What theoretical structures characterise our notions of what it means for a whole physical system to be the sum of its parts? We explore various aspects of this question, with emphasise on quantum theory, from the following perspective: A physical theory constitutes the definition of a set of propositions with logical relationships between them such that probabilities can be used to judge the merits of the theory, given empirical evidence. The logical relationships between the propositions characterise our semantic notions such as individuation. We distinguish between the ontological and epistemological notions of individuation. We introduce the notion of ontological individuation within the context of ontological models. A subsystem is defined as a proposition that provides necessary and sufficient information for making useful predictions. This definition to some extent generalises the notions of separability and local causality to define systems that may not be local. It highlights the unified motivations for many assumptions in the literature, such as measurement independence, and points to hidden assumptions of causality and mutual exclusivity that occur when defining systems. An epistemic no-signalling criterion gives rise to a tensor product structure for epistemic systems in quantum theory. We utilise a symmetry emergent from this structure to derive a bound on the observability of a large class of operations, dependent on only the purity of the quantum state. In particular, we derive an upper bound on the trace distance between an untransformed state and the state transformed by any trace preserving, unital operation. Our notions of epistemic systems also relate to distinguishability. It is shown that for measurements of any two (_nite outcome) particle quantum numbers on multi-fermion states, the total uncertainty, minimised over all states, is zero. This is because despite indistinguishability characterised as a constraint on the observable algebra, the appropriate correspondence between states of distinguishable and indistinguishable particles is one where the Hilbert space of indistinguishable particles relates to particles with an extra quantum number such that effective distinguishability can emerge. This Hilbert space is larger than the one for distinguishable particles and hence can (does) contain states for which the uncertainty relations for distinguishable particles are no longer valid. We conclude by arguing that in general, epistemic systems are not necessarily distinguishable; They may be only effectively distinguishable. This would imply a theory of indistinguishable modes. Several motivations are presented and the form of the theory suggested. It is hypothesised that such a theory may provide a relativistic quantum theory, alternative to quantum field theory, that satisfies cluster decomposition.
What theoretical structures characterise our notions of what it means for a whole physical system to be the sum of its parts? We explore various aspects of this question, with emphasise on quantum theory, from the following perspective: A physical theory constitutes the definition of a set of propositions with logical relationships between them such that probabilities can be used to judge the merits of the theory, given empirical evidence. The logical relationships between the propositions characterise our semantic notions such as individuation. We distinguish between the ontological and epistemological notions of individuation. We introduce the notion of ontological individuation within the context of ontological models. A subsystem is defined as a proposition that provides necessary and sufficient information for making useful predictions. This definition to some extent generalises the notions of separability and local causality to define systems that may not be local. It highlights the unified motivations for many assumptions in the literature, such as measurement independence, and points to hidden assumptions of causality and mutual exclusivity that occur when defining systems. An epistemic no-signalling criterion gives rise to a tensor product structure for epistemic systems in quantum theory. We utilise a symmetry emergent from this structure to derive a bound on the observability of a large class of operations, dependent on only the purity of the quantum state. In particular, we derive an upper bound on the trace distance between an untransformed state and the state transformed by any trace preserving, unital operation. Our notions of epistemic systems also relate to distinguishability. It is shown that for measurements of any two (_nite outcome) particle quantum numbers on multi-fermion states, the total uncertainty, minimised over all states, is zero. This is because despite indistinguishability characterised as a constraint on the observable algebra, the appropriate correspondence between states of distinguishable and indistinguishable particles is one where the Hilbert space of indistinguishable particles relates to particles with an extra quantum number such that effective distinguishability can emerge. This Hilbert space is larger than the one for distinguishable particles and hence can (does) contain states for which the uncertainty relations for distinguishable particles are no longer valid. We conclude by arguing that in general, epistemic systems are not necessarily distinguishable; They may be only effectively distinguishable. This would imply a theory of indistinguishable modes. Several motivations are presented and the form of the theory suggested. It is hypothesised that such a theory may provide a relativistic quantum theory, alternative to quantum field theory, that satisfies cluster decomposition.
