Transmit beamforming and artificial noise-based methods have been widely employed to achieve physical-layer (PHY) security. However, these approaches may fail to provide satisfactory secure performance if the channels of legitimate user (LU) and eavesdropper (Eve) are highly correlated, which usually occurs in the case of close-located LU and Eve. The goal of this paper is to address the PHY security problem for proximal LU and Eve in millimeter-wave transmissions. To this end, we propose a novel frequency diverse array (FDA) beamforming approach, which intentionally introduces some frequency offsets across array antennas to decouple the highly correlated channels of LU and Eve. By exploiting this decoupling capability, the FDA beamforming can degrade Eve's reception and thus enhance PHY security. Leveraging FDA beamforming, we aim to maximize the secrecy rate by jointly optimizing the frequency offsets and the transmit beamformer. This secrecy rate maximization problem is difficult due to the tightly coupled variables. However, we show that it can be reformulated into a form only depending on the frequency offsets. Building upon this reformulation, we further employ the block successive upper-bound minimization method to iteratively obtain a solution with stationary convergence guarantee. Numerical results demonstrate that FDA beamforming can provide higher secrecy rate than conventional beamforming, especially for proximal LU and Eve.
Transmit beamforming and artificial noise-based methods have been widely employed to achieve physical-layer (PHY) security. However, these approaches may fail to provide satisfactory secure performance if the channels of legitimate user (LU) and eavesdropper (Eve) are highly correlated, which usually occurs in the case of close-located LU and Eve. The goal of this paper is to address the PHY security problem for proximal LU and Eve in millimeter-wave transmissions. To this end, we propose a novel frequency diverse array (FDA) beamforming approach, which intentionally introduces some frequency offsets across array antennas to decouple the highly correlated channels of LU and Eve. By exploiting this decoupling capability, the FDA beamforming can degrade Eve's reception and thus enhance PHY security. Leveraging FDA beamforming, we aim to maximize the secrecy rate by jointly optimizing the frequency offsets and the transmit beamformer. This secrecy rate maximization problem is difficult due to the tightly coupled variables. However, we show that it can be reformulated into a form only depending on the frequency offsets. Building upon this reformulation, we further employ the block successive upper-bound minimization method to iteratively obtain a solution with stationary convergence guarantee. Numerical results demonstrate that FDA beamforming can provide higher secrecy rate than conventional beamforming, especially for proximal LU and Eve.
In this paper, we consider a physical layer security (PLS) problem for a hybrid wiretapping wireless system in millimeter-wave transmission, where the active eavesdropper and passive eavesdropper (Eve) may coexist to intercept the confidential messages and emit jamming signals. To achieve secure and reliable transmission, we propose a switched phased-array directional modulation (DM) scheme that employs multi-beam symbol-level precoding with aided artificial noise (AN) technique at the transmitter, and array reception at legitimate users (LU). Here we consider a more practical case that the information of the eavesdropper (Eve) is unknown by the transmitter. Leveraging DM beamforming, we aim to minimize transmit message power by optimizing the beamforming vector, subject to prescribed symbol-level constraints, thus generating exact/relaxed phases at LU. The remaining transmit power can be utilized to generate AN. Additionally, by means of the minimum variance distortionless response method at the LU, the jamming caused by active Eve can be efficiently eliminated. Simulation results demonstrate the superiority of the proposed scheme.
Prior studies on wideband physical layer security (PLS) have mostly focused on either far-field or near-field communication systems. In this paper, we investigate PLS in a more general and practical mixed near-field and far-field wideband communication scenario, where a base station (BS) equipped with an extremely large-scale array (XL-array) serves multiple legitimate users in the far field, while a near-field eavesdropper attempts to intercept confidential information at close range. Specifically, we formulate an optimization problem to maximize the secrecy rate of all legitimate users across all subcarriers by jointly designing the transmit beamforming and artificial noise (AN), subject to per-subcarrier power constraints. To gain useful insights into the unique characteristics of mixed-field wideband PLS, we first analyze a special case with a single legitimate user and an eavesdropper. Interestingly, we show that the secure transmission regions in mixed-field wideband systems are not the same across all subcarriers, as revealed by subcarrier-specific secrecy conditions derived from the Fresnel integrals. Moreover, we theoretically demonstrate that introducing frequency-selective AN into the system offers two key benefits: 1) it transforms originally insecure subcarriers into secure ones, and 2) it substantially improves the overall secrecy performance. For the general multiuser setup, we propose an efficient two-stage hybrid beamforming algorithm to jointly design the transmit beamforming and AN, ensuring secure transmission under mixed-field conditions. Building on our analytical insights, we further develop an efficient and low-complexity algorithm that designs the AN beamformers by directly aligning them with the eavesdropper's channel, thereby eliminating the need to optimize AN beamformers across all subcarriers.
