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WORLD SCIENTIFIC (EUROPE) eBooks

Principles of Empiricism and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

George Jaroszkiewicz

Published Nov 14, 2016• 2 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1142/9781786341419_0006

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Moritz Schlick’s interpretation of the causality principle is based on Schlick’s understanding of quantum mechanics and on his conviction that quantum mechanics strongly supports an empiricist reading of causation in his sense. The present paper compares the empiricist position held by Schlick with Bas van Fraassen’s more recent conception of constructive empiricism. It is pointed out that the development from Schlick’s understanding of logical empiricism to constructive empiricism reflects a difference between the understanding of quantum mechanics endorsed by Schlick and the understanding that had been established at the time of van Fraassen’s writing.
Moritz Schlick’s interpretation of the causality principle is based on his understanding of quantum mechanics and on his conviction that quantum mechanics strongly supports an empiricist reading of causation in his sense. The present chapter compares the empiricist position held by Schlick with Bas van Fraassen’s more recent conception of constructive empiricism. It is pointed out that the development of philosophy of science from Schlick’s understanding of logical empiricism to constructive empiricism reflects a difference between the understanding of quantum mechanics endorsed by Schlick and the understanding that had been established by the time of van Fraassen’s writing.
Two conceptions of the contemporary philosophy of science are taken under consideration: scientific realism and constructive empiricism. Scientific realism presupposes 1) the conception of truth as the correspondence of knowledge to reality, 2) the real existence of entities postulated by a theory. The constructive empiricism puts forward the idea of empirical adequacy: science aims to give us the theories which are empirically adequate and acceptance of the theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate. To compare methodological resources of these two positions in the philosophy of science the problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics is involved. As a methodological realization of scientific realism the ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics is taken under consideration. K.Popper’s version