Realism is not a new idea even to theoretical physicists, and the development of physical theory involves a continuous approximation to a structure isomorphous with the facts. The aim of this talk is to draw attention to a particular aspect in which recent theories try to improve on their predecessors—by a lessened reliance on the fallacy of the isolated system. It is widely accepted that the natural world is in some sense real.
Realism is not a new idea even to theoretical physicists, and the development of physical theory involves a continuous approximation to a structure isomorphous with the facts. The aim of this talk is to draw attention to a particular aspect in which recent theories try to improve on their predecessors—by a lessened reliance on the fallacy of the isolated system. It is widely accepted that the natural world is in some sense real.
Physicists usually admit a rather naive concept of physical reality: it is the object they are investigating using experiments understood as actions in the real world.in theoretical physics, the object of investigation is not the real world itself but its mathematical description which is considered as describing physical reality as exactly as possible.i present arguments from philosophy of science and from recent work in the theory of gravitational physics which indicate a possibility to defend also antirealistic views, and clarify in which sense both standpoints can be viable.
Scientific realism does not view theoretical terms as mere instruments of experimental predictions; it grants referential status to natural kind terms with 'epistemic access' and view scientific theories and terms as corresponding to physical phenomena and entities which exist independently of observation, and as thereby being the source of objective -approximate and not absolute- knowledge of the physical realm. As a result, scientific realism is accused of ontologising the unobservables. Against this charge, scientific realism posits the idea of the dialectical relation between theoretical terms referring to the unobservables and scientific methods. The second argument made by realism is the ‘no miracle’ thesis. These arguments stand challenged by the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The aim of the paper is to examine the relevance of the two arguments of scientific realism in countering the idea that the existence of quantum states in the microphysical world renders realism obsolete.
We still lack any consensus about what one is actually talking about as one uses quantum mechanics. There is a gap between the abstract terms in which the theory is couched and the phenomena the theory enables each of us to account for so well. Because it has no practical consequences for how we each use quantum mechanics to deal with physical problems, this cognitive dissonance has managed to coexist with the quantum theory from the very beginning. The absence of conceptual clarity for almost a century suggests that the problem might lie in some implicit misconceptions about the nature of scientific explanation that are deeply held by virtually all physicists, but are rarely explicitly acknowledged. I describe here such unvoiced but widely shared assumptions. Rejecting them clarifies and unifies a range of obscure remarks about quantum mechanics made almost from the beginning by some of the giants of physics, many of whom are held to be in deep disagreement. This new view of physics requires physicists to think about science in an unfamiliar way. My primary purpose is to explain the new perspective and urge that it be taken seriously. My secondary aims are to explain why this perspective differs significantly from what Bohr, Heisenberg, and Pauli had been saying from the very beginning, and why it is not solipsism, as some have maintained. To emphasize that this is a general view of science, and not just of quantum mechanics, I apply it to a long-standing puzzle in classical physics: the apparent inability of physics to give any meaning to 'Now'-the present moment.
The central aim of this thesis is to present a new kind of realism that is driven not from the traditional realism/anti-realism debate but from the practice of physicists. The usual debate focuses on discussions about the truth of theories and their fit with nature, while the real practices of the scientists are forgotten. The position I shall defend is called 'phenomenological realism': theories are merely tools to construct other theories and models, including phenomenological models; phenomenological models are the vehicles of representation. The realist doctrine was recently undermined by the argument from the pessimistic meta-induction, also known as the argument from scientific revolutions. I argue that phenomenological realism is a new kind of scientific realism which can overcome the problem generated by the argument from scientific revolutions, and which depend on the scientific practice. The realist tried to overcome this problem by suggesting various types of theory dichotomy. I claim that different types of dichotomy presented by realists did not overcome the problem, these dichotomies cut through theory vertically. I argue for a different kind of dichotomy between high level theoretical abstractions and low-level theoretical representations. I claim that theoretical work in physics have two distinct types depending on the way they are built these are: theoretical models which built depending on a top-down approach and phenomenological models which are built depending on a bottom-up approach, this dichotomy cuts the division along a horizontal line between low and high level theory. I present two case studies. One from superconductivity where I contrast the BCS theory of superconductivity with the phenomenological model of Landau and Ginzburg. I show how in that field of physics the historical developments favoured phenomenological models over high-level theoretical abstraction. I show how the BCS theory of superconductivity was constructed, and why it was accepted as the fundamental theory of superconductivity, and how later failed to account for new kinds of superconductors. I contrast that with the building of the widely accepted phenomenological model of superconductivity. The other case study is a fresh look at the Bohr-Einstein debate. I think that the main difference between Bohr and Einstein was their position from how theoretical work ought to be conducted in physics. Einstein always sought the mathematical clarity and simplicity, he adopted a top-down approach toward theoretical work, while Bohr insisted on a bottom-up approach. (author)
I consider the extent to which the applicability of the concept of classical realism is constrained, irrespective of the validity or not of the quantum formalism, by existing experiments both in the EPR–Bell setup, including recent experiments testing ‘nonlocal realistic’ theories, and in the area of ‘macroscopic quantum coherence’. Unless we are willing to sacrifice one or more other intuitively plausible notions such as that of the conventional ‘arrow of time’, it appears impossible, in either context, to maintain the classical notion of realism.
Due to the idea of atomism, there were discovered atoms, nucleons, and electrons. The atomic theory incorporated seeds of the idea of infinite divisibility of matter aimed at perceiving the structure of the entire material world. The next step in that perceiving should have been the recognition of ether discovered in Fizeau’s experiment. However, physicists did not recognize the discovery. The neglect of ether in physical theories resulted in physicists’ failure to use the methods of “classic”, Newtonian physics to gain a detailed understanding of atomic structure, and to build a “classic” microworld theory. As consequence, there emerged the quantum hypothesis that became a basis for the quantum physics of microworld. As the quantum hypothesis appeared to be in irreconcilable contradiction with the idea of infinite divisibility of matter, because of the neglect of ether, the quantum physics failed to understand the real structure of electrons and nucleons, even though all the necessary and ample experimental facts there had been obtained on microobject accelerators. Instead of objective ideas of the structure of electrons and nucleons or further development of knowledge regarding the structure of matter, there appeared fake concepts of quarks, myons, pions, bosons, etc., that do not exist in the real material world Experimental evidence as to the lack of indivisible quanta in nature [1] seemed to have fixed the intolerable situation but quantum physicists did not “notice” that.