In order to build a secure and an efficient scheme even in the presence of quantum computers, we propose an improved authenticated key agreement scheme based on NTRU for applications in e-health platforms. In fact, user authentication and key agreement are important cryptographic primitives that allow two entities to establish a secure and an authenticated channel over insecure networks. Currently, the security of the most of these primitives relies on RSA or ECC standards, which ensure high security levels. Unfortunately, all cryptosystems based on factorization problems (e.g., RSA) or the discrete logarithm problem in finite groups (e.g., ECC) will be vulnerable to quantum attacks in the next few years due to Shor’s algorithm. Security and efficiency analysis show that the proposed scheme can resist various attacks, including quantum attacks while preserving efficiency.
In order to build a secure and an efficient scheme even in the presence of quantum computers, we propose an improved authenticated key agreement scheme based on NTRU for applications in e-health platforms. In fact, user authentication and key agreement are important cryptographic primitives that allow two entities to establish a secure and an authenticated channel over insecure networks. Currently, the security of the most of these primitives relies on RSA or ECC standards, which ensure high security levels. Unfortunately, all cryptosystems based on factorization problems (e.g., RSA) or the discrete logarithm problem in finite groups (e.g., ECC) will be vulnerable to quantum attacks in the next few years due to Shor’s algorithm. Security and efficiency analysis show that the proposed scheme can resist various attacks, including quantum attacks while preserving efficiency.
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are pervasively employed in critical domains such as smart healthcare, industrial automation, and environmental surveillance, where secure access control is essential. User authentication protocols are vital for thwarting unauthorized intrusions, yet the vast majority of existing schemes rely on conventional public-key cryptography (such as ECC, RSA), which is provably insecure in the post-quantum era due to Shor's algorithm. This motivates the design of post-quantum authentication that is also lightweight for resource-limited sensors. To address this challenge, we propose an efficient authentication and key agreement protocol based on Number Theory Research Unit (NTRU), a lattice-based cryptosystem offering proven resistance to quantum attacks. We have proven the correctness and security of our scheme through BAN logic and random oracle model and demonstrated through informal analysis that our scheme can resist various attack methods and possesses high security features. Moreover, we thoroughly evaluate our protocol against the most recent state-of-the-art schemes. The results indicate that our scheme has the lowest computational cost, and its communication cost is superior to that of most other schemes. Overall, our proposed protocol provides a robust, efficient, and future-proof authentication solution for WSNs, well-suited for deploying WSNs environments.
A quantum computer is a paradigm of information processing that can show remarkable possibilities of exponentially improved information processing. However, this paradigm could disrupt the current cryptosystem, which is called quantum computing attacks, by calculating factoring problem and discrete logarithm problem. Recently, NTRU is applied to various security systems, because it provides security against to provide secu-rity against quantum computing attacks. Furthermore, NTRU provides similar security level and efficient computation time of encryption/decryption compared to traditional PKC. In 2018, Jeong et al. proposed an user authentication and key distribution scheme using NTRU. They claimed that their scheme provides various security properties and secure against quantum comput-ing attacks. In this paper, we demonstrate that their scheme has security pitfalls and incorrectness in login and authentication phase. We also suggest countermeasures to fix the incorrectness and provide security against various attacks.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to the security foundations of current asymmetric cryptographic schemes, which primarily rely on the perceived difficulty of integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems. Shor's algorithm, in particular, demonstrates that a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could break these schemes efficiently, necessitating the development of quantum-resistant alternatives. This paper explores the construction of quantum-secure primitives utilizing ideal lattices, a specialized class of lattices that offer enhanced efficiency and structural advantages compared to general lattices. We delve into the theoretical underpinnings of ideal lattices, including the Ring Learning With Errors (Ring-LWE) problem and the NTRU problem, which are believed to be hard even for quantum computers. The paper reviews the evolution of lattice-based cryptography, analyzes the security reductions from worst-case lattice problems to average-case problem instances relevant for cryptographic constructions, and discusses the practical implications for key encapsulation mechanisms and digital signatures. We examine the current state of ideal lattice-based schemes, such as those standardized by NIST, and consider their performance characteristics, key sizes, and resistance to known attacks, including side-channel vulnerabilities. Our analysis highlights that ideal lattices provide a robust and efficient foundation for building the next generation of asymmetric cryptographic primitives, moving beyond the vulnerabilities inherent in factoring-based systems.
Authentication has been adopted in many areas, but most of these authentication schemes are built using traditional cryptographic primitives. It is widely believed that such primitives are not resistant to quantum algorithms. To deal with those quantum attacks, lattice-based cryptography was introduced by Ajtai in 1996. To the best of our knowledge, the existing lattice-based authentication schemes are based on a lattice-based public key encryption called NTRU: a ring-based public key cryptosystem, proposed by Hoffstein, Pipher, and Silverman in 1998. However, these schemes only support the case of a single user. In view of the aforementioned issue, we propose the first lattice-based group authentication scheme. The proposed scheme is secure against replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks. Moreover, compared with the existing lattice-based authentication schemes, ours provides the most efficient method to agree upon a session key among a group of users after mutual authentication.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant existential threat to current public-key cryptographic systems, most notably RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which rely on the presumed hardness of integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems. Shor's algorithm, a quantum algorithm, can efficiently solve these problems, rendering classical asymmetric primitives insecure. This paper addresses the imperative need for post-quantum cryptography (PQC) by exploring lattice-based constructs as robust alternatives for asymmetric primitives. We provide a comprehensive overview of the fundamental mathematical problems underlying lattice-based cryptography, such as the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP), Closest Vector Problem (CVP), Learning With Errors (LWE), and Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE). The paper surveys prominent lattice-based schemes, including NTRU, CRYSTALS-Kyber, and CRYSTALS-Dilithium, analyzing their security foundations, performance characteristics, and the extent to which they offer a viable "post-quantum RSA." We delve into the methodology of constructing these primitives, discuss their resilience against both classical and quantum attacks, and evaluate their practical implications for key sizes, computational efficiency, and deployment challenges. Our analysis highlights that lattice-based cryptography, particularly the NIST-standardized schemes, presents a strong candidate for securing digital communications in the quantum era, offering provable security rooted in worst-case to average-case reductions for lattice problems.