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Cambridge University Press eBooks

The BB84 protocol

Gilles Van Assche

Published Jun 29, 2006• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The publication of the BB84 protocol by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [10] marks the beginning of quantum key distribution. Since then, many other protocols have been invented. Yet, BB84 keeps a privileged place in the list of existing protocols: it is the one most analyzed and most often implemented, including those used in commercial products, e.g., [91, 113]. In this chapter, I define the BB84 protocol, although I already described it informally in Section 1.1. The physical implementation is then investigated. Finally, I analyze the eavesdropping strategies against BB84 and deduce the secret key rate. Description Alice chooses binary key elements randomly and independently, denoted by the random variable X ∈ χ = {0, 1}. In this protocol, there are two encoding rules, numbered by i ∈ {1, 2}. Alice randomly and independently chooses which encoding rule she uses for each key element. In case 1, Alice prepares a qubit from the basis {|0〉, |1〉} as In case 2, Alice prepares a qubit from the basis {|+〉, |−〉} as On his side, Bob measures either Z or X , yielding the result Y Z or Y X , choosing at random which observable he measures. After sending a predefined number of qubits, Alice reveals to Bob the encoding rule for each of them. They proceed with sifting, that is, they discard the key elements for which Alice used case 1 (or case 2) and Bob measured Z (or X ). For the remaining (sifted) key elements, we denote Bob's sifted measurements by Y .

