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IEEE Long Island Systems, Applications and Technology Conference (LISAT)

Entanglement measurement-device-independent Quantum Key Distribution

Muneer Alshowkan, Khaled M. Elleithy

Published May 1, 2017• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We propose a measurement-device-independent Quantum Key Distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol using weak coherent states and entanglement from weak coherent pulses. To overcome the side channel attacks, the sender and the receiver use decoy states to verify the security of the quantum channel. Then, they use uncorrelated entangled pairs to establish a correlated entanglement between them. The protocol establishes entangled communication channel between the sender and the receiver without performing the quantum distillation protocol. The protocol provides protection against side channel attacks such as photon-number-splitting (PNS). During the communication process, each party chooses to prepare a decoy state or a signal state. Then, they send their signals to a third party who performs Bell state measurement and then announces the measurement result. Using the information from the third party, who also could be an attacker, the sender and the receiver analyze the communication channel for any abnormalities. After verifying the security of the communication channel, the sender and the receiver establish the entanglement together for sharing secret keys.

DOI
10.1109/lisat.2017.8001976

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We propose a measurement-device-independent Quantum Key Distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol using weak coherent states and entanglement from weak coherent pulses. To overcome the side channel attacks, the sender and the receiver use decoy states to verify the security of the quantum channel. Then, they use uncorrelated entangled pairs to establish a correlated entanglement between them. The protocol establishes entangled communication channel between the sender and the receiver without performing the quantum distillation protocol. The protocol provides protection against side channel attacks such as photon-number-splitting (PNS). During the communication process, each party chooses to prepare a decoy state or a signal state. Then, they send their signals to a third party who performs Bell state measurement and then announces the measurement result. Using the information from the third party, who also could be an attacker, the sender and the receiver analyze the communication channel for any abnormalities. After verifying the security of the communication channel, the sender and the receiver establish the entanglement together for sharing secret keys.
The measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol has been proposed for the purpose of removing the detector side channel attacks. Due to the multiphoton events of coherent states sources, real-life implementations of MDI-QKD protocol must employ decoy states to beat the photon-number-splitting attack. Decoy states for MDI-QKD based on the weak coherent states (WCSs) have been studied recently. In this Letter, we propose to perform MDI-QKD protocol with modified coherent states (MCS) sources. We simulate the performance of MDI-QKD with the decoy states based on MCS sources. And our simulation indicates that both the secure-key rate and transmission distance can be improved evidently with MCS sources. The physics behind this improvement is that the probability of multiphoton events of the MCS is lower than that of WCSs while at the same time the probability of single-photon is higher.
The ideal measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD), which is immune to all detector side-channel attacks, is built on the Bell state measurement of two single-photon states. However, in practical MDI-QKD where phase-randomized weak coherent pulses (PR-WCPs) are used, the mismatch between states preparation and measurement in X basis leads to the bit error rate of more than 25%, which poses a challenge to the security of QKD. In this paper, we provide a security analysis of practical MDI-QKD based on polarization coding. We analyze the Hong-Ou-Mandel interference of PR-WCPs and Poisson-distributed photon number states (PNs), and find that these two sources are equivalent in MDI-QKD. The security analysis based on entanglement distillation is carried out on PNs, and the measurement results in Z basis and X basis are averaged to overcome the noncorrelation of the error rates in these two bases. Compared with GLLP scheme, a tighter key rate is obtained in this work, and the key rate deviates from the linear key rate bound in a short distance due to the finite proportion of multiphoton terms.
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) is immune to all the detection attacks; thus when it is combined with the decoy-state method, the final key is unconditionally secure, even if a practical weak coherent source is used by Alice and Bob. However, until now, the analysis of decoy-state MDI-QKD with a weak coherent source is incomplete. In this paper, we derive, with only vacuum+weak decoy state, some tight formulas to estimate the lower bound of yield and the upper bound of error rate for the fraction of signals in which both Alice and Bob send a single-photon pulse to the untrusted third party Charlie. The numerical simulations show that our method with only vacuum+weak decoy state can asymptotically approach the theoretical limit of the infinite number of decoy states. Furthermore, the statistical fluctuation due to the finite length of date is also considered based on the standard statistical analysis.
The measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol is proposed to remove the detector side channel attacks, while its security relies on the assumption that the encoding systems are perfectly characterized. In contrast, the MDI-QKD protocol based on the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt inequality (CHSH-MDI-QKD) weakens this assumption, which only requires the quantum state to be prepared in the two-dimensional Hilbert space and the devices are independent. In experimental realizations, the weak coherent state, which is always used in QKD systems due to the lack of an ideal single-photon source, may be prepared in the high-dimensional space. In this paper, we investigate the decoy-state CHSH-MDI-QKD protocol with $s(3\ensuremath{\le}s\ensuremath{\le}5)$ intensities, including one signal state and $s\ensuremath{-}1$ decoy states, and we also consider the finite-size effect on the decoy-state CHSH-MDI-QKD protocol with five intensities. Simulation results show that this scheme is very practical.
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) can remove all detection side-channels from quantum communication systems. The security proofs require, however, that certain assumptions on the sources are satisfied. This includes, for instance, the requirement that there is no information leakage from the transmitters of the senders, which unfortunately is very difficult to guarantee in practice. In this paper we relax this unrealistic assumption by presenting a general formalism to prove the security of MDI-QKD with leaky sources. With this formalism, we analyze the finite-key security of two prominent MDI-QKD schemes-a symmetric three-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol and a four-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol-and determine their robustness against information leakage from both the intensity modulator and the phase modulator of the transmitters. Our work shows that MDI-QKD is feasible within a reasonable time frame of signal transmission given that the sources are sufficiently isolated. Thus, it provides an essential reference for experimentalists to ensure the security of implementations of MDI-QKD in the presence of information leakage.
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol was proposed to remove all the detector side channel attacks, while its security relies on the trusted encoding systems. Here we propose a one-sided MDI-QKD (1SMDI-QKD) protocol, which enjoys detection loophole-free advantage, and at the same time weakens the state preparation assumption in MDI-QKD. The 1SMDI-QKD can be regarded as a modified MDI-QKD, in which Bob's encoding system is trusted, while Alice's is uncharacterized. For the practical implementation, we also provide a scheme by utilizing coherent light source with an analytical two decoy state estimation method. Simulation with realistic experimental parameters shows that the protocol has a promising performance, and thus can be applied to practical QKD applications.