This letter proposes a robust beamforming (BF) scheme to enhance physical layer security (PLS) of the downlink of a multibeam satellite system in the presence of either uncoordinated or coordinated eavesdroppers (Eves). Specifically, with knowing only the approximate locations of the Eves, we aim at maximizing the worst-case achievable secrecy rate (ASR) of the legitimate user (LU), subject to the constraints of per-antenna transmit power and quality of service (QoS) requirement of the LU. Since the optimization problem is non-convex, we first adopt the discretization method to deal with the unknown regions of the Eves and then exploit the log-sum-exp function to approximate the objective function. Afterwards, a BF method joint alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) with Dinkelbach iteration is presented to solve this non-convex problem. Finally, simulation results verify that our robust BF algorithm can effectively improve the security of multibeam satellite systems.
In this paper, we propose a new frequency-switching array (FSA) to enhance the physical-layer security (PLS) in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers (Eves), where the carrier frequency can be flexibly switched and small frequency offsets can be imposed on each antenna at the secrecy transmitter (Alice).First, we analytically show that by flexibly controlling the carrier frequency parameters, FSAs can effectively form uniform/non-uniform sparse arrays, hence resembling existing mechanically controlled movable antennas (MAs) via the control of inter-antenna spacing and providing additional degree-of-freedom in the beam manipulation.Although the proposed FSA suffers from additional path-gain attenuation in the received signals, it can overcome several hardware and signal processing issues incurred by MAs, such as limited positioning accuracy, extra hardware and energy cost.Then, a secrecy-rate maximization problem is formulated under the constraints on the frequency control.To shed useful insights, we first consider a secrecy-guaranteed problem with a null-steering constraint for which maximum ratio transmission beamformer is considered at Alice and the frequency offsets are set as uniform frequency increment.Interestingly, it is shown that the proposed FSA can flexibly realize null-steering over Eve in both the angular domain and range domain, thereby achieving improved PLS performance.Then, for the general case, we propose an efficient algorithm to solve the formulated non-convex optimization problem by using the block coordinate descent and projected gradient ascent techniques. Finally, numerical results demonstrate that the proposed FSA achieves superior secrecy rate performance over conventional fixed-position array, while it only suffers a slight secrecy rate loss than the existing mechanically controlled MA.
Traditional approaches for providing confidentiality of wirelessly transmitted signals are often based on cryptographic techniques. While these techniques ensure that messages are encrypted and secured against eavesdropping, they are not sufficient to protect important transmission attributes at the physical (PHY) layer. Specifically, several elds in the headers of PHY and medium access control (MAC) frames are typically sent unencrypted to maintain proper protocol functionality (e.g., sender/receiver identification). As a result, they leak side-channel information (SCI), including payload size, frequency and phase oset, modulation and coding scheme, identities of communication nodes, frame type, transmission rate, etc. These SCI can be exploited by an adversary to launch various passive (eavesdropping) and active (jamming) attacks. To complement cryptographic techniques used at upper layers and prevent the leakage of SCI at the PHY/MAC layers, PHY-layer security techniques have been introduced. These techniques exploit the characteristics of the wireless channel along with multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) technologies, in which multiple transmitting and receiving antennas are utilized to prevent information leakage to eavesdroppers and/or avoid jamming attacks. In particular, if the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at an adversary is lower than the one at a legitimate receiver, secure communication can be achieved through the so-called wiretap coding. MIMO systems enable the transmitter and/or the receiver to generate artificial noise, called friendly jamming (FJ), so as to reduce the SINR at the adversary without impacting the SINR at the legitimate receiver. In this dissertation, we focus on exploring the security threats to next-generation wireless systems. We develop MIMO-based PHY-layer security methods to achieve reliable and secret communications in these systems. First, we consider a broadcast channel, in which a multi-antenna transmitter (Alice) sends K confidential information signals to K legitimate receivers (Bobs) in the presence of L eavesdropping devices (Eves). Alice uses MIMO precoding to generate the information signals along with her own Tx-based friendly jamming (TxFJ). Interference at each Bob is removed via a technique called MIMO zero-forcing. This TxFJ, however, leaves an