Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Designs Codes and Cryptography

Strengthening the security of authenticated key exchange against bad randomness

Michèle Feltz, Cas J. F. Cremers

Published Feb 13, 2017• 12 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s10623-017-0337-5

Related papers

Authenticated Key Exchange under Bad Randomness

Guomin Yang, Shanshan Duan, Duncan S. Wong +2 more

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2012•12 citations

Randomized authentication primitive problem in key exchange with strong security

Zheng Yang, Chao Liu, Wanping Liu +1 more

Journal of Information Security and Applications•Sep 11, 2017•1 citation

Authenticated Key Exchange under Bad Randomness ⋆

Guomin Yang, Shanshan Duan, Duncan S. Wong +2 more

Abstract. We initiate the formal study on authenticated key exchange (AKE) under bad randomness. This could happen when (1) an adversary compromises the randomness source and hence directly controls the randomness of each AKE session; and (2) the randomness repeats in different AKE sessions due to reset attacks. We construct two formal security models, Reset-1 and Reset-2, to capture these two bad randomness situations respectively, and investigate the security of some widely used AKE protocols in these models by showing that they become insecure when the adversary is able to manipulate the randomness. On the positive side, we propose simple but generic methods to make AKE protocols secure in Reset-1 and Reset-2 models. The methods work in a modular way: first, we strengthen a widely used AKE protocol to achieve Reset-2 security, then we show how to transform any Reset-2 secure AKE protocol to a new one which also satisfies Reset-1 security.

•Jan 1, 2011•0 citations

Authenticated Key Exchange under Bad Randomness, Revisited

Hui Cui, Glen Mudra

A bad randomness may cause catastrophic results in security; thus, it is of importance to make cryptographic systems secure against bad randomness. In this paper, we focus on a practical situation where an adversary is able to force participants in an authenticated key exchange (AKE) system to reuse the random values and the functions of these values, called related randomness attack (RRA). Following the existing randomness resetting security model of AKE and the RRA security model of public-key encryption, we present a model of RRA security for authenticated key exchange, as well as the necessary restrictions on the related randomness functions used to obtain the security definition. Then we show how a related randomness attack adversary breaks the security of some existing AKE protocols, and propose some constructions of RRA-secure authenticated key exchange in the random oracle model and standard model, respectively.

Mathematics•Jun 15, 2023•1 citation

Strengthening the security of key exchange protocols

Michèle Feltz

•Jan 1, 2014•0 citations

Stronger Security of Authenticated Key Exchange

Brian A. LaMacchia, Kristin Lauter, Anton Mityagin

Springer eBooks•Oct 5, 2007•709 citations
Abstract. We initiate the formal study on authenticated key exchange (AKE) under bad randomness. This could happen when (1) an adversary compromises the randomness source and hence directly controls the randomness of each AKE session; and (2) the randomness repeats in different AKE sessions due to reset attacks. We construct two formal security models, Reset-1 and Reset-2, to capture these two bad randomness situations respectively, and investigate the security of some widely used AKE protocols in these models by showing that they become insecure when the adversary is able to manipulate the randomness. On the positive side, we propose simple but generic methods to make AKE protocols secure in Reset-1 and Reset-2 models. The methods work in a modular way: first, we strengthen a widely used AKE protocol to achieve Reset-2 security, then we show how to transform any Reset-2 secure AKE protocol to a new one which also satisfies Reset-1 security.
A bad randomness may cause catastrophic results in security; thus, it is of importance to make cryptographic systems secure against bad randomness. In this paper, we focus on a practical situation where an adversary is able to force participants in an authenticated key exchange (AKE) system to reuse the random values and the functions of these values, called related randomness attack (RRA). Following the existing randomness resetting security model of AKE and the RRA security model of public-key encryption, we present a model of RRA security for authenticated key exchange, as well as the necessary restrictions on the related randomness functions used to obtain the security definition. Then we show how a related randomness attack adversary breaks the security of some existing AKE protocols, and propose some constructions of RRA-secure authenticated key exchange in the random oracle model and standard model, respectively.