Quantum nonlocality has been a long-standing and fascinating problem in the foundations of quantum theory since its proof by the Bell inequality. It seems to contradict our intuitive picture of space-time and thus urges us to reconsider its foundation. With the advent of quantum information science, it has attracted renewed interest from a fundamental point of view as well as from a quantum information-theoretic one. Another fundamental question on the nature of quantum theory is how we understand what quantum states represent. (Quantum states hereafter refer to pure states.) This is also a long-standing problem since the early days of quantum theory. Roughly speaking, there are two conflicting views on this matter: one is ontology and the other is epistemology. Ontological models of quantum theory are models in which we assume some underlying reality for physical systems and require that all the predictions of quantum theory should be reproduced. The ontological models are divided into two categories, depending on which views the models are based on, ontology or epistemology. In the models based on ontology, quantum states represent the underlying reality in some sense, and different quantum states correspond to different realities. In the models based on epistemology, quantum states do not necessarily correspond to the underlying realities, and even different quantum states can be consistent with a common underlying reality. The former type of ontological models of quantum theory is called 1⁄4-ontic. The latter is called 1⁄4-epistemic. Thus, it might be rather confusing that ontological models are classified further into 1⁄4-ontic models and 1⁄4-epistemic ones. We use these terms here in accordance with the recent literature on quantum foundations. (For details of these notions in the ontological models of quantum theory, see the paper by Harrigan and Spekkens.) Quite recently, the question just mentioned has been answered by Pusey et al., and one of the above models has been refuted. It was shown that 1⁄4-epistemic models are inconsistent with the predictions of quantum theory. In other words, epistemological views on quantum states turned out to be false as long as we assume some underlying reality for physical systems. Therefore, only 1⁄4-ontic models of quantum theory are valid for describing quantum systems. This significantly advances our understanding on the nature of quantum states. It is expected that various conclusions will be drawn from this fact. In this paper, we will discuss a connection with nonlocality. The above two fundamental questions, nonlocality and the nature of quantum states, are intimately connected, and the connection was first implicitly recognised by Einstein in the early days of quantum theory. In a private correspondence with Schrodinger, Einstein constructed a fascinating argument that relates the above two. (That argument is distinctly different from the well-known EPR argument.) Recently, it was revisited and reconstructed in accordance with more rigorous notions in quantum foundations. Nonlocality is usually shown by violations of Bell inequalities. (Bell inequalities hereafter include all the subsequent developments such as the CHSH inequality.) Even if it is not clear whether the models of quantum theory are 1⁄4-ontic or 1⁄4-epistemic, we can prove nonlocality just by showing the violation of Bell inequalities. However, the above argument originated by Einstein implies that if we know the models are 1⁄4-ontic in advance (as we do now), we can prove nonlocality in a simpler way without Bell inequalities. (This argument had been known in quantum foundations before the refutation of 1⁄4-epistemic models.) Nonlocality is rigorously defined as a violation of the notion of local causality defined by Bell. Showing the violation of Bell inequalities is one way of demonstrating the violation of local causality. Since the simpler proof initiated by Einstein directly demonstrates the violation of local causality, it is a more straightforward proof of nonlocality from a conceptual point of view. In the following, we will see that this simple argument of nonlocality without Bell inequalities can be used to show multipartite nonlocality as well. Before moving onto multipartite cases, first let us define the necessary notions for presenting our result. First of all, we assume that there exists a complete specification of the properties of a physical system, which we refer to as the ontic state of that system. The ontic states represent the underlying realities and are not necessarily equal to ordinary quantum states. (In other words, the ontic states correspond to hidden variables.) Ontological models of quantum theory are models that assume ontic states and reproduce all the predictions of quantum theory. An important question is how ontic states correspond to quantum states in quantum theory. In order to frame the question accurately, we need the notion of an epistemic state, which represents the relation between them. Suppose we prepare a physical system in a quantum state 1⁄4. Although the system is uniquely specified as 1⁄4 in quantum theory, there still remains a possibility that it allows a more detailed specification in the ontic state space, in which case many different ontic states turn out to be consistent with 1⁄4. The relation between ontic states and the preparation procedure, P1⁄4, is described by a conditional probability distribution over the ontic state space, pð jP1⁄4Þ, which we refer to as an epistemic state. In general, the preparation P can be a preparation of a physical system in a mixed sate. Unless there exists a one-to-one correspondence between ontic states and quantum states, the probability distribution spreads over . (See Fig. 1.) The question of whether an ontological model is 1⁄4-ontic or 1⁄4-epistemic is concerned with the behaviour of the epistemic states for two distinct preparations of quantum states. Consider two distinct preparations of quantum states, Journal of the Physical Society of Japan 82 (2013) 055003
The characterization of entanglement is a fundamental issue for Quantum Information Theory. But the definition of entanglement depends on the notion of locality, and thus on the tensor product structure of the state space of the composite system. This notion is affected by the presence of superselection rules that restrict the accessible Hilbert space to a direct sum of subspaces. Indistinguishability of particles imposes one such restriction, namely to totally symmetric or totally antisymmetric states. The entanglement can in this case be defined with respect to partitions of modes in the second quantization formalism. For fermionic systems the Fock space of m modes is isomorphic to the space of m qubits, but the action of creation and annihilation operators is not local, due to their anticommutation. Conservation of the parity of fermion number imposes another relevant superselection rule. It requires that local physical observables commute with the local parity operator. Taking into account the considerations above, it is possible to define the set of separable states or equivalently the concept of entanglement for fermionic systems in a number of ways. Here we analyze systematically these possibilities and the relation among the various sets of separable states. We also discuss the behavior of the different classes when taking several copies of the state, as well as the characterization of the sets in terms of the usual criteria regarding the tensor product.
