cryptographic community. 1 Malicious Versus Semi-honest Adversaries