eavesdropping \vulnerability region" in the proximity of each Bob, which can be exploited by a nearby Eve. Specically, because of the high correlation in the channel state information (CSI) at a Bob and nearby Eves, the TxFJ becomes less effective in preventing eavesdropping at these Eves. We address this problem by augmenting TxFJ with receiver-based friendly jamming (RxFJ), generated by each Bob. Specifically, we allow each Bob to use self-interference suppression (SIS) techniques to transmit a friendly jamming signal while simultaneously receiving an information signal over the same channel. These SIS techniques exploit circulators to attenuate the self-interference power of RxFJ at Bobs and utilize analog/digital cancellation methods to clean out any remaining residual self-interference. Considering the resulting broadcast channel, we rst study a two-user scenario and develop a secrecy encoding scheme for constructing the signals intended to two Bobs. We characterize the corresponding achievable secrecy sum-rate and formulate an optimization problem to maximize this metric. We then extend our approach to K-user scenarios and study a power minimization problem. Particularly, in our analysis we minimize the powers allocated to information and friendly jamming signals (both TxFJ and RxFJ) while guaranteeing individual secrecy rates for various Bobs. The problem is solved for the cases when the eavesdropper's CSI (ECSI) is known or unknown (but with a known distribution). Simulations show the effectiveness of the proposed solutions. Furthermore, we discuss how to schedule transmissions when the rate requirements need to be satised on average rather than instantaneously. In low and high power regime, a scheduling algorithm that serves only the strongest receivers is shown to outperform the one that schedules all receivers. Next, we consider a single-cell massive MIMO system in which a base station (BS) with a large number of antennas transmits simultaneously to several single antenna users. The BS acquires the CSI for various receivers using uplink pilot transmissions. We demonstrate the vulnerability of the CSI estimation process to a pilot-contamination (PC) attack that aims at minimizing the sum-rate of downlink transmissions by contaminating uplink pilots. We rst study PC attacks for two downlink power allocation strategies under the assumption that the attacker knows the locations of the BS and its users. Later on, we relax this assumption and consider the case when such knowledge is probabilistic. The formulated problems are solved using stochastic optimization, Lagrangian minimization, and game-theoretic methods. A closed-form solution for a special case of the problem is obtained. Furthermore, we analyze the \achievable individual secrecy rates" under PC attacks, and provide an upper-bound on these rates. We also study this scenario without a priori knowledge of user locations at the attacker by introducing chance constraints. Another attack model is considered, where the attacker generates jamming signals in both the CSI estimation and data transmission phases by exploiting inband full-duplex techniques. Our results indicate that such attacks can degrade the throughput of a massive MIMO system by more than 50%, and reduce fairness among users significantly.
In this paper, we studyrobustbeamforming design fornear-fieldphysical-layer-security (PLS) systems, where a base station (BS) equipped with an extremely large-scale array (XL-array) serves multiple near-field legitimate users (Bobs) in the presence of multiple near-field eavesdroppers (Eves). Unlike existing works that mostly assume perfect channel state information (CSI) or location information of Eves, we consider a more practical and challenging scenario in this paper, where the locations of Bobs are perfectly known, while onlyimperfect location informationof Eves is available at the BS. We first formulate a robust optimization problem to maximize the sum-rate of Bobs while guaranteeing a worst-case limit on the eavesdropping rate under location uncertainty. By transforming Cartesian position errors into the polar domain, we reveal an important near-fieldangular-error amplification effect, i.e., under the same location error, the closer the Eve, the larger the angle error, which severely degrades the performance of conventional robust beamforming methods based on imperfect channel state information. To address this issue, we first establish the conditions for which the first-order Taylor approximation of the near-field channel steering vector under location uncertainty is largely accurate. Then, we propose atwo-stagerobust beamforming method, which first partitions the uncertainty region into multiple fan-shaped sub-regions, followed by the second stage to formulate and solve a refined linear-matrix-inequality (LMI)-based robust beamforming optimization problem. In addition, the proposed method is further extended to scenarios with multiple Bobs and multiple Eves. Finally, numerical results validate that the proposed method achieves a superior trade-off between rate performance and secrecy robustness, hence significantly outperforming existing benchmarks under Eve location uncertainty.