The Quantum Revolution in Philosophy
David Wallace
Richard Healey’s The Quantum Revolution in Philosophy is a terrific book, and yet I disagree with nearly all its main substantive conclusions.1 The purpose of this review is to say why the book is well worth your time if you have any interest in the interpretation of quantum theory or in the general philosophy of science, and yet why in the end I think Healey’s ambitious project fails to achieve its full goals. The quantum measurement problem is the central problem in philosophy of quantum mechanics, and arguably the most important issue in philosophy of physics more generally; not coincidentally, it has seen some of the field’s best work, and some of its most effective engagement with physics. Yet the debate in the field largely now appears deadlocked: the last few years have seen developments in our understanding of many of the proposed solutions, but not much movement in the overall dialectic. This is perhaps clearest with a little distance: metaphysicians who need to refer to quantum mechanics increasingly tend to talk of ‘the three main interpretations’ (they mean: de Broglie and Bohm’s hidden variable theory; Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber’s (‘GRW’) dynamical-collapse theory; Everett’s many-universes theory) and couch their discussions so as to be, as much as possible, equally valid for any of those three. It is not infrequent for philosophers of physics to use the familiar framework of underdetermination of theory by evidence to discuss the measurement problem.
Analysis•Mar 11, 2020•4 citations