DOI
10.1017/cbo9780511617744.012

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The publication of the BB84 protocol by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [10] marks the beginning of quantum key distribution. Since then, many other protocols have been invented. Yet, BB84 keeps a privileged place in the list of existing protocols: it is the one most analyzed and most often implemented, including those used in commercial products, e.g., [91, 113]. In this chapter, I define the BB84 protocol, although I already described it informally in Section 1.1. The physical implementation is then investigated. Finally, I analyze the eavesdropping strategies against BB84 and deduce the secret key rate. Description Alice chooses binary key elements randomly and independently, denoted by the random variable X ∈ χ = {0, 1}. In this protocol, there are two encoding rules, numbered by i ∈ {1, 2}. Alice randomly and independently chooses which encoding rule she uses for each key element. In case 1, Alice prepares a qubit from the basis {|0〉, |1〉} as In case 2, Alice prepares a qubit from the basis {|+〉, |−〉} as On his side, Bob measures either Z or X , yielding the result Y Z or Y X , choosing at random which observable he measures. After sending a predefined number of qubits, Alice reveals to Bob the encoding rule for each of them. They proceed with sifting, that is, they discard the key elements for which Alice used case 1 (or case 2) and Bob measured Z (or X ). For the remaining (sifted) key elements, we denote Bob's sifted measurements by Y .
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a technique that enables secure communication between two parties by sharing a secret key. One of the most well-known QKD protocols is the BB84 protocol, proposed by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard in 1984. In this protocol, Alice and Bob use a quantum channel to exchange qubits, allowing them to generate a shared key that is resistant to eavesdropping. This paper presents a comparative study of existing QKD schemes, including the BB84 protocol, and highlights the advancements made in the BB84 protocol over the years. The study aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the different QKD schemes and their strengths and weaknesses and demonstrate QKDs working principles through existing simulations and implementations. Through this study, we show that the BB84 protocol is a highly secure QKD scheme that has been extensively studied and implemented in various settings. Furthermore, we discuss the improvements made to the BB84 protocol to enhance its security and practicality, including the use of decoy states and advanced error correction techniques. Overall, this paper provides a comprehensive analysis of QKD schemes, focusing on the BB84 protocol in secure communication technologies.
Abstract. The BB84 protocol is used by Alice (the sender) and Bob (the receiver) to settle on a secret classical bit-string by communicating qubits over an insecure quantum channel where Eve (the Eavesdropper) can have access. In this paper, we revisit a well known eavesdropping technique against BB84. We claim that there exist certain gaps in understanding the existing eavesdropping strategyin terms of cryptanalytic view and we try to bridge those gaps in this paper. First we refer to the result where it is shown that in the six-state variant of the BB84 protocol (Bruß, Phys. Rev. Lett., 1998), the mutual information between Alice (the sender) and Eve (the eavesdropper) is higher when two-bit probe is used compared to the one-bit probe and hencethetwo-bitprobeprovidesastrongereavesdroppingstrategy.However, from cryptanalytic point of view, we show that Eve has the same success probability in guessing the bit transmitted by Alice in both the cases of the two-bit and the one-bit probe. Thus, we point out that having higher mutual information may not directly lead to obtaining higher probability in guessing the key bit. It is also explained in the work of Bruß that the six-state variant of the BB84 protocol is more secure than the traditional four-state BB84. We look into this point in more detail and identify that this advantage is only achieved at the expense of communicating more qubits in the sixstate protocol. In fact, we present different scenarios, where given the same number of qubits communicated, the security comparison of the four and six-state protocols is evaluated carefully.
The quantum key distribution protocol BB84, published by C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard in 1984, describes how two spatially separated parties can generate a random bit string fully known only to them by transmission of single-qubit quantum states. Any attempt to eavesdrop on the protocol introduces disturbance which can be detected by the legitimate parties. In this Master's Thesis a novel modification to the BB84 protocol is analyzed. Instead of sending single particles one-by-one as in BB84, they are grouped and a non-local transformation is applied to each group before transmission. Each particle is sent to the intended receiver, always delaying the transmission until the receiver has acknowledged the previous particle on an authenticated classical channel, restricting eavesdropping to accessing the quantum transmission one particle at a time. Hence, an eavesdropper cannot undo the non-local transformation perfectly. Even if perfect cloning of quantum states was possible the state of the group could not be cloned. We calculate the maximal information on the established key provided by an intercept-resend attack and the induced disturbance for different transformations. We observe that it is possible to significantly reduce the eavesdropper's maximal information on the key--to one eighth of that in BB84 for a fixed, reasonable amount of disturbance. We also show that the individual access to the particles poses a fundamental restriction to the eavesdropper, and discuss a novel attack type against the proposed protocol.
The quantum key distribution protocol with classical Bob, well known as semiquantum key distribution, has been proposed a few years back (Boyer et al., PRL 2007, PRA 2009). In this protocol Alice has the same capability as in the traditional BB84 protocol, but Bob is limited by the constraint that he can measure or prepare qubits only in {∣0>,∣1>}\{|0>, |1>\}{∣0>,∣1>} basis and reflect any other qubit (or in other words, let it go undisturbed). In this scheme the qubits travel from Alice to Bob and then again from Bob to Alice. We study an eavesdropping strategy on this scheme that listens to the channel in both the directions. With the same level of disturbance induced in the channel, Eve can be extract more information using our two-way strategy than what can be obtained by the direct application of one-way eavesdropping in case of BB84 protocol. Towards resisting this eavesdropping strategy, we modify the semiquantum scheme by incorporating a Hadamard gate at Bob's end.
Cryptographic protocols can be classified by the type of security against eavesdropping which they provide. There exist mathematically secure schemes whose security relies on mathematical proofs (like the Vernam cipher discussed below) or conjectures (like public key RSA encryption) about the complexity of deciphering the message without possessing the correct key. The majority of current secure public Internet connections rely on such schemes. Alternatively, a cryptographic setup may provide a physically secure method for communicating. In these setups the security is provided by the physical laws governing the communication protocol. Here we first discuss a provably secure classical communication protocol and then quantum methods for distributing the necessary keys. The BB84 protocol relies on the impossibility of perfectly distinguishing non-orthogonal quantum states from one copy of the quantum system. The scheme was invented in 1984 and is the first of its kind. In contrast, the Ekert91 protocol makes use of Bell correlations between entangled pairs of photons. These correlations are destroyed when Eve attempts to make a measurement on one of the particles but also when imperfections, such as decoherence processes, affect the scheme. As long as no such “elements of reality” are introduced, and Bell correlations violating local realism can be generated by Alice and Bob, no eavesdropper can be present. One-time pads and the Vernam cipher The Vernam cipher is a cryptographic protocol which allows the encryption and decryption protocol to be publicly known. The security of the protocol relies entirely on the key which is private and not publicly known. Alice and Bob share identical n -bit secret key strings (one-time pad).