Quantum mechanics is empirically unrivalled, yet the origin of its distinctive non-classical features remains a foundational question. This paper proves, within the unchanged standard quantum formalism, that these features—collectively termed “quantumness”—arise if and only if certain configurations of the system are indistinguishable in principle. Quantumness is defined as any deviation from classical probability distributions, i.e., probabilities that require coherent amplitude addition rather than incoherent probability addition. Three theorems are established using only the standard Hilbert-space formalism and unitary evolution: 1. Indistinguishability of configurations is necessary and sufficient for quantumness.2. Indistinguishability of identical particles is neither necessary nor sufficient.3. An equivalent restatement in precise operational terms: quantumness occurs exactly when a variable lacks physical definition (distinguishability in principle by macroscopic outcomes). These results are presented and interpreted within the Logical Interpretation of quantum mechanics, a minimalist framework that adds no new postulates and applies classical logic strictly to physically defined facts. The interpretation provides the conceptual tools—particularly the precise notion of “indistinguishability in principle”—that make the theorems sharp and unified. This work unifies the origin of quantumness and serves as the conceptual prequel to the full Logical Interpretation developed in the author’s companion paper.
This essay argues that many interpretative paradoxes in quantum mechanics arise from a systematic confusion between regimes of description and regimes of existence. It therefore proposes an operative distinction between the real (material dynamics), the concrete (the mark as a stabilising inscription), and theory (the symbolic organisation of prediction). On this basis, degeneracy is reinterpreted as a limit of individuation defined by the experimental cut: where there is no difference at the level of the mark, formal multiplicity amounts to an excess of description rather than to ontological plurality. Likewise, the density matrix is treated as an epistemic operator appropriate to incomplete knowledge and variability of preparation, thereby avoiding the reification of “mixture” into an entity. Interference and superposition are traced back to the manner in which the calculus organises possibilities prior to their separation by a mark. Entanglement is analysed as epistemic correlation inherited in the absence of present interaction, and is distinguished from dynamical non-separability except in cases of effective coupling. In the context of EPR/Bell, it is argued that the update of the predictive regime following a local mark does not constitute a physical process in the distant system; Bell inequalities constrain certain classical grammars of factorisation without determining a positive ontology of superluminal influences. The paper concludes with a critical comparison of consistent histories, informational approaches, and collapse models in terms of their respective ontological costs.
The general view is that all fundamental physical laws should be formulated within the framework given by quantum mechanics (QM). In a sense, QM therefore has the character of a metaphysical theory. Consequently, if it is possible to derive QM from more basic principles, these principles should be of general, philosophical nature. Here, we derive the formalism of QM from well-motivated epistemic principles. A key assumption is that a physical theory that relies on entities or distinctions that are unknowable in principle gives rise to wrong predictions. First, an epistemic formalism is developed, using concepts like knowledge and potential knowledge, identifying a physical state S with the potential knowledge of the physical world. It is demonstrated that QM emerges from this formalism. However, Hilbert spaces, wave functions and probabilities are defined in certain well-defined observational contexts only. This means that the epistemic formalism is broader than QM. In the fundamental layer of description, the physical state S is a subset of a state space S={Z}, such that S always contains many elements Z. These elements correspond to unattainable states of complete knowledge of the world. The evolution of S cannot be determined in terms of the individual evolution of the elements Z, unlike the evolution of an ensemble in classical phase space. The evolution of S is described in terms of sequential time n∈N, which is updated according to n→n+1 each time an event occurs, each time potential knowledge changes. Sequential time n can be separated from relational time t, which describes distances between events in space-time. There is an entire space-time associated with each n, in which t represents the knowledge at sequential time n about the temporal relations between present and past events.
This paper addresses the following main question: Do we have a theoretical understanding of entanglement applicable to a full variety of physical settings? It is clear that not only the assumption of distinguishability, but also the few-subsystem scenario, are too narrow to embrace all possible physical settings. In particular, the need to go beyond the traditional subsystem-based framework becomes manifest when one tries to apply the conventional concept of entanglement to the physics of matter, since the constituents of a quantum many-body system are indistinguishable particles. We shall discuss here a notion of generalized entanglement, which can be applied to any operator language (fermions, bosons, spins, etc.) used to describe a physical system and which includes the conventional entanglement settings introduced to date in a unified fashion. This is realized by noticing that entanglement is an observer-dependent concept, whose properties are determined by the expectations of a distinguished set of observables without reference to a preferred subsystem decomposition, i.e., it depends on the physically relevant point of view. This viewpoint depends in turn upon the relationship between different sets of observables that determine our ability to control the system of interest. Indeed, the extent to which entanglement is present depends on the observables used to measure a system and describe its states. This represents a most conspicuous advantage as will be highlighted by the condensed-matter application we will discuss.