Designing Protocols for Nuclear Weapons Verification

Alexander Glaser, Boaz Barak, R.J. Goldston

Sébastien Philippe

Future nuclear arms-control agreements may call for reductions of the total number of nuclear weapons and warheads in the world arsenals. Such agreements would require new trusted verification mechanisms to confirm that items presented to inspectors are nuclear warheads and not spoofs. Proliferation and national security concerns require, however, that inspectors gain no warhead design information through this process. To address this paradox, considerable efforts have been directed towards the development of "information barriers." These barriers consist of automated measurement systems that process sensitive information but only display the results of internal analysis in a binary valid/invalid manner. These systems are, by their nature, at risk of electronic tampering and snooping – and their trusted implementation has so far proved extremely difficult to realize. This thesis takes radically different directions to address this challenge. It demonstrates new approaches to information protection and trusted instruments for nuclear warhead verification that are based on the cryptographic concepts of zero-knowledge proofs and physically unclonable functions. To the author's knowledge, this thesis provides the first demonstration of a zero-knowledge physical measurement technique. Using fast neutron differential radiography and superheated emulsion detectors, such a technique can show two objects have identical geometry and opacity to 14-MeV neutrons without revealing what these properties are. This zero-knowledge feature no longer holds when the objects compared are significantly different. Such a technique could form the basis of a template-matching verification system that could confirm the authenticity of nuclear weapons without sharing any secret design information. The thesis then introduces and demonstrates key elements of an optical physical unclonable function sensitive to neutrons and based on superheated emulsions. Such sensors are unique objects that cannot be cloned or simulated. The data they produce are a function of both their internal disordered structure and the physical quantity they measure. Due to their sensitivity against any structural variation, including through neutron irradiation, it is possible to show that they – or the data they have recorded -- have not been tampered with. Such sensors could be used by adversarial parties in sensitive facilities without the risk of being compromised.

B K Sujatha, G. Srinivasa Rao, S. Nagaprasad

Nuclear Weapons are subtle Weapons with State-of-art Technology that usually utilized in warfare. These are high level explosives with huge heat and radiation they emit. just in case of Fusion Energy discharged is associate quantity of 14Mev. Currently considering these aspects …. Quantum cryptography that uses quantum physics to create a secured manner of communication protocol can have a sway on this. This is often little effort to concentrate on the following situations just in case of nuclear weapons are utilized in a district what may well be things

J. T. C. Moore-Brabazon

Ilias Cherkaoui

Jake J. Hecla, Areg Danagoulian

Nuclear disarmament treaties are not sufficient in and of themselves to neutralize the existential threat of the nuclear weapons. Technologies are necessary for verifying the authenticity of the nuclear warheads undergoing dismantlement before counting them toward a treaty partner's obligation. Here we present a concept that leverages isotope-specific nuclear resonance phenomena to authenticate a warhead's fissile components by comparing them to a previously authenticated template. All information is encrypted in the physical domain in a manner that amounts to a physical zero-knowledge proof system. Using Monte Carlo simulations, the system is shown to reveal no isotopic or geometric information about the weapon, while readily detecting hoaxing attempts. This nuclear technique can dramatically increase the reach and trustworthiness of future nuclear disarmament treaties.