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Critical Review

Schrödinger’s Cat and the Dog That Didn’t Bark: Why Quantum Mechanics is (Probably) Irrelevant to the Social Sciences

David Waldner

Published Apr 3, 2017• 21 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Alexander Wendt’s Quantum Mind and Social Science reopens the question of the relevance of quantum mechanics to the social sciences. In response, I argue that due to “quantum decoherence,” the macroscopic world filters out quantum effects. Moreover, quantum decoherence makes it unlikely that the theory of quantum brains, on which Wendt relies, is true. Finally, while quantum decision theory is a potentially revolutionary field, it has not clearly accounted for alleged anomalies in classical understandings of decision making. However, the logic of quantum decoherence can motivate a new approach to the structure-agent problem.

DOI
10.1080/08913811.2017.1323431

Related papers

Quantum Mind and Social Science

Alexander E. Wendt

There is an underlying assumption in the social sciences that consciousness and social life are ultimately classical physical/material phenomena. In this ground-breaking book, Alexander Wendt challenges this assumption by proposing that consciousness is, in fact, a macroscopic quantum mechanical phenomenon. In the first half of the book, Wendt justifies the insertion of quantum theory into social scientific debates, introduces social scientists to quantum theory and the philosophical controversy about its interpretation, and then defends the quantum consciousness hypothesis against the orthodox, classical approach to the mind-body problem. In the second half, he develops the implications of this metaphysical perspective for the nature of language and the agent-structure problem in social ontology. Wendt's argument is a revolutionary development which raises fundamental questions about the nature of social life and the work of those who study it.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Apr 20, 2015•528 citations

Entangling the social: Comments on Alexander Wendt, Quantum Mind and Social Science

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Abstract Alexander Wendt suggests that an emerging field of research on quantum consciousness may have important implications for our understanding of the social world as well. He wants us to consider that the operations of the brain are not “classical” but rather quantum‐mechanical, and that this sheds light on the social worker as well. This article casts doubt on these claims. First, the idea of panpsychism (all physical things possess features of consciousness) is implausible on its face. Second, the findings of “quantum decision theory” are much more limited than Wendt recognizes. Third, the biological quantum effects currently subject to investigation are limited in their application to brains and persons by unavoidable limits of time and space scale on quantum effects. The “brain as quantum computer” or “brain as wave function” theory is very implausible given current knowledge.

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Abstract Quantum mechanics supersedes classical mechanics, and social science, some argue, should be responsive to this change. This paper finds that two rather different arguments are currently being used to argue that quantum mechanics is epistemically relevant in social science. One, attributed to Alexander Wendt, appeals to the presence of quantum physical effects in the social world. The other, attributed to Karen Barad, insists on the importance of quantum metaphysics even when quantum effects are negligible. Neither argument, however, is sound. Consequently, the paper concludes that neither of them offers compelling arguments for the view that quantum mechanics has epistemic relevance for social science.

European Journal for Philosophy of Science•Jul 29, 2023•8 citations

We are not walking wave functions. A response to “Quantum Mind and Social Science” by Alexander Wendt

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Abstract Alexander Wendt raises many interesting questions in this book, but to get to the answers he wants, he relies on a misunderstanding of the nature of the quantum states of macroscopic objects.

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour•Mar 30, 2018•11 citations

A quantum leap for social theory

Steve Fuller

Abstract I discuss the revolutionary implications of Alexander Wendt's Quantum Mind and Social Science for social theory. These center on the significance given to society as a possibility space in which observable social reality amounts to quantum decoherent states in the system. I discuss how Wendt radicalises social constructivism and goes considerably beyond Bourdieu's conceptions of society as a field. A signature feature in Wendt's theory, the state as a hologram, comports well with the implied view of the social order in much public opinion and market research. In this respect, Wendt's theory is very attuned to the spirit of our times.

Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour•Apr 17, 2018•7 citations

