By moving to the context of relativistic space-time structure, this chapter completes the argument of Chapter 4 that we can use quantum theory locally to explain correlations that violate Bell inequalities with no instantaneous action at a distance. Chance here must be relativized not just to time but to a space-time point, so that an event may have more than one chance at the same time—it may even be certain relative to one space-time point but ‘at the same time’ completely uncertain relative to another. This renders Bell’s principle of Local Causality either inapplicable or intuitively unmotivated. Counterfactual dependence between the outcomes of measurements on systems assigned an entangled state is not causal since neither outcome is subject to intervention: but it may still be appealed to in a non-causal explanation of one in terms of the other.
By moving to the context of relativistic space-time structure, this chapter completes the argument of Chapter 4 that we can use quantum theory locally to explain correlations that violate Bell inequalities with no instantaneous action at a distance. Chance here must be relativized not just to time but to a space-time point, so that an event may have more than one chance at the same time—it may even be certain relative to one space-time point but ‘at the same time’ completely uncertain relative to another. This renders Bell’s principle of Local Causality either inapplicable or intuitively unmotivated. Counterfactual dependence between the outcomes of measurements on systems assigned an entangled state is not causal since neither outcome is subject to intervention: but it may still be appealed to in a non-causal explanation of one in terms of the other.
Introduction Fifty years after the publication of Bell's theorem, there remains some controversy regarding what the theorem is telling us about quantum mechanics, and what the experimental violations of Bell inequalities are telling us about the world. This chapter represents my best attempt to be clear about what I think the lessons are. In brief: There is some sort of nonlocality inherent in any quantum theory, and, moreover, in any theory that reproduces, even approximately, the quantum probabilities for the outcomes of experiments. But not all forms of nonlocality are the same; there is a distinction to be made between action at a distance and other forms of nonlocality, and I will argue that the nonlocality needed to violate the Bell inequalities need not involve action at a distance. Furthermore, the distinction between forms of nonlocality makes a difference when it comes to compatibility with relativistic causal structure. The Bell locality condition is a condition which, if satisfied, renders possible a completely local account of the correlations between outcomes of spatially separated experiments. Bell's theorem tells us that the probabilities that we compute from quantum mechanics do not admit of such an account. Modulo auxiliary assumptions that, in my opinion, should be noncontroversial, this yields the conclusion that there must be something nonlocal about any theory that yields the quantum mechanical probabilities or anything close to them. One way to violate the Bell locality condition – and this is the way that any deterministic theory must do it – is via straightforward action at a distance. However, we should also consider the possibility of a stochastic theorywith probabilistic laws that involve irreducible correlations. The sort of nonlocality inherent in such a theory involves relations between events that are significantly different from causal relations as usually conceived. Perhaps surprisingly, such a theory, unlike its deterministic cousins, need not invoke a distinguished relation of distant simultaneity. This makes a difference for the situation of the two sorts of theories vis-a-vis relativity. Though a deterministic theory can achieve the appearance of being relativistic, at the level of observable phenomena, it can do so only by introducing a preferred foliation and with it a causal structure at odds with relativistic causal structures. Things are otherwise with dynamical collapse theories.
Abstract This essay sketches a pragmatist interpretation of quantum theory and shows how to use it to explain EPR-Bell correlations consistently with relativity. Quantum theory is not a locally causal theory, not because it violates Bell’s local causality condition, but because that condition is simply inapplicable to it. Any agent can use quantum theory to show why EPR-Bell correlations are to be expected. For space-like separated measurements of vertical/horizontal polarization of each photon from a pair in Bell state Φ+, an agent’s explanation of why the distant measurement outcome matches his own appeals neither to a preferred frame nor to any direct connection or influence between these events. Here, as elsewhere, quantum theory helps one explain an initially puzzling phenomenon not by locating it in a causal net but by showing why its occurrence is just what one should have expected in the circumstances.
It has been claimed that quantum mechanics is a non-local theory, i.e., that the predictions of quantum mechanics are at odds with a conception of the world where all the interactions are mediated by local mechanisms. The cited reason is the violation of the Bell inequality in cases where measurements are performed on quantum systems of particles that have interacted in the past. Quantum mechanics predicts that the state of the particles in such a system are correlated, a result obtained from considering a thought-experiment often known as EPR. In this thesis, I will argue that the violation of the Bell inequality in EPR forces us to either accept that causes sometimes act both backwards and forwards in time, or give up some widely-held assumptions about causal relations or the role of causal explanations. First, I will present three principles regarding causality that I take be widely accepted. I will then present the background for the claim the quantum mechanics is a non-local theory, and discuss the implications of non-local causal influences in light of the Special Theory of Relativity. One argument against a causal explanation of the EPR-correlations will be discussed, and different models for the causal structure of EPR will be assessed. I will argue that a retrocausal model – models that include instances of retrocausation, where the direction of causation is the opposite of the direction of time – is the only viable option if we want to uphold the three principles presented in chapter 1. I will discuss the plausibility of rejecting one of these principles, and argue that at least one of the can be restricted in a way that still accounts for our commitment to it. Finally, I will assess the non-local models against the retrocausal models, and argue that a retrocausal model offers interpretational advantages over the non-local alternatives.
Bell appealed to the theory of relativity in formulating his principle of local causality. But he maintained that quantum field theories do not conform to that principle, even when their field equations are relativistically covariant and their observable algebras satisfy a relativistically motivated microcausality condition. A pragmatist view of quantum theory and an interventionist approach to causation prompt the reevaluation of local causality and microcausality. Local causality cannot be understood as a reasonable requirement on relativistic quantum field theories: it is unmotivated even if applicable to them. But microcausality emerges as a sufficient condition for the consistent application of a relativistic quantum field theory.
J.S. Bell's work has convinced many that correlations in violation of CHSH inequalities show that the world itself is non-local, and that there is an apparently essential conflict between any sharp formulation of quantum theory and relativity. Against this consensus, this paper argues that there is no conflict between quantum theory and relativity. Quantum theory itself helps us explain such (otherwise) puzzling correlations in a way that contradicts neither Bell's intuitive locality principle nor his local causality condition. The argument depends on understanding quantum theory along pragmatist lines, and on a more general view of how that theory helps us explain. Quantum theory is compatible with Bell's intuitive locality principle and with his local causality condition not because it conforms to them, but because they are simply inapplicable to quantum theory, as so understood.
Quantum entanglement is popularly believed to give rise to spooky action at a distance of a kind that Einstein decisively rejected. Indeed, important recent experiments on systems assigned entangled states have been claimed to refute Einstein by exhibiting such spooky action. After reviewing two considerations in favor of this view I argue that quantum theory can be used to explain puzzling correlations correctly predicted by assignment of entangled quantum states with no such instantaneous action at a distance. We owe both considerations in favor of the view to arguments of John Bell. I present simplified forms of these arguments as well as a game that provides insight into the situation. The argument I give in response turns on a prescriptive view of quantum states that differs both from Dirac’s (as stated in Chapter 2) and Einstein’s.