Prologue A memorial conference for John Bell, open to the public, was held at Rutgers University around 20 years ago. I gave a short talk there on Bell's views about David Bohm's “hidden variables” formulation of quantum mechanics, a version of quantum mechanics often called the de Broglie–Bohm theory or Bohmian mechanics. This theory was in fact discovered by Louis de Broglie in 1927. In 1952, it was rediscovered and developed by Bohm, who was the first to appreciate its connection to the predictions of standard quantum mechanics. I did not publish the talk. I have decided that it would be appropriate to publish a very lightly edited version of it here, in this volume devoted to the work of Bell on the foundation of quantum mechanics. One reason for doing so is that the connection between Bell and Bohm continues to be somewhat underplayed, with the strength of his advocacy of Bohmian mechanics not properly appreciated. For example, about half of the papers in Bell's collected works on the foundations of quantum mechanics deal with Bohmian mechanics. But in his fine introduction to the revised edition of this great book [1], Alain Aspect mentions this theory in only a single sentence, and parenthetically at that. For several decades after Bell proved his nonlocality theorem, based in part on Bell's inequality, it was widely claimed that Bell had shown that hidden variables – and Bohmian mechanics in particular – were impossible, that they were incompatible with the predictions of quantum mechanics. For example, the great physicist Eugene Wigner, who, unlike most of his contemporaries, was profoundly concerned with the conceptual foundations of quantum mechanics and usually wrote on the subject with great clarity and insight, has written that This [hidden variables] is an interesting idea and even though few of us were ready to accept it, it must be admitted that the truly telling argument against it was produced as late as 1965, by J. S. Bell … This appears to give a convincing argument against the hidden variables theory.
Prologue A memorial conference for John Bell, open to the public, was held at Rutgers University around 20 years ago. I gave a short talk there on Bell's views about David Bohm's “hidden variables” formulation of quantum mechanics, a version of quantum mechanics often called the de Broglie–Bohm theory or Bohmian mechanics. This theory was in fact discovered by Louis de Broglie in 1927. In 1952, it was rediscovered and developed by Bohm, who was the first to appreciate its connection to the predictions of standard quantum mechanics. I did not publish the talk. I have decided that it would be appropriate to publish a very lightly edited version of it here, in this volume devoted to the work of Bell on the foundation of quantum mechanics. One reason for doing so is that the connection between Bell and Bohm continues to be somewhat underplayed, with the strength of his advocacy of Bohmian mechanics not properly appreciated. For example, about half of the papers in Bell's collected works on the foundations of quantum mechanics deal with Bohmian mechanics. But in his fine introduction to the revised edition of this great book [1], Alain Aspect mentions this theory in only a single sentence, and parenthetically at that. For several decades after Bell proved his nonlocality theorem, based in part on Bell's inequality, it was widely claimed that Bell had shown that hidden variables – and Bohmian mechanics in particular – were impossible, that they were incompatible with the predictions of quantum mechanics. For example, the great physicist Eugene Wigner, who, unlike most of his contemporaries, was profoundly concerned with the conceptual foundations of quantum mechanics and usually wrote on the subject with great clarity and insight, has written that This [hidden variables] is an interesting idea and even though few of us were ready to accept it, it must be admitted that the truly telling argument against it was produced as late as 1965, by J. S. Bell … This appears to give a convincing argument against the hidden variables theory.
Abstract We will first define what is meant by “hidden variables”. Then, we will review theorems proving the impossibility of theories introducing such variables in a naive way. Next, we will outline the de Broglie-Bohm theory and show that it is not refuted by those theorems. To do that, we will explain how “measurements” work in that theory, using the examples of spin measurements and of momentum measurements. Those measurements do not reveal pre-existing properties of the quantum particle but are the result of interactions between that particle and the measuring apparatus. And this is why the de Broglie-Bohm theory is not refuted by the theorems on the impossibility of hidden variables. We will also explain the relationship between the no “hidden variables” theorems and nonlocality, with and without introducing Bell’s inequalities.
Introduction This contribution to the book in honour of J. S. Bell will probably differ from the remaining ones, in particular since only a part of it will be devoted to specific technical arguments. In fact I have considered it appropriate to share with the community of physicists interested in the foundational problems of our best theory the repeated interactions I had with him in the last four years of his life, the deep discussions in which we have been involved in particular in connection with the elaboration of collapse theories and their interpretation, and the contributions he gave to the development of this approach at a formal level, as well as championing it on repeated occasions. In brief, I intend to play here the role of one of those lucky persons who became acquainted with him personally, who has exchanged important views with him, who has learned a lot from his deep insight and conceptual lucidity, and, last but not least, whose scientific work has been appreciated by him. Moreover, due to the fact that this book intends to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the derivation of the fundamental inequality which bears his name, I will also devote a small part of the text to recalling his clearcut views about the locality issue, views that I believe have not been grasped correctly by a remarkable part of the scientific community. I will analyze this problem in quite general terms at the end of the paper. Some of Bell's Scientific Achievements Bell received bachelor's degrees in experimental physics and in mathematical physics at Queen'sUniversity of Belfast in the years 1948 and 1949, respectively, and a PhD in physics at the University of Birmingham. We all know very well that already at that time he was absolutely unsatisfied with the conceptual structure of quantum mechanics and with the way in which it was taught. This is significantly expressed by the statement he made during an interview to Jeremy Bernstein: I remember arguing with one of my professors, a Doctor Sloane, about that. I was getting very heated and accusing him, more or less, of dishonesty. He was getting very heated too and said, ‘You're going too far.’
Various interpretations of quantum mechanics, favored (or neglected) by John Bell in the context of his nonlocality theorem, are compared and discussed. Varenna 1970 I met John Bell for the first time at the Varenna conference of 1970 [1]. I had been invited on the suggestion of Eugene P. Wigner, who had already helped me to publish my first paper on the concept that was later called decoherence – to appear in the first issue of Foundations of Physics a few months after the conference [2]. This concept arose from my conviction, based on many applications of quantum mechanics to composite systems under various conditions, that Schrödinger's wave function in configuration space, or more generally the superposition principle, is universally valid and applicable. In particular, stable narrow wavepackets can represent classical configurations, while their superpositions define novel individual properties – such as “momentum,” defined as a plane wave superposition of different positions. Superpositions of macroscopically different properties, on the other hand, are regularly irreversibly “dislocalized” (distributed over many degrees of freedom) by means of interactions described by the Schrödinger equation. The corresponding disappearance of certain local superpositions (“decoherence”) seems to explain the phