Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security

Secure Identification for Wiretap Channels; Robustness, Super-Additivity and Continuity

Holger Boche, Christian Deppe

Published Jan 23, 2018• 65 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We determine the identification capacity of compound channels in the presence of a wiretapper. It turns out that the secure identification capacity formula fulfills a dichotomy theorem: It is positive and equals the identification capacity of the channel if its message transmission secrecy capacity is positive. Otherwise, the secure identification capacity is zero. Thus, we show in the case that the secure identification capacity is greater than zero we do not pay a price for secure identification, i.e., the secure identification capacity is equal to the identification capacity. This is in strong contrast to the transmission capacity of the compound wiretap channel. We then use this characterization to investigate the analytic behavior of the secure identification capacity. In particular, it is practically relevant to investigate its continuity behavior as a function of the channels. We completely characterize this continuity behavior. We analyze the (dis-) continuity and (super-) additivity of the capacities. In 1998, N. Alon gave a conjecture about maximal violation for the additivity of capacity functions in graphs. We show that this maximal violation as well holds for the secure identification capacity of compound wiretap channels. This is the first example of a capacity function exhibiting this behavior.

DOI
10.1109/tifs.2018.2797004

Related papers

Robust and secure identification

Holger Boche, Christian Deppe

We determine the identification capacity of compound channels with and without wiretapper. It turned out, that the secure capacity formula fulfill a dichotomy theorem. It is positive if its secure capacity is positive and equals the transmission capacity of the channel. Otherwise the capacity is zero. We analyze the (dis-)continuity and (super-)additivity of the capacities, which we determined. Alon gave in [6] a conjecture about maximal violation for the additivity for capacity functions. We show that this maximal violation holds for the secure identification capacity. This is the first example of a capacity function, which has this behavior.

IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)•Jun 1, 2017•8 citations

Secure and Robust Identification via Classical-Quantum Channels

Holger Boche, Christian Deppe, Andreas Winter

We study the identification capacity of classical-quantum channels (“cq-channels”) under channel uncertainty and privacy constraints. To be precise, we first consider compound memoryless cq-channels and determine their identification capacity; then we add an eavesdropper by considering compound memoryless wiretap cqq-channels, and determine their secret identification capacity. In the first case (without privacy), we find the identification capacity always equal to the transmission capacity. In the second case, we find a dichotomy: either the secrecy capacity (also known as private capacity) of the channel is zero, and then the secrecy identification capacity is also zero, or the secrecy capacity is positive and then the secrecy identification capacity equals the transmission capacity of the main channel without the wiretapper. We perform the same analysis for the case of arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channels (cqq-AVWC) with analogous findings, and make several observations regarding the continuity and super-additivity of the identification capacity in the latter case.

arXiv:1801.09967•IEEE Transactions on Information Theory•Jun 5, 2019•24 citations

Secure and Robust Identification via Classical-Quantum Channels

Holger Boche, Christian Deppe, Andreas Winter

We study the identification capacity of classical-quantum channels (“cq-channels”), under channel uncertainty and privacy constraints. To be precise, we consider first compound memoryless cq-channels and determine their identification capacity; then we add an eavesdropper, considering compound memoryless wiretap cqq-channels, and determine their secret identification capacity. In the first case (without privacy), we find the identification capacity always equal to the transmission capacity. In the second case, we find a dichotomy: either the secrecy capacity (also known as private capacity) of the channel is zero, and then also the secrecy identification capacity is zero, or the secrecy capacity is positive and then the secrecy identification capacity equals the transmission capacity of the main channel without the wiretapper. We perform the same analysis for the case of arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channels (cqq-AVWC), with analogous findings, and make several observations regarding the continuity and super-additivity of the identification capacity in the latter case.

IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)•Jun 1, 2018•4 citations

Super-activation as a unique feature of arbitrarily varying wiretap channels

Rafael F. Schaefer, Holger Boche, H. Vincent Poor

The question of additivity of the capacity of a channel goes back to Shannon who asked this for the zero error capacity function. Despite the common sense that the capacity is usually additive, there is surprisingly little known for non-trivial channels. This paper addresses this question for the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel (AVWC) which models secure communication in the presence of arbitrarily varying channel (AVC) conditions. For orthogonal AVWCs it has been shown that the non-additivity phenomenon of super-activation occurs; that is, there are orthogonal AVWCs, each having zero secrecy capacity, which allow for transmission with positive secrecy rate if they are used together. It is shown that for such orthogonal AVWCs super-activation is generic in the sense that whenever super-activation is possible, it is possible for all AVWCs in a certain neighborhood as well. Moreover, it is shown that the issue of super-activation and the continuity of the secrecy capacity solely depend on the legitimate link. Accordingly, the single-user AVC is studied and it is shown that in this case, super-activation for non-secure message transmission is not possible, making it a unique feature of secure communication over AVWCs. However, the capacity for message transmission of the single-user AVC is shown to be super-additive including a complete characterization.

IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)•Jul 1, 2016•9 citations

On the Continuity of the Secrecy Capacity of Compound and Arbitrarily Varying Wiretap Channels

Holger Boche, Rafael F. Schaefer, H. Vincent Poor

The wiretap channel models secure communication between two users in the presence of an eavesdropper who must be kept ignorant of transmitted messages. The performance of such a system is usually characterized by its secrecy capacity which determines the maximum transmission rate of secure communication. In this paper, the issue of whether or not the secrecy capacity is a continuous function of the system parameters is examined. In particular, this is done for channel uncertainty modeled via compound channels and arbitrarily varying channels, in which the legitimate users know only that the true channel realization is from a prespecified uncertainty set. In the former model, this realization remains constant for the entire duration of transmission, while in the latter the realization varies from channel use to channel use in an unknown and arbitrary manner. These models not only capture the case of channel uncertainty, but are also suitable for modeling scenarios in which a malicious adversary jams or otherwise influences the legitimate transmission. The secrecy capacity of the compound wiretap channel is shown to be robust in the sense that it is a continuous function of the uncertainty set. Thus, small variations in the uncertainty set lead to small variations in secrecy capacity. On the other hand, the deterministic secrecy capacity of the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel is shown to be discontinuous in the uncertainty set meaning that small variations can lead to dramatic losses in capacity.

arXiv:1409.4752•IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security•Aug 13, 2015•51 citations

Secure identification under jamming attacks

Holger Boche, Christian Deppe

In next generation connectivity systems, relying on robust and low-latency information exchange, there exists communication tasks in which the Ahlswede/Dueck identification scheme is much more efficient than Shannon's transmission scheme. We concentrate on the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel (AVWC) modeling jamming attacks. We provide a coding scheme for secure identification and determine the secrecy capacity of the AVWC. Furthermore, we analyze important properties of this capacity function, e.g. continuity and super-additivity.

IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security•Dec 1, 2017•6 citations
We determine the identification capacity of compound channels in the presence of a wiretapper. It turns out that the secure identification capacity formula fulfills a dichotomy theorem: It is positive and equals the identification capacity of the channel if its message transmission secrecy capacity is positive. Otherwise, the secure identification capacity is zero. Thus, we show in the case that the secure identification capacity is greater than zero we do not pay a price for secure identification, i.e., the secure identification capacity is equal to the identification capacity. This is in strong contrast to the transmission capacity of the compound wiretap channel. We then use this characterization to investigate the analytic behavior of the secure identification capacity. In particular, it is practically relevant to investigate its continuity behavior as a function of the channels. We completely characterize this continuity behavior. We analyze the (dis-) continuity and (super-) additivity of the capacities. In 1998, N. Alon gave a conjecture about maximal violation for the additivity of capacity functions in graphs. We show that this maximal violation as well holds for the secure identification capacity of compound wiretap channels. This is the first example of a capacity function exhibiting this behavior.
We determine the identification capacity of compound channels with and without wiretapper. It turned out, that the secure capacity formula fulfill a dichotomy theorem. It is positive if its secure capacity is positive and equals the transmission capacity of the channel. Otherwise the capacity is zero. We analyze the (dis-)continuity and (super-)additivity of the capacities, which we determined. Alon gave in [6] a conjecture about maximal violation for the additivity for capacity functions. We show that this maximal violation holds for the secure identification capacity. This is the first example of a capacity function, which has this behavior.
We study the identification capacity of classical-quantum channels (“cq-channels”) under channel uncertainty and privacy constraints. To be precise, we first consider compound memoryless cq-channels and determine their identification capacity; then we add an eavesdropper by considering compound memoryless wiretap cqq-channels, and determine their secret identification capacity. In the first case (without privacy), we find the identification capacity always equal to the transmission capacity. In the second case, we find a dichotomy: either the secrecy capacity (also known as private capacity) of the channel is zero, and then the secrecy identification capacity is also zero, or the secrecy capacity is positive and then the secrecy identification capacity equals the transmission capacity of the main channel without the wiretapper. We perform the same analysis for the case of arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channels (cqq-AVWC) with analogous findings, and make several observations regarding the continuity and super-additivity of the identification capacity in the latter case.
We study the identification capacity of classical-quantum channels (“cq-channels”), under channel uncertainty and privacy constraints. To be precise, we consider first compound memoryless cq-channels and determine their identification capacity; then we add an eavesdropper, considering compound memoryless wiretap cqq-channels, and determine their secret identification capacity. In the first case (without privacy), we find the identification capacity always equal to the transmission capacity. In the second case, we find a dichotomy: either the secrecy capacity (also known as private capacity) of the channel is zero, and then also the secrecy identification capacity is zero, or the secrecy capacity is positive and then the secrecy identification capacity equals the transmission capacity of the main channel without the wiretapper. We perform the same analysis for the case of arbitrarily varying wiretap cqq-channels (cqq-AVWC), with analogous findings, and make several observations regarding the continuity and super-additivity of the identification capacity in the latter case.
The question of additivity of the capacity of a channel goes back to Shannon who asked this for the zero error capacity function. Despite the common sense that the capacity is usually additive, there is surprisingly little known for non-trivial channels. This paper addresses this question for the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel (AVWC) which models secure communication in the presence of arbitrarily varying channel (AVC) conditions. For orthogonal AVWCs it has been shown that the non-additivity phenomenon of super-activation occurs; that is, there are orthogonal AVWCs, each having zero secrecy capacity, which allow for transmission with positive secrecy rate if they are used together. It is shown that for such orthogonal AVWCs super-activation is generic in the sense that whenever super-activation is possible, it is possible for all AVWCs in a certain neighborhood as well. Moreover, it is shown that the issue of super-activation and the continuity of the secrecy capacity solely depend on the legitimate link. Accordingly, the single-user AVC is studied and it is shown that in this case, super-activation for non-secure message transmission is not possible, making it a unique feature of secure communication over AVWCs. However, the capacity for message transmission of the single-user AVC is shown to be super-additive including a complete characterization.
The wiretap channel models secure communication between two users in the presence of an eavesdropper who must be kept ignorant of transmitted messages. The performance of such a system is usually characterized by its secrecy capacity which determines the maximum transmission rate of secure communication. In this paper, the issue of whether or not the secrecy capacity is a continuous function of the system parameters is examined. In particular, this is done for channel uncertainty modeled via compound channels and arbitrarily varying channels, in which the legitimate users know only that the true channel realization is from a prespecified uncertainty set. In the former model, this realization remains constant for the entire duration of transmission, while in the latter the realization varies from channel use to channel use in an unknown and arbitrary manner. These models not only capture the case of channel uncertainty, but are also suitable for modeling scenarios in which a malicious adversary jams or otherwise influences the legitimate transmission. The secrecy capacity of the compound wiretap channel is shown to be robust in the sense that it is a continuous function of the uncertainty set. Thus, small variations in the uncertainty set lead to small variations in secrecy capacity. On the other hand, the deterministic secrecy capacity of the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel is shown to be discontinuous in the uncertainty set meaning that small variations can lead to dramatic losses in capacity.
In next generation connectivity systems, relying on robust and low-latency information exchange, there exists communication tasks in which the Ahlswede/Dueck identification scheme is much more efficient than Shannon's transmission scheme. We concentrate on the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel (AVWC) modeling jamming attacks. We provide a coding scheme for secure identification and determine the secrecy capacity of the AVWC. Furthermore, we analyze important properties of this capacity function, e.g. continuity and super-additivity.