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Chinese Physics B

Cryptanalysis of quantum broadcast communication and authentication protocol with a one-time pad

Ya Nan Cao, Fei Gao

Published Nov 1, 2016• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Chang et al . [ Chin. Phys. B 23 010305 (2014)] have proposed a quantum broadcast communication and authentication protocol. However, we find that an intercept-resend attack can be preformed successfully by a potential eavesdropper, who will be able to destroy the authentication function. Afterwards, he or she can acquire the secret transmitted message or even modify it while escaping detection, by implementing an efficient man-in-the-middle attack. Furthermore, we show a simple scheme to defend this attack, that is, applying non-reusable identity strings.

DOI
10.1088/1674-1056/25/11/110305

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Chang et al . [ Chin. Phys. B 23 010305 (2014)] have proposed a quantum broadcast communication and authentication protocol. However, we find that an intercept-resend attack can be preformed successfully by a potential eavesdropper, who will be able to destroy the authentication function. Afterwards, he or she can acquire the secret transmitted message or even modify it while escaping detection, by implementing an efficient man-in-the-middle attack. Furthermore, we show a simple scheme to defend this attack, that is, applying non-reusable identity strings.
The security of quantum broadcast communication (QBC) and authentication protocol based on Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger (GHZ) state and quantum one-time pad is analyzed. It is shown that there are some security issues in this protocol. Firstly, an external eavesdropper can take the intercept–measure–resend attack strategy to eavesdrop on 0.369 bit of every bit of the identity string of each receiver without being detected. Meanwhile, 0.524 bit of every bit of the secret message can be eavesdropped on without being detected. Secondly, an inner receiver can take the intercept–measure–resend attack strategy to eavesdrop on half of the identity string of the other's definitely without being checked. In addition, an alternative attack called the CNOT-operation attack is discussed. As for the multi-party QBC protocol, the attack efficiency increases with the increase of the number of users. Finally, the QBC protocol is improved to a secure one.
A quantum broadcast communication and authentication protocol with a quantum one-time pad based on the Greenberger—Horne—Zeilinger state is proposed. A binary string is used to express the identity of the receiver, which is encoded as a single sequence of photons. The encoded photon sequence acts as a detection sequence and implements authentication. An XOR operation serves as a one-time pad and is used to ensure the security of the protocol. The binary string is reused even in a noisy channel and proves to be unconditionally secure. In contrast with the protocols proposed by Wang et al. [ Chin. Phys. 16 1868 (2007) ] and Yang et al. [ Chin. Phys. B 19 070304 (2010) ], the protocol in this study implements the identity authentication with a reusable binary string; no hash function or local unitary operation is used. The protocol in this study is also easier to implement and highly efficient without losing security.
An entanglement-based quantum dialogue protocol [Phys. Lett. A 328 (2004) 6] is proven to be insecure: that is, in the protocol an eavesdropper can steal the secret messages without being detected provided that he/she adopts the intercept-and-resend attack strategy. We modify the protocol, i.e. in the control mode, by introducing and randomly choosing two sets of measuring basis: the intercept-and-resend attack can be accordingly detected. Hence, within the present version two users can securely and simultaneously exchange their secret messages.
An entanglement-based quantum dialogue protocol [Phys. Lett. A 328 (2004) 6] is proven to be insecure: that is, in the protocol an eavesdropper can steal the secret messages without being detected provided that he/she adopts the intercept-and-resend attack strategy. We modify the protocol, i.e. in the control mode, by introducing and randomly choosing two sets of measuring basis: the intercept-and-resend attack can be accordingly detected. Hence, within the present version two users can securely and simultaneously exchange their secret messages.