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The Persistance of Memory: Surreal Trajectories in

Jeffrey Alan Barrett

Published Jan 1, 2000• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

In this paper I describe the history of the surreal trajectories problem and argue that in fact it is not a problem for Bohm’s theory. More specifically, I argue that one can take the particle trajectories predicted by Bohm’s theory to be the actual trajectories that particles follow and that there is no reason to suppose that good particle detectors are somehow fooled in the context of the surreal trajectories experiments. Rather than showing that Bohm’s theory predicts the wrong particle trajectories or that it somehow prevents one from making reliable measurements, such experiments ultimately reveal the special role played by position and the fundamental incompatibility between Bohm’s theory and the relativity. 1 1This paper is an extension of the discussion of surreal trajectories in Barrett (1999, 127–40). That section of the book was based on talk I gave at the Quantum Mechanics Workshop at the University of Pittsburgh in the Spring of 1997. And that talk owed much

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The Persistence of Memory: Surreal Trajectories in Bohm's Theory

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In this paper I describe the history of the surreal trajectories problem and argue that in fact it is not a problem for Bohm's theory. More specifically, I argue that one can take the particle trajectories predicted by Bohm's theory to be the actual trajectories that particles follow and that there is no reason to suppose that good particle detectors are somehow fooled in the context of the surreal trajectories experiments. Rather than showing that Bohm's theory predicts the wrong particle trajectories or that it somehow prevents one from making reliable measurements, such experiments ultimately reveal the special role played by position and the fundamental incompatibility between Bohm's theory and relativity. They also provide a striking example of the theory-ladenness of observation.

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On the Supposed Surrealism of Bohmian Mechanics

Lon Becker

Abstract In a recent paper, Englert et al. reject Bohm's reinterpretation of quantum mechanics as "surrealistic." Responses to this by Dewdney et al. and Durr et al. have generally missed the point of this somewhat strange characterization of the interpretation. In this paper I explain the experiment which is supposed to illustrate the surrealism. I argue that what is really being objected to is the non-locality of the interpretation. While this is an undesirable feature of Bohm's interpretation, it is not a feature of which the standard interpretation gives a more satisfactory account.

Zeitschrift für Naturforschung A•Jul 1, 1997•3 citations
In this paper I describe the history of the surreal trajectories problem and argue that in fact it is not a problem for Bohm’s theory. More specifically, I argue that one can take the particle trajectories predicted by Bohm’s theory to be the actual trajectories that particles follow and that there is no reason to suppose that good particle detectors are somehow fooled in the context of the surreal trajectories experiments. Rather than showing that Bohm’s theory predicts the wrong particle trajectories or that it somehow prevents one from making reliable measurements, such experiments ultimately reveal the special role played by position and the fundamental incompatibility between Bohm’s theory and the relativity. 1 1This paper is an extension of the discussion of surreal trajectories in Barrett (1999, 127–40). That section of the book was based on talk I gave at the Quantum Mechanics Workshop at the University of Pittsburgh in the Spring of 1997. And that talk owed much
In this paper I describe the history of the surreal trajectories problem and argue that in fact it is not a problem for Bohm's theory. More specifically, I argue that one can take the particle trajectories predicted by Bohm's theory to be the actual trajectories that particles follow and that there is no reason to suppose that good particle detectors are somehow fooled in the context of the surreal trajectories experiments. Rather than showing that Bohm's theory predicts the wrong particle trajectories or that it somehow prevents one from making reliable measurements, such experiments ultimately reveal the special role played by position and the fundamental incompatibility between Bohm's theory and relativity. They also provide a striking example of the theory-ladenness of observation.
The claim of Kocsis et al. to have experimentally determined "photon trajectories" calls for a re-examination of the meaning of "quantum trajectories". We will review the arguments that have been assumed to have established that a trajectory has no meaning in the context of quantum mechanics. We show that the conclusion that the Bohm trajectories should be called "surreal" because they are at "variance with the actual observed track" of a particle is wrong as it is based on a false argument. We also present the results of a numerical investigation of a double Stern-Gerlach experiment which shows clearly the role of the spin within the Bohm formalism and discuss situations where the appearance of the quantum potential is open to direct experimental exploration.
The proposal that the one-parameter solutions of the real part of the Schrodinger equation (quantum Hamilton-Jacobi equation) can be regarded as `quantum particle trajectories' has received considerable attention recently. Opinions as to their significance differ. Some argue that they do play a fundamental role as actual particle trajectories, others regard them as mere metaphysical appendages without any physical significance. Recent work has claimed that in some cases the Bohm approach gives results that disagree with those obtained from standard quantum mechanics and, in consequence, with experiment. Furthermore it is claimed that these trajectories have such unacceptable properties that they can only be considered as `surreal'. We re-examine these questions and show that the specific objections raised by Englert, Scully, Sussmann and Walther cannot be sustained. We also argue that contrary to their negative view, these trajectories can provide a deeper insight into quantum processes.
Quoting James Cushing (1994): '... most will never have heard of Bohm's theory. Those who have are certain it must be wrong, although they are not sure exactly why...Those few who still remain to listen to a description of Bohm's theory are usually surprised when they learn that they can, if they wish, consistently believe in actual particle trajectories in a space-time background.'In this talk we present the main features of the de Broglie-Bohm quantum mechanics from a perspective where it could provide a path to new physics, where the orthodox approach to quantum mechanics would be an effective description of a more fundamental underlying theory.
Abstract In a recent paper, Englert et al. reject Bohm's reinterpretation of quantum mechanics as "surrealistic." Responses to this by Dewdney et al. and Durr et al. have generally missed the point of this somewhat strange characterization of the interpretation. In this paper I explain the experiment which is supposed to illustrate the surrealism. I argue that what is really being objected to is the non-locality of the interpretation. While this is an undesirable feature of Bohm's interpretation, it is not a feature of which the standard interpretation gives a more satisfactory account.