In the present paper I aim to discuss the philosophical foundations of the early correspondence principle (1917-1924), by comparing the conceptual structure underlying the first correspondence principle with the procedure of analogy that Immanuel Kant introduced in the Critique of Judgment from 1790. On such a comparison, I will seek to demonstrate the consistency of the conceptual ratio according to which the correspondence principle is to the classical "concepts" of space and time, as these a priori forms of intuition (space and time), in Kant, are related to the separate faculty of pure intuition. As a result, it will turn out that the conceptual structure of the correspondence principle suits to the Kantian doctrine of a separate faculty of pure intuition, which is divided from the faculty of understanding. The aim is to shed new light on the line of reasoning underlying Niels Bohr's analogical thinking in quantum physics.
In the present paper I aim to discuss the philosophical foundations of the early correspondence principle (1917-1924), by comparing the conceptual structure underlying the first correspondence principle with the procedure of analogy that Immanuel Kant introduced in the Critique of Judgment from 1790. On such a comparison, I will seek to demonstrate the consistency of the conceptual ratio according to which the correspondence principle is to the classical "concepts" of space and time, as these a priori forms of intuition (space and time), in Kant, are related to the separate faculty of pure intuition. As a result, it will turn out that the conceptual structure of the correspondence principle suits to the Kantian doctrine of a separate faculty of pure intuition, which is divided from the faculty of understanding. The aim is to shed new light on the line of reasoning underlying Niels Bohr's analogical thinking in quantum physics.
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues that the empirical knowledge of the world depends on a priori conditions of human sensibility and understanding, i. e., our capacities of sense experience and concept formation. The objective knowledge presupposes, on one hand, space and time as a priori conditions of sensibility and, on another hand, a priori judgments, like the principle of causality, as constitutive conditions of understanding. The problem is that in the XX century the physical science completely changed how we conceive our knowledge of the world. Face to this new situation, what was changed in our classical reason? However, if the transcendental point of view is adopted, in the specific case of quantum mechanics, we have to wonder about the general conditions of this theory that make possible such knowledge, which predictive value is much more accurate than the classical physics. The aim of this work is firstly to show the Kantian implications on Bohr’s interpretation of quantum phenomena and secondly to provide an overview of the key elements for understanding the transcendental locus of ordinary language in the quantum mechanics context, in order to give support to a transcendental pragmatic position in the analysis of science.
Abstract: In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues that the empirical knowledge of the world depends on a priori conditions of human sensibility and understanding, i. e., our capacities of sense experience and concept formation. The objective knowledge presupposes, on one hand, space and time as a priori conditions of sensibility and, on another hand, a priori judgments, like the principle of causality, as constitutive conditions of understanding. The problem is that in the XX century the physical science completely changed how we conceive our knowledge of the world. Face to this new situation, what was changed in our classical reason? However, if the transcendental point of view is adopted, in the specific case of quantum mechanics, we have to wonder about the general conditions of this theory that make possible such knowledge, which predictive value is much more accurate than the classical physics. The aim of this work is firstly to show the Kantian implications on Bohr’s interpretation of quantum phenomena and secondly to provide an overview of the key elements for understanding the transcendental locus of ordinary language in the quantum mechanics context, in order to give support to a transcendental pragmatic position in the analysis of science.
Niels Bohr and Philosophy of Physics: Twenty-First Century Perspectives examines the philosophical views, influences and legacy of the Nobel Prize physicist and philosophical spokesman of the quantum revolution, Niels Bohr. The sixteen contributions in this collection by some of the best contemporary philosophers and physicists writing on Bohr's philosophy today all carefully distinguish his subtle and unique interpretation of quantum mechanics from views often imputed to him under the banner of the “Copenhagen Interpretation.” With respect to philosophical influences on Bohr's outlook, the contributors analyse prominent similarities between his viewpoint and Kantian ways of thinking, the views of the Danish philosopher Harald Høffding, and themes characteristic of American pragmatism. In recognizing the importance of Bohr's epistemological naturalism they examine his defence of the indispensability of classical concepts from a variety of different perspectives. This collection shows us that Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics, now nearly a century old, still has the power to shed light on a variety of issues that have arisen only since his lifetime, as well as decoherence theory and other non-collapse interpretations. Balancing historical themes with contemporary discussions, Niels Bohr and the Philosophy of Physics establishes Bohr's on-going contribution to the philosophy of physics and examines his place in the history of philosophy.
According to Kant, intuition is a non-logical mental form of representation, one that serves partly to idealize conceptual contents and partly to render them concrete. In performing this task, intuition fulfills the semantic function of giving sense and significance to formal concepts. With reference to Kant, Bohr and Heisenberg demand that abstract quantum theory be interpreted intuitively by means of complementary classical descriptions of phenomena. This interpretation rests on Bohr’s correspondence principle, which gives sense and significance to abstract quantum theory. Since today’s physics does not have consistent axiomatic foundations, Bohr’s principle is required as a bridge principle, in order to give a physical interpretation of quantum mechanical states with recourse to classical magnitudes. In the case of the Feynman diagrams of quantum field theory, by contrast, intuition merely has the function of making a complex theoretical calculus comprehensible by means of iconic representation.
Introduction In order to develop the insight that is worked out by Brock (Niels Bohr's Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics, Logos, 2003), that the philosophy of quantum mechanics should parallel Kant's philosophy of natural science, some preliminary analyses of key concepts need to be done. Initiated by Niels Bohr (Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, John Wiley and Sons, 1958), the concept of ‘complementarity’ has played a major role in the interpretation of quantum theory. However, the exact place it occupies in respect of the logical form of the relation of complementarity between descriptive predicates has not been spelled out in detail to my knowledge. Complementary predicates exclude one another as simultaneous attributions to the same subject. Exactly what form does this exclusion take? How is it related to the basic exclusion-of-predicates principle, the logical law of non-contradiction?
Niels Bohr thought that what quantum mechanics has taught us is not only to understand something new, but also a new meaning of the term “to understand”. Bohr wanted to free himself from ontology by putting emphasis on epistemology; i.e. on certain conditions for observation and description. He believed that the epistemological lesson of quantum mechanics was a crucial one. Basically it has two important aspects. 1. Bohr's philosophy leads to a break with the so-called correspondence theory for truth and meaning. It states that true propositions are descriptions of a world that is independent of our observations; i.e. that on a regular basis one can compare with reality, that is, in compare the two areas against each other. Bohr believed that this did not make sense, since in many situations cannot add meaning to a world that has a sich structure (the thing-in-itself), which in turn can be depicted when observed. 2. All knowledge is attained under certain conditions for description. Bohr thought that the long-lasting criterion for valid knowledge is that can communicate it unambiguously to each other. When Bohr emphasised that we are suspended in language in the sense that all knowledge determines what can say about the world in an understandable way, and not what the world actually is, this must be understood in the sense that only know the world as recognised; i.e., structured on the basis of the conditions for description, to which are, as part of the world, necessarily are subjected to. Bohr's emphasis on conditions for descriptions invalidates the well-known distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. An important feature of the descriptive use of ordinary language, as well as in classical physics, is that description is based on a dividing line between subject and object. This results in idealism and materialism not being tenable positions. Furthermore, it is such that cannot use the designation of things independently of the designation of time and space. Logical principles are only meaningfully applied in situations relating to our conditions for observation. So based on inspiration from Bohr, Favrholdt developed a more adequate and comprehensive philosophy, where he, among other things, states that all humans possess a fundamental language, underlying all languages. This constitutes a number of concepts – the core – where the correct use is dictated by the structure of the world, which humans learn through sensory perception and action.