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On quantum entanglement, counterfactuals, causality and dispositions

Tomasz Bigaj

Published Jan 12, 2017• 5 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract The existence of non-local correlations between outcomes of measurements in quantum entangled systems strongly suggests that we are dealing with some form of causation here. An assessment of this conjecture in the context of the collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is the primary goal of this paper. Following the counterfactual approach to causation, I argue that the details of the underlying causal mechanism which could explain the non-local correlations in entangled states strongly depend on the adopted semantics for counterfactuals. Several relativistically-invariant interpretations of spatiotemporal counterfactual conditionals are discussed, and the corresponding causal stories describing interactions between parts of an entangled system are evaluated. It is observed that the most controversial feature of the postulated causal connections is not so much their non-local character as a peculiar type of circularity that affects them.

DOI
10.1007/s11229-016-1304-9

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Abstract The existence of non-local correlations between outcomes of measurements in quantum entangled systems strongly suggests that we are dealing with some form of causation here. An assessment of this conjecture in the context of the collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is the primary goal of this paper. Following the counterfactual approach to causation, I argue that the details of the underlying causal mechanism which could explain the non-local correlations in entangled states strongly depend on the adopted semantics for counterfactuals. Several relativistically-invariant interpretations of spatiotemporal counterfactual conditionals are discussed, and the corresponding causal stories describing interactions between parts of an entangled system are evaluated. It is observed that the most controversial feature of the postulated causal connections is not so much their non-local character as a peculiar type of circularity that affects them.
We investigate whether standard counterfactual analyses of causation (CACs) imply that the outcomes of space-like separated measurements on entangled particles are causally related. Although it has sometimes been claimed that standard CACs imply such a causal relation, we argue that a careful examination of David Lewis’s influential counterfactual semantics casts doubt on this. We discuss ways in which Lewis’s semantics and standard CACs might be extended to the case of space-like correlations. 1 Introduction2 Measurement Outcomes and Counterfactual Analyses of Causation3 Lewis’s Analysis 1 of Counterfactuals (‘Asymmetry-by-Fiat’) 3.1 Analysis 1 3.2 A frame-relative reading of Analysis 1 3.3 Frame-invariant readings of Analysis 1 3.4 Discussion4 Lewis’s Analysis 2 of Counterfactuals (‘Closest Worlds’)5 Extending the Everyday Concept of Cause6 Conclusion
At the basis of the problem of explaining non-local quantum correlations lies the tension between two factors: on the one hand, the natural interpretation of correlations as the manifestation of a causal relation; on the other, the resistance on the part of the physics underlying said correlations to adjust to the most essential features of a pre-theoretic notion of causation. In this paper, I argue for the rejection of the first horn of the dilemma, i.e., the assumption that quantum correlations call for a causal explanation. The paper is divided into two parts. The first, destructive, part provides a critical overview of the enterprise of causally interpreting non-local quantum correlations, with the aim of warning against the temptation of an account of causation claiming to cover such correlations 'for free'. The second, constructive, part introduces the so-called structural explanation (a variety of non-causal explanation that shows how the explanandum is the manifestation of a fundamental structure of the world) and argues that quantum correlations might be explained structurally in the context of an information-theoretic approach to QT.
By moving to the context of relativistic space-time structure, this chapter completes the argument of Chapter 4 that we can use quantum theory locally to explain correlations that violate Bell inequalities with no instantaneous action at a distance. Chance here must be relativized not just to time but to a space-time point, so that an event may have more than one chance at the same time—it may even be certain relative to one space-time point but ‘at the same time’ completely uncertain relative to another. This renders Bell’s principle of Local Causality either inapplicable or intuitively unmotivated. Counterfactual dependence between the outcomes of measurements on systems assigned an entangled state is not causal since neither outcome is subject to intervention: but it may still be appealed to in a non-causal explanation of one in terms of the other.
Is time necessary for causation? We argue that, given a counterfactual theory of causation, it is not. We defend this claim by considering cases of counterfactual dependence in quantum mechanics. These cases involve laws of nature that govern entanglement. These laws make possible the evaluation of causal counterfactuals between space-like separated entangled particles. There is, for the proponent of a counterfactual theory of causation, a possible world in which causation but not time exists that can be reached by "stripping out" time from the actual world, leaving (some) quantum mechanical laws intact.
Realist interpretations of quantum mechanics presuppose the existence of elements of reality that are independent of the actions used to reveal them. Such a view is challenged by several no-go theorems that show quantum correlations cannot be explained by non-contextual ontological models, where physical properties are assumed to exist prior to and independently of the act of measurement. However, all such contextuality proofs assume a traditional notion of causal structure, where causal influence flows from past to future according to ordinary dynamical laws. This leaves open the question of whether the apparent contextuality of quantum mechanics is simply the signature of some exotic causal structure, where the future might affect the past or distant systems might get correlated due to non-local constraints. Here we show that quantum predictions require a deeper form of contextuality: even allowing for arbitrary causal structure, no model can explain quantum correlations from non-contextual ontological properties of the world, be they initial states, dynamical laws, or global constraints.
Abstract We introduce a formalism for the evaluation of counterfactual queries in the framework of quantum causal models, generalising Pearl’s semantics for counterfactuals in classical causal models, thus completing the last rung in the quantum analogue of Pearl’s ‘ladder of causation’. To this end, we define a suitable extension of Pearl’s notion of a ‘structural causal model’, which we denote analogously by ‘quantum structural causal model (QSM)’ , and a corresponding extension of Pearl’s three-step procedure of abduction, action, and prediction. We show that every classical (probabilistic) structural causal model can be extended to a QSM, and prove that counterfactual queries that can be formulated within a classical structural causal model agree with their corresponding queries in the quantum extension—but the latter is more expressive. Counterfactuals in quantum causal models come in different forms: we distinguish between active and passive counterfactual queries, depending on whether or not an intervention is to be performed in the action step. This is in contrast to the classical case, where counterfactuals are always interpreted in the active sense. Another distinctive feature of our formalism is that it breaks the connection between causal and counterfactual dependence that exists in the classical case: quantum counterfactuals allow for counterfactual dependence without causal dependence . This distinction between classical and quantum causal models may shed light on how the latter can reproduce quantum correlations that violate Bell inequalities while being faithful to the relativistic causal structure.