Two new protocols for quantum binary voting are proposed. One of the proposed protocols is designed using a standard scheme for controlled deterministic secure quantum communication (CDSQC), and the other one is designed using the idea of quantum cryptographic switch, which uses a technique known as permutation of particles. A few possible alternative approaches to accomplish the same task (quantum binary voting) have also been discussed. Security of the proposed protocols is analyzed. Further, the efficiencies of the proposed protocols are computed, and are compared with that of the existing protocols. The comparison has established that the proposed protocols are more efficient than the existing protocols.
Two new protocols for quantum binary voting are proposed. One of the proposed protocols is designed using a standard scheme for controlled deterministic secure quantum communication (CDSQC), and the other one is designed using the idea of quantum cryptographic switch, which uses a technique known as permutation of particles. A few possible alternative approaches to accomplish the same task (quantum binary voting) have also been discussed. Security of the proposed protocols is analyzed. Further, the efficiencies of the proposed protocols are computed, and are compared with that of the existing protocols. The comparison has established that the proposed protocols are more efficient than the existing protocols.
In a traditional voting system, voters have to reach the voting system to cast their votes. It is difficult for the elderly and for those living in remote localities to cast a vote. In the era of digital advancements, remote electronic voting has emerged as an efficient means of engaging citizens in decision-making processes. However, ensuring fairness and mitigating fraud in elections remain significant challenges. This research paper proposes a novel approach called Quantum Secret Sharing (QSS) combined with the quantum binary voting protocol, leveraging the capabilities of the IBM Quantum Experience platform. By incorporating established security features and introducing new criteria, this protocol aims to surpass the limitations of classical voting systems. The research involves the creation of communication circuits using IBM Quantum Experience and subsequent analysis through quantum state tomography. By integrating the principles of QSS and the quantum binary voting protocol, the proposed approach addresses the limitations of classical voting systems. The protocol satisfies the standards of traditional voting systems while introducing new criteria to overcome their shortcomings. Through the utilization of IBM Quantum Experience, secure communication circuits are established, and the outcomes are analyzed using quantum state tomography, ensuring the fairness and accuracy of the voting process. It integrates quantum cryptography, quantum communication, and classical cryptography techniques to create a robust and tamper-resistant voting protocol. By employing quantum superposition, the protocol enables voters to cast their votes in multiple states simultaneously, making it extremely difficult for a malicious person to intercept or alter individual votes. Furthermore, quantum entanglement ensures that any unauthorized attempt to measure or manipulate the quantum states would result in detectable changes, enhancing the overall security of the voting process.
Recent advances indicate that quantum computers will soon be reality. Motivated by this ever more realistic threat for existing classical cryptographic protocols, researchers have developed several schemes to resist “quantum attacks.” In particular, for electronic voting (e-voting), several schemes relying on properties of quantum mechanics have been proposed. However, each of these proposals comes with a different and often not well-articulated corruption model, has different objectives, and is accompanied by security claims that are never formalized and are at best justified only against specific attacks. To address this, we propose the first formal security definitions for quantum e-voting protocols. With these at hand, we systematize and evaluate the security of previously proposed quantum e-voting protocols; we examine the claims of these works concerning privacy, correctness, and verifiability, and if they are correctly attributed to the proposed protocols. In all non-trivial cases, we identify specific quantum attacks that violate these properties. We argue that the cause of these failures lies in the absence of formal security models and references to the existing cryptographic literature.
A set of new schemes for quantum computation and communication have been either designed or experimentally realized using optimal quantum resources. A multi-output quantum teleportation scheme, where a sender (Alice) teleports an m and m+1-qubit GHZ-like unknown state to a receiver (Bob), has been demonstrated using two copies of the Bell state instead of a five-qubit cluster state and implemented on IBM's quantum computer for the m=1 case. Another scheme, known as quantum broadcasting where a known state is sent to two spatially separated parties (Bob and Charlie) has also been realized using two Bell states. It is shown that existing quantum broadcasting schemes can be reduced to multiparty remote state preparation. After achieving teleportation of unknown and known states, sending a quantum operator becomes the next step. A scheme for remote implementation of operators (RIO), specifically a controlled joint-RIO (CJRIO), has been proposed using a four-qubit hyper-entangled state involving spatial and polarization degrees of freedom. In this direction, two more variants, remote implementation of hidden and partially unknown operators (RIHO and RIPUO) have also been proposed. Their success probabilities are analyzed considering dissipation of an auxiliary coherent state interacting with the environment. For secure multiparty tasks like quantum voting or auction, secure multiparty quantum computation (SMQC) becomes essential. A quantum anonymous voting (QAV) scheme has been experimentally implemented on IBM's quantum computer. Finally, two quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, coherent one-way (COW) and differential phase shift (DPS), are experimentally demonstrated and the key rates are analyzed as functions of post-processing parameters and detector dead times across various distances.
Recent advances at Google, IBM, as well as a number of research groups indicate that quantum computers will soon be reality. Motivated by the ever more realistic threat quantum computers pose to existing classical cryptographic protocols, researchers have developed several schemes to resist "quantum attacks". In particular, for electronic voting, several e-voting schemes relying on properties of quantum mechanics have been proposed. However, each of these proposals comes with a different and often not well-articulated corruption model, has different objectives, and is accompanied by security claims which are never formalized and are at best justified only against specific attacks. In this paper, we systematize and evaluate the security of suggested e-voting protocols based on quantum technology. We examine the claims of these works concerning privacy, correctness and verifiability, and if they are correctly attributed to the proposed protocols. In all non-trivial cases, we identified specific quantum attacks that violate these properties. We argue that the cause of these failures lies in the absence of formal security models and in a more general lack of reference to the existing cryptographic literature.
The development of quantum computing poses a very real threat to traditional cryptography, especially these, which are number-theoretic like RSA and ECC. With the more and more development of quantum algorithms such as Shor and Grover, there is an immediate necessity to come up with cryptographic protocols that are resistant to quantum attacks. This paper reviews and discusses different quantum-resistant (post-quantum) cryptographic schemes, such as lattice-based, code-based, multivariate, hash-based, and isogeny-based cryptography. It compares these protocols on the assumptions of their security and their efficiency in their computation and the size of their keys as well as their possible integrations into the existing communication infrastructure. Moreover, we also evaluate the standardization process by NIST and the difficulties of moving towards post-quantum security in practical use. This paper proposes a scalable comparison system, which correlates the hypothetical security basis of postquantum cryptography with the ability to effectively operate in the real world. It has emphasized protocol interoperability, migration compatibility and trade-offs in performance that gives a viable roadmap towards quantum-resistant cryptographic protocols implementation into current communication infrastructures whilst also providing scalable and future secure communication systems. This study, by emphasizing the potential and the drawbacks of the existing post-quantum cryptography schemes, helps in a more precise idea of the directions to follow on the way to a secure, future-proof communications scheme.