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arXiv:2001.08086 · Scientific Reports

Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution with leaky sources

Weilong Wang, Kiyoshi Tamaki, Marcos Curty

Published Jan 18, 2021• 44 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) can remove all detection side-channels from quantum communication systems. The security proofs require, however, that certain assumptions on the sources are satisfied. This includes, for instance, the requirement that there is no information leakage from the transmitters of the senders, which unfortunately is very difficult to guarantee in practice. In this paper we relax this unrealistic assumption by presenting a general formalism to prove the security of MDI-QKD with leaky sources. With this formalism, we analyze the finite-key security of two prominent MDI-QKD schemes-a symmetric three-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol and a four-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol-and determine their robustness against information leakage from both the intensity modulator and the phase modulator of the transmitters. Our work shows that MDI-QKD is feasible within a reasonable time frame of signal transmission given that the sources are sufficiently isolated. Thus, it provides an essential reference for experimentalists to ensure the security of implementations of MDI-QKD in the presence of information leakage.

DOI
10.1038/s41598-021-81003-2

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Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) can remove all detection side-channels from quantum communication systems. The security proofs require, however, that certain assumptions on the sources are satisfied. This includes, for instance, the requirement that there is no information leakage from the transmitters of the senders, which unfortunately is very difficult to guarantee in practice. In this paper we relax this unrealistic assumption by presenting a general formalism to prove the security of MDI-QKD with leaky sources. With this formalism, we analyze the finite-key security of two prominent MDI-QKD schemes-a symmetric three-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol and a four-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol-and determine their robustness against information leakage from both the intensity modulator and the phase modulator of the transmitters. Our work shows that MDI-QKD is feasible within a reasonable time frame of signal transmission given that the sources are sufficiently isolated. Thus, it provides an essential reference for experimentalists to ensure the security of implementations of MDI-QKD in the presence of information leakage.
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) is the only known QKD scheme that can completely overcome the problem of detection side-channel attacks. Yet, despite its practical importance, there is no standard approach towards proving the security of MDI-QKD. Here, we present a simple numerical method that can efficiently compute almost-tight security bounds for any discretely modulated MDI-QKD protocol. To demonstrate the broad utility of our method, we use it to analyze the security of coherent-state MDI-QKD, decoy-state MDI-QKD with leaky sources, and a variant of twin-field QKD called phase-matching QKD. In all of the numerical simulations (using realistic detection models) we find that our method gives significantly higher secret key rates than those obtained with current security proof techniques. Interestingly, we also find that phase-matching QKD using only two coherent test states is enough to overcome the fundamental rate-distance limit of QKD. Taken together, these findings suggest that our security proof method enables a versatile, fast, and possibly optimal approach towards the security validation of practical MDI-QKD systems.
Measurement-device-independent quantum key dis-tribution (MDI-QKD) can remove all detector side-channel attacks. However, there are still some assumptions on source preparations in MDI-QKD protocols, which are too strict to achieve in real-life implementations. To remove those assump-tions, here we construct a scheme on characterizing the source modulation errors with Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) interferences. Furthermore, we combine it with the decoy-state method and present the security analysis. Besides, finite data-size effects are taken into account as well. Simulation results verify the feasibility and practicability of this scheme. It thus seems a very promising candidate for constructing high-security network in the near future.
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) can remove all detection side channels but still makes additional assumptions on sources that can be compromised through uncharacterized side channels in practice. Here, we combine a recently proposed reference technique to prove the security of MDI-QKD against possible source imperfections and/or side channels. This requires some reference states and an upper bound on the parameter that describes the quality of the sources. With this formalism we investigate the asymptotic performance of single-photon sources, and the results show that the side channels have a great impact on the key rates.
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) is designed to be secure against any detector-side channel attacks. However, assumption of characterized sources in preparation is a demanding requirement and can not be fully satisfied in real-life implementations. Luckily, by utilizing the data of mismatched bases, the system can even generate secure keys with uncharacterized sources. Here, we give a framework on investigating the practical performance of an improved MDI-QKD with uncharacterized sources, where the three-intensity decoy-state method is employed and full parameter optimizations are applied. Simulation results show that the improved method can significantly enhance the performance compared with the original MDI-QKD with uncharacterized sources.
To date, only active-decoy-state methods have been adopted in current measurement-device-independent (MDI) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, causing security loopholes when modulating multiple light intensities with practical devices. To solve this problem, the passive-decoy-state method will be a good choice. Until today practical passive-decoy-state MDI QKD is still missing. In this paper, based on a recently discussed structure of heralded single-photon sources, we propose a passive-decoy-state MDI QKD protocol. In present work, one does not need to modulate light sources into different intensities, but utilizes the built-in local detection events to passively generate different decoy states. Furthermore, through carrying out an appropriate mathematical method, we are able to give very precise estimations for single-photon-pair contributions. As a result, our protocol can exhibit distinct advantages compared with state-of-the-art MDI QKD schemes even when the finite-key-size effect is taken into account. Therefore, our protocol seems a promising candidate to enhance both the security and performance of MDI QKD in practical implementation.
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) is proposed to close the loopholes of the detection part in QKD systems, while it still requires the light source to be trusted. This assumption is not guaranteed in practice, leading to practical secure issues. In this paper, we propose a light source monitoring scheme with single-photon detectors for MDI-QKD, which can guarantee the security of the system under the untrusted source condition with both common decoy state method and the newly proposed five-intensity decoy state method. Moreover, our monitoring scheme performs almost the same as the ideal MDI protocol even considering the imperfect factors in practical systems. Compared to the previous scheme, our work improves the secure key rate and the transmission distance of practical MDI-QKD systems significantly.