Recent advances at Google, IBM, as well as a number of research groups indicate that quantum computers will soon be reality. Motivated by the ever more realistic threat quantum computers pose to existing classical cryptographic protocols, researchers have developed several schemes to resist "quantum attacks". In particular, for electronic voting, several e-voting schemes relying on properties of quantum mechanics have been proposed. However, each of these proposals comes with a different and often not well-articulated corruption model, has different objectives, and is accompanied by security claims which are never formalized and are at best justified only against specific attacks. In this paper, we systematize and evaluate the security of suggested e-voting protocols based on quantum technology. We examine the claims of these works concerning privacy, correctness and verifiability, and if they are correctly attributed to the proposed protocols. In all non-trivial cases, we identified specific quantum attacks that violate these properties. We argue that the cause of these failures lies in the absence of formal security models and in a more general lack of reference to the existing cryptographic literature.
Recent advances at Google, IBM, as well as a number of research groups indicate that quantum computers will soon be reality. Motivated by the ever more realistic threat quantum computers pose to existing classical cryptographic protocols, researchers have developed several schemes to resist "quantum attacks". In particular, for electronic voting, several e-voting schemes relying on properties of quantum mechanics have been proposed. However, each of these proposals comes with a different and often not well-articulated corruption model, has different objectives, and is accompanied by security claims which are never formalized and are at best justified only against specific attacks. In this paper, we systematize and evaluate the security of suggested e-voting protocols based on quantum technology. We examine the claims of these works concerning privacy, correctness and verifiability, and if they are correctly attributed to the proposed protocols. In all non-trivial cases, we identified specific quantum attacks that violate these properties. We argue that the cause of these failures lies in the absence of formal security models and in a more general lack of reference to the existing cryptographic literature.
Recent advances indicate that quantum computers will soon be reality. Motivated by this ever more realistic threat for existing classical cryptographic protocols, researchers have developed several schemes to resist “quantum attacks.” In particular, for electronic voting (e-voting), several schemes relying on properties of quantum mechanics have been proposed. However, each of these proposals comes with a different and often not well-articulated corruption model, has different objectives, and is accompanied by security claims that are never formalized and are at best justified only against specific attacks. To address this, we propose the first formal security definitions for quantum e-voting protocols. With these at hand, we systematize and evaluate the security of previously proposed quantum e-voting protocols; we examine the claims of these works concerning privacy, correctness, and verifiability, and if they are correctly attributed to the proposed protocols. In all non-trivial cases, we identify specific quantum attacks that violate these properties. We argue that the cause of these failures lies in the absence of formal security models and references to the existing cryptographic literature.
Electronic voting (e-voting) has emerged as a transformative technology in the modern digital era. Many countries across the world are using e-voting systems in different types of elections, from political to non-political. One of the primary goals of e-voting is ensuring both verifiability and privacy simultaneously, which we refer to as security. Verifiability is a security feature that guarantees voters can confirm their vote is reflected in the final election result, while privacy guarantees that no one is able to link a vote to the voter who cast it. Verifiability needs to hold only for the duration of the election, whereas privacy needs to extend beyond the election period, even decades after the election. This property, known as everlasting privacy in the literature, ensures that even computationally unbounded adversaries cannot compromise voter privacy, securing elections against future advances in computing, including quantum computing. Researchers have proposed a wide variety of protocols to achieve this ambitious goal in secure e-voting, however, these protocols differ significantly, making the analysis and state-of-the-art complicated. In this thesis, we first address this fragmentation by systematically analyzing all existing e-voting protocols designed to ensure everlasting privacy. We map out the relationships and dependencies among these protocols, evaluate their security and efficiency under realistic assumptions, and identify unresolved challenges in the field. Our work provides a foundational reference for researchers aiming to design secure e-voting systems with everlasting privacy, paving the way for privacypreserving elections in the post-quantum era. Building on these insights, we propose a novel e-voting system that integrates the best practices from prior research while addressing their limitations. Leveraging the Hyperion scheme as a foundation, we develop an enhanced protocol that not only guarantees everlasting privacy but also introduces everlasting receipt-freeness and coercion mitigation. Unlike existing systems like Selene and Hyperion, which rely on computational assumptions for privacy, our protocol offers privacy even against adversaries with unlimited computational power. In secure electronic voting systems with everlasting privacy, the focus is on futureproofing privacy, while sometimes election verifiability relies on the computational soundness of zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP), which are vulnerable to quantum adversaries. Therefore, a key technical challenge is designing e-voting systems with efficient post-quantum cryptographic primitives to secure both privacy and verifiability against quantum attacks. In this thesis, we advance the state of post-quantum ZKPs by focusing on the ZKPs proposed by Jain et al., which are based on the conservative Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) assumption. We optimize the efficiency of these ZKPs, achieve formal security verification using EasyCrypt, and uncover flaws in existing implementations, demonstrating their vulnerability to malicious provers. Additionally, we construct the first code-based ZKP of shuffle, enabling a verifiable and privacy-preserving e-voting protocol with mixing-based tallying. Our e-voting system ensures both verifiability and vote privacy through the computational difficulty of decoding random linear codes, marking it as the first verifiable code-based e-voting system.
