Quantum random number generators (QRNGs) based on a symmetric beam splitter have attracted a great deal of interest, and the commercial version can be found in the marketplace. However, practical implementations of this QRNG may be imperfect. Here, we propose two attacks for this kind of QRNG, based on some imperfections existing in devices. The first attack exploits the imperfection that the transmission-reflection ratio of a symmetric beam splitter varies with different wavelengths. The second attack can be successful because of the detection efficiency mismatch in two single-photon detectors. With our attacks, Eve can easily break the inherent randomness of the QRNG without being detected. A key point of our paper is to raise awareness of such security loopholes in existing QRNG schemes.
Quantum random number generators (QRNGs) based on a symmetric beam splitter have attracted a great deal of interest, and the commercial version can be found in the marketplace. However, practical implementations of this QRNG may be imperfect. Here, we propose two attacks for this kind of QRNG, based on some imperfections existing in devices. The first attack exploits the imperfection that the transmission-reflection ratio of a symmetric beam splitter varies with different wavelengths. The second attack can be successful because of the detection efficiency mismatch in two single-photon detectors. With our attacks, Eve can easily break the inherent randomness of the QRNG without being detected. A key point of our paper is to raise awareness of such security loopholes in existing QRNG schemes.
Quantum random number generators (QRNGs) harness the inherent unpredictability of quantum mechanics to produce true randomness. Yet, in many optical implementations, the light source remains a potential vulnerability—susceptible to deviations from ideal behavior and even adversarial eavesdropping. Source-device-independent (SDI) protocols address this with a pragmatic strategy, by removing trust assumptions on the source, and instead rely on realistic modeling and characterization of the measurement device. In this work, we enhance an existing SDI-QRNG protocol by eliminating the need for a perfectly balanced beam splitter within the trusted measurement device, which is an idealized assumption made for the simplification of security analysis. We demonstrate that certified randomness can still be reliably extracted across a wide range of beam-splitting ratios, significantly improving the protocol’s practicality and robustness. Using only off-the-shelf components, our implementation achieves real-time randomness generation rates of 0.347 Gbps. We also experimentally validate the protocol’s resilience against adversarial attacks and highlight its self-testing capabilities. These advances mark a significant step toward practical, lightweight, high-performance, fully passive, and composably secure QRNGs suitable for real-world deployment.
A quantum random-number generator (QRNG) can theoretically generate unpredictable random numbers with perfect devices and is an ideal and secure source of random numbers for cryptography. However, the practical implementations always contain imperfections, which will greatly influence the randomness of the final output and even open loopholes to eavesdroppers. Recently, Thewes et al. experimentally demonstrated a continuous-variable eavesdropping attack, based on heterodyne detection, on a trusted continuous-variable QRNG in Phys. Rev. A 100, 052318 (2019), yet like in many other practical continuous-variable QRNG studies, they always supposed the local oscillator was stable and ignored its fluctuation, which might lead to security threats such as wavelength attack. In this work, based on the theory of the conditional min-entropy, imperfections of the practical security of continuous-variable QRNGs are systematically analyzed, especially the local oscillator fluctuation under imbalanced homodyne detection. Experiments of a practical QRNG based on vacuum fluctuation are demonstrated to show the influence of local oscillator fluctuation on the total measurement noise variances and the practical conditional min-entropy with beam splitters of different transmittances. Moreover, a local oscillator monitoring method is proposed for the practical continuous-variable QRNG, which can be used to calibrate the practical conditional min-entropy.
Abstract A quantum random number generator (QRNG) as a genuine source of randomness is essential in many applications, such as number simulation and cryptography. Recently, a source-independent quantum random number generator (SI-QRNG), which can generate secure random numbers with untrusted sources, has been realized. However, the measurement loopholes of the trusted but imperfect devices used in SI-QRNGs have not yet been fully explored, which will cause security problems, especially in high-speed systems. Here, we point out and evaluate the security loopholes of practical imperfect measurement devices in SI-QRNGs. We also provide corresponding countermeasures to prevent these information leakages by recalculating the conditional minimum entropy and adding a monitor. Furthermore, by taking into account the finite-size effect, we show that the influence of the afterpulse can exceed that of the finite-size effect with the large number of sampled rounds. Our protocol is simple and effective, and it promotes the security of SI-QRNG in practice as well as the compatibility with high-speed measurement devices, thus paving the way for constructing ultrafast and security-certified commercial SI-QRNG systems.
Recently, a source-independent quantum random number generator (SI-QRNG), which can generate secure random numbers with untrusted sources, has been realized. However, the measurement loopholes of the trusted but imperfect devices used in SI-QRNGs have not yet been fully explored. Here, we point out and evaluate the security loopholes of practical imperfect measurement devices in SI-QRNGs. We also provide corresponding countermeasures to prevent these information leakages by recalculating the conditional minimum entropy and adding a monitor. Furthermore, by taking into account the finite-size effect, we show that the influence of the afterpulse can exceed that of the finite-size effect with the large number of sampled rounds. Our protocol is simple and effective, and it promotes the security of SI-QRNG in practice as well as the compatibility with high-speed measurement evices, thus paving the way for constructing ultrafast and security-certified commercial SI-QRNG systems.
A quantum random number generator (QRNG) based on the quantum nature of vacuum fluctuations allows one to obtain random bit sequences that can be used in applications that require a high degree of randomness.In that type of quantum random generation system, optical beam splitters with two inputs and two outputs are normally used.A comparison of Y-splitter and spatial beam splitters shows that for two types of optical splitters, the quantum mathematical description of output signals is identical.This allows the use of fiber Y-splitters in practical QRNG schemes.The possibility of generating true random bits was demonstrated experimentally by using quantum random number generator based on homodyne detection.
Certifying random number generators is challenging, especially in security-critical fields like cryptography. Here, we demonstrate a measurement-device-independent quantum random number generator (MDI-QRNG) using high-dimensional photonic path states. Our setup extends the standard qubit beam-splitter QRNG to a three-output version with tunable fiber-optic interferometers acting as tunable beam splitters and superconducting detectors. This setup generates over 1.2 bits per round and 1.77 Mbits per second of certifiably secure private randomness without requiring \emph{any} trust in the measurement apparatus, a critical requirement for the security of real-world cryptographic applications. Our results demonstrate certifiably secure high-dimensional quantum random-number generation, paving the way for practical, scalable QRNGs without the need for complex devices.