In this paper a statistical analysis of common qubits(photon) transmitted by Alice and received by Bob in the same basis using BB84 protocol with and without the presence of eavesdroppers are studied. The simulation used here is based on java language for transmission of the polarized photon between Alice and Bob via quantum channel (BB84 Protocol coding in Java).
In this paper a statistical analysis of common qubits(photon) transmitted by Alice and received by Bob in the same basis using BB84 protocol with and without the presence of eavesdroppers are studied. The simulation used here is based on java language for transmission of the polarized photon between Alice and Bob via quantum channel (BB84 Protocol coding in Java).
In this paper,the security of BB84 key distribution protocol is considered.We assume that in the protocol the eavesdropper Eve intercepts/resends photons transmitted between Alice and Bob with probability e.First,the BB84 key distribution protocol will be made equivalent to a special Wire-tap channel model,where the main channel is a binary symmetric channel with probability of flipping bits 0.25e and the eavesdropper's channel is a binary erasure channel with probability of erasure 1-e.Using the coding method and properties of quantum LDPC codes CSS(C1,C2) for secure communication across the Wire-tap channel in the BB84 protocol is an equivalent proof of the security of BB84 protocol.Finally,the tolerable error rate of the BB84 protocol based on quantum LDPC codes can be obtained by calculating the secrecy capacity of this special Wire-tap channel.
Abstract. The BB84 protocol is used by Alice (the sender) and Bob (the receiver) to settle on a secret classical bit-string by communicating qubits over an insecure quantum channel where Eve (the Eavesdropper) can have access. In this paper, we revisit a well known eavesdropping technique against BB84. We claim that there exist certain gaps in understanding the existing eavesdropping strategyin terms of cryptanalytic view and we try to bridge those gaps in this paper. First we refer to the result where it is shown that in the six-state variant of the BB84 protocol (Bruß, Phys. Rev. Lett., 1998), the mutual information between Alice (the sender) and Eve (the eavesdropper) is higher when two-bit probe is used compared to the one-bit probe and hencethetwo-bitprobeprovidesastrongereavesdroppingstrategy.However, from cryptanalytic point of view, we show that Eve has the same success probability in guessing the bit transmitted by Alice in both the cases of the two-bit and the one-bit probe. Thus, we point out that having higher mutual information may not directly lead to obtaining higher probability in guessing the key bit. It is also explained in the work of Bruß that the six-state variant of the BB84 protocol is more secure than the traditional four-state BB84. We look into this point in more detail and identify that this advantage is only achieved at the expense of communicating more qubits in the sixstate protocol. In fact, we present different scenarios, where given the same number of qubits communicated, the security comparison of the four and six-state protocols is evaluated carefully.
The publication of the BB84 protocol by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [10] marks the beginning of quantum key distribution. Since then, many other protocols have been invented. Yet, BB84 keeps a privileged place in the list of existing protocols: it is the one most analyzed and most often implemented, including those used in commercial products, e.g., [91, 113]. In this chapter, I define the BB84 protocol, although I already described it informally in Section 1.1. The physical implementation is then investigated. Finally, I analyze the eavesdropping strategies against BB84 and deduce the secret key rate. Description Alice chooses binary key elements randomly and independently, denoted by the random variable X ∈ χ = {0, 1}. In this protocol, there are two encoding rules, numbered by i ∈ {1, 2}. Alice randomly and independently chooses which encoding rule she uses for each key element. In case 1, Alice prepares a qubit from the basis {|0〉, |1〉} as In case 2, Alice prepares a qubit from the basis {|+〉, |−〉} as On his side, Bob measures either Z or X , yielding the result Y Z or Y X , choosing at random which observable he measures. After sending a predefined number of qubits, Alice reveals to Bob the encoding rule for each of them. They proceed with sifting, that is, they discard the key elements for which Alice used case 1 (or case 2) and Bob measured Z (or X ). For the remaining (sifted) key elements, we denote Bob's sifted measurements by Y .
In this article, a model of secure key exchange based on the BB84 protocol of quantum cryptography was developed and simulated. In the study, photons transmitted through a quantum channel between Alice and Bob were encoded in quantum states, and security was ensured by random selection of bases when reading them. An error indicator was calculated to detect Eavesdropping (Eve) interference. After generating the key, a simple ECC encryption algorithm based on XOR was used to transmit data in a protected manner. The results showed that it is possible to effectively maintain information confidentiality using a key formed through the BB84 protocol.
Abstract: BB84 (Bennett and Brassard 1984) is one of the well known protocols of quantum keys distribution. It is built to allow two interlocutors commonly called Alice and Bob to share two similar binary keys and to detect the eavesdropper presence (the eavesdropper is commonly called Eve). However, Eve presence in a disturbed environment causes errors to the sifted keys and decreases the amount of secure information between Alice and Bob. One of the most important stages in BB84 protocol is to decide by using error probability estimation if we can continue the protocol phases or no. Indeed, this decision is function of some factors like: what is the amount of information that we will lose in the error correction phase? What is the degree of errors detected in our sifted keys? What is the origin of these errors: Eve strategy or the channel disturbance? For these reasons, we will study in this study some conditions to stop BB84 protocol in the context of depolarizing channel. We implement two types of eavesdropping strategy: Intercept and Resend and Cloning Attack.
Quantum cryptography uses quantum mechanics to guarantee secure communication. BB84 is a widely used quantum key distribution that provides a way for two parties, a sender, Alice, and a receiver, Bob, to share an unconditionally secure key in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. Three different criteria can be assumed to study the BB84 protocol. They are the efficiency of the protocol, the probability that Eve remains undetected, and the amount of knowledge Eve has about Alice's bit sequence. In a previous approach, we only considered the probability that Eve remains undetected. We viewed this protocol as a three player static game in which Alice and Bob were two cooperative players and Eve was a competitive one. In our game model, Alice's and Bob's objective was to maximize the probability of detecting Eve, while Eve's objective was to minimize this probability. In this paper, our previous effort is extended and we also consider the other two criteria, i.e. the efficiency of the protocol and the amount of knowledge Eve has about Alice's bit sequence. Using these models, we show how game theory can be used to find the strategies for Alice, Bob and Eve.