Quantum social science: a non-mathematical motivation

Emmanuel E. Haven, Andrei Yu. Khrennikov

What is quantum social science? After a short discursion into the field of “econophysics” we now arrive at a much more exotic stop. However, readers who have perused Chapter 1, will possibly be less astonished to find that instead of making reference to social science within a statistical mechanics environment, we now make reference to social science as it could be embedded in a quantum mechanical context. Or is “quantum social science” denoting something altogether different? The term is certainly fraught with a huge potential for misinterpretation. A common, but maybe not so erroneous, interpretation of the term often made by newcomers to this “field” can be expressed via the following question: “is quantum social science about reformulating social science with quantum mechanical tools?” Such a question brings us closer to the goal of attempting to explain quantum social science, but right here and now, i.e. at this very point in this book, we have the opportunity to make a serious attempt to be really precise on what is meant with this new term. Therefore, let us from the outset indicate what it is not . Quantum social science is not about reformulating social science on a quantum size scale. The macroscopic world does not operate at the Planck scale. On prima facie, this obvious statement does not need any further explanation. However, if the human experience is centered around consciousness and the functioning of the brain, then we are much less sure to claim there is a total absence of quantum processes.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Jan 17, 2013•0 citations
Alexander Wendt’s Quantum Mind and Social Science reopens the question of the relevance of quantum mechanics to the social sciences. In response, I argue that due to “quantum decoherence,” the macroscopic world filters out quantum effects. Moreover, quantum decoherence makes it unlikely that the theory of quantum brains, on which Wendt relies, is true. Finally, while quantum decision theory is a potentially revolutionary field, it has not clearly accounted for alleged anomalies in classical understandings of decision making. However, the logic of quantum decoherence can motivate a new approach to the structure-agent problem.
There is an underlying assumption in the social sciences that consciousness and social life are ultimately classical physical/material phenomena. In this ground-breaking book, Alexander Wendt challenges this assumption by proposing that consciousness is, in fact, a macroscopic quantum mechanical phenomenon. In the first half of the book, Wendt justifies the insertion of quantum theory into social scientific debates, introduces social scientists to quantum theory and the philosophical controversy about its interpretation, and then defends the quantum consciousness hypothesis against the orthodox, classical approach to the mind-body problem. In the second half, he develops the implications of this metaphysical perspective for the nature of language and the agent-structure problem in social ontology. Wendt's argument is a revolutionary development which raises fundamental questions about the nature of social life and the work of those who study it.
Abstract Alexander Wendt suggests that an emerging field of research on quantum consciousness may have important implications for our understanding of the social world as well. He wants us to consider that the operations of the brain are not “classical” but rather quantum‐mechanical, and that this sheds light on the social worker as well. This article casts doubt on these claims. First, the idea of panpsychism (all physical things possess features of consciousness) is implausible on its face. Second, the findings of “quantum decision theory” are much more limited than Wendt recognizes. Third, the biological quantum effects currently subject to investigation are limited in their application to brains and persons by unavoidable limits of time and space scale on quantum effects. The “brain as quantum computer” or “brain as wave function” theory is very implausible given current knowledge.
Abstract Quantum mechanics supersedes classical mechanics, and social science, some argue, should be responsive to this change. This paper finds that two rather different arguments are currently being used to argue that quantum mechanics is epistemically relevant in social science. One, attributed to Alexander Wendt, appeals to the presence of quantum physical effects in the social world. The other, attributed to Karen Barad, insists on the importance of quantum metaphysics even when quantum effects are negligible. Neither argument, however, is sound. Consequently, the paper concludes that neither of them offers compelling arguments for the view that quantum mechanics has epistemic relevance for social science.
Abstract I discuss the revolutionary implications of Alexander Wendt's Quantum Mind and Social Science for social theory. These center on the significance given to society as a possibility space in which observable social reality amounts to quantum decoherent states in the system. I discuss how Wendt radicalises social constructivism and goes considerably beyond Bourdieu's conceptions of society as a field. A signature feature in Wendt's theory, the state as a hologram, comports well with the implied view of the social order in much public opinion and market research. In this respect, Wendt's theory is very attuned to the spirit of our times.
What is quantum social science? After a short discursion into the field of “econophysics” we now arrive at a much more exotic stop. However, readers who have perused Chapter 1, will possibly be less astonished to find that instead of making reference to social science within a statistical mechanics environment, we now make reference to social science as it could be embedded in a quantum mechanical context. Or is “quantum social science” denoting something altogether different? The term is certainly fraught with a huge potential for misinterpretation. A common, but maybe not so erroneous, interpretation of the term often made by newcomers to this “field” can be expressed via the following question: “is quantum social science about reformulating social science with quantum mechanical tools?” Such a question brings us closer to the goal of attempting to explain quantum social science, but right here and now, i.e. at this very point in this book, we have the opportunity to make a serious attempt to be really precise on what is meant with this new term. Therefore, let us from the outset indicate what it is not . Quantum social science is not about reformulating social science on a quantum size scale. The macroscopic world does not operate at the Planck scale. On prima facie, this obvious statement does not need any further explanation. However, if the human experience is centered around consciousness and the functioning of the brain, then we are much less sure to claim there is a total absence of quantum processes.