The rapid advancement of internet technology has raised attention to the importance of electronic voting in maintaining democracy and fairness in elections. E-voting refers to the use of electronic technology to facilitate the casting and counting of votes in elections. The need for designated verification arises from concerns about voter privacy, auditability, and the prevention of manipulation. Traditional e-voting systems use cryptographic techniques for security but lack verifiable proof of integrity. Integrating e-voting with a quantum designated verifier could address these challenges by leveraging the principles of quantum mechanics to enhance security and trustworthiness. In light of this, we propose a quantum e-voting scheme that uses a designated verifier signature. To ensure the confidentiality and authenticity of the voting process, the scheme uses quantum features like the no-cloning theorem and quantum key distribution. The proposed scheme has security properties like source hiding, non-transferability, and message anonymity. The proposed scheme is resistant to many quantum attacks, such as eavesdropping and impersonation. Due to designated verification, the scheme minimizes the risk of tempering. This paper provides a detailed description of the proposed scheme and analyzes its security properties. Therefore, the proposed scheme is efficient, practical, and secure.
Abstract Quantum computing promises unprecedented computational power, posing fundamental threats and offering novel solutions to modern cryptography and cybersecurity. This survey paper reviews the rapidly evolving landscape of quantum-resistant and quantum-native security protocols. By analyzing foundational computational security models and the unique vulnerabilities introduced by quantum algorithms, this work proposes a structured evaluation framework for assessing the robustness of cryptographic systems. Ultimately, this survey highlights the critical transition from classical cryptographic infrastructures to quantum-secure paradigms, ensuring data confidentiality and integrity in the post-quantum era. Keywords: Quantum Computing, Security Protocol, Vulnerabilities 1.Introduction The emergence of quantum computing represents a paradigm shift in both computational physics and information technology. Quantum algorithms, particularly Shor's and Grover's algorithms, inherently challenge the mathematical foundations of classical public-key cryptography. As a result, securing communication channels against quantum-empowered adversaries has become an urgent priority for global infrastructure and national security. The motivation for this survey stems from the immediate need to bridge the gap between theoretical quantum mechanics and applied cybersecurity, ensuring that secure communications can withstand the computational leaps expected in the next decade. The core problem addressed in this paper is the comprehensive evaluation of security protocols under the threat model of a fully scalable quantum computer. The scope encompasses both post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) protocols and inherently quantum protocols, such as those relying on physical quantum states for key distribution. Existing classical approaches are insufficient for two main reasons. First, classical computational security models often rely on mathematical hardness assumptions (like integer factorization) that are rapidly undermined by theoretical quantum algorithms. Second, current software tools for designing secure classical protocols fail to account for quantum state phenomena, such as superposition and entanglement, rendering classical verification methods inadequate for quantum threat models. To address these structural challenges, this paper presents the following contributions: We provide a comprehensive taxonomy of vulnerabilities in both classical and quantum security protocols, mapping specific algorithmic advantages to protocol failure points. We propose a structured, multi-module framework for simulating, attacking, and verifying the security of hybrid quantum-classical cryptographic architectures. 2.Foundations of Classical Protocol Analysis The rigorous analysis of security protocols has traditionally relied on well-defined computational and symbolic models (Toorani, 2016). Researchers have extensively mapped out the taxonomy of attacks on authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols and password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) systems, establishing the mathematical groundwork for secure communication. The core idea of these foundational works is to establish provable security bounds that distinguish between information-theoretic and computational security. While this traditional paradigm offers strong mathematical guarantees against classical adversaries, its primary weakness is the failure to incorporate quantum attack vectors into the adversary's capability profile. Our work builds upon these classical models by explicitly injecting quantum algorithmic capabilities into standard protocol verification routines. 2.1.Quantum Algorithm Development and Simulation A significant body of literature focuses on the theoretical development and computational simulation of quantum algorithms capable of compromising or enhancing network security. Academic overviews have formalized algorithms like Grover's and Shor's, demonstrating their theoretical efficiency over classical counterparts in breaking cryptographic primitives. Furthermore, researchers have developed advanced design automation tools, such as decision diagrams, to simulate and verify complex quantum circuits. The strength of these simulation tools lies in their ability to model complex quantum states without requiring expensive physical hardware. However, a notable weakness is that they often abstract away the physical noise and hardware constraints that exist in real-world cryptographic deployments. This survey contextualizes these simulation techniques specifically within the framework of adversarial security testing, bridging theoretical algorithms with practical protocol defense. 3.Physical Implementations and Hardware Considerations Beyond algorithmic theory, the physical realization of quantum states directly impacts the practical security of any quantum protocol. Research into cavity quantum electrodynamics (QED) has demonstrated the complete mathematical construction of fundamental quantum gates, such as the controlled-controlled NOT gate, operating in the weak coupling regime (Fujii et al., 2005). Additionally, methods like Quantum Computed Moments (QCM) address the hardware constraints and noise typical of Near-Term Intermediate Scale Quantum (NISQ) devices, estimating ground state properties even with suboptimal trial states. The strength of this hardware-focused research is its realism regarding current technological limits; however, it often lacks a direct bridge to high-level network protocol verification. Compared to these purely physical studies, our survey integrates physical noise models into a generalized, software-driven protocol verification framework. 4.Approach To systematically evaluate quantum computing security protocols, we propose a structured Quantum Protocol Verification Framework (QPVF). The first module is the "Threat Modeling Engine," which defines the adversary's capabilities, ranging from classical data interception to full quantum memory manipulation. The second module is the "Quantum Circuit Synthesizer," which leverages decision diagram-based tools to translate high-level cryptographic operations into verifiable quantum circuits. The final module is the "Vulnerability Analyzer," which subjects the synthesized circuits to simulated quantum attacks, effectively distinguishing between idealized computational security and realistic hardware-constrained security. This modular pipeline allows security engineers to isolate specific vulnerabilities at both the abstract algorithmic layer and the simulated physical implementation layer. A key design choice in the QPVF is the utilization of decision diagrams for circuit simulation. This choice is predicated on the fact that decision diagrams efficiently handle the exponential state space of quantum systems during complex verification tasks (Wille et al., 2021). Furthermore, our framework explicitly incorporates noise models derived from current NISQ hardware limitations, ensuring that the security evaluation reflects realistic physical constraints rather than purely idealized environments (Vallury & Hollenberg, 2023). To evaluate this framework, we propose a hypothetical benchmarking plan using an artificially generated dataset of 10,000 hybrid quantum-classical cryptographic key exchanges. We will measure the success rate of simulated Grover-based brute-force attacks against varying key sizes and simulated environmental noise levels. This evaluation will compare the theoretical vulnerability threshold of a protocol against the practical threshold observed when quantum noise severely degrades the adversary's computational capabilities. The operational flow of the QPVF is designed to provide end-to-end security verification for next-generation networks. It bridges the critical gap between abstract protocol design and simulated hardware execution. The methodology can be summarized by the following numbered pipeline: Protocol Ingestion: The classical or quantum protocol is parsed into a standardized symbolic representation. Adversary Assignment: The user assigns a precise computational profile, selecting between traditional classical algorithms or advanced quantum capabilities. Circuit Generation: Protocol steps are mapped to equivalent quantum decision diagrams for scalable software simulation. Execution & Attack: Simulated quantum algorithms are executed against the mapped circuits to test for cryptographic resilience. Output Generation: The system outputs a vulnerability score and highlights specific failure points caused by either algorithmic weaknesses or simulated hardware noise. 5.Discussion The transition to quantum-secure protocols carries profound practical implications for global information infrastructure and enterprise deployment. Deploying these advanced protocols requires immense updates to existing software toolkits, as current digital systems are not fundamentally designed to handle the complexity of quantum states. Furthermore, organizations must consider the massive educational and workforce development efforts needed to train software engineers in quantum cryptography, a requirement already highlighted by international hackathons and educational initiatives. Integrating quantum-resistant protocols into complex domains like high-energy physics networks or global banking systems will require bridging the gap between theoretical quantum mechanics and applied computer engineering. Consequently, practical deployment must occur in hybrid phases, maintaining classical cryptographic wrappers while dedicated quantum infrastructure matures. Despite the robust theoretical design of proposed quantum security frameworks, several limitations and failure modes persist in practical applications. First, physical implementation attacks, such as side-channel attacks on the lasers and cavities used in physical quantum gates can bypass theoretical software security guarant
We present a number of schemes that use quantum mechanics to preserve privacy, in particular, we show that entangled quantum states can be useful in maintaining privacy. We further develop our original proposal [see M. Hillery, M. Ziman, V. Bu\ifmmode \check{z}\else \v{z}\fi{}ek, and M. Bielikov\'a, Phys. Lett. A 349, 75 (2006)] for protecting privacy in voting, and examine its security under certain types of attacks, in particular dishonest voters and external eavesdroppers. A variation of these quantum-based schemes can be used for multiparty function evaluation. We consider functions corresponding to group multiplication of N group elements, with each element chosen by a different party. We show how quantum mechanics can be useful in maintaining the privacy of the choices group elements.
Quantum voting protocols aim to offer ballot secrecy and publicly verifiable tallies using physical guarantees from quantum mechanics, rather than relying solely on computational hardness. This article surveys whether such quantum voting protocols are practical. We begin by outlining core mathematical ideas such as the superposition principle, the no-cloning theorem, and quantum entanglement. We then define a common system and threat model, identifying key actors, trust assumptions, and security goals. Representative protocol families are reviewed, including entanglement-based schemes with central tallying, self-tallying designs that enable public verification, and authority-minimized approaches that certify untrusted devices through observable correlations. Finally, we evaluate implementation challenges, including loss, noise, device imperfections, scalability, and coercion resistance, and discuss realistic near-term deployment scenarios for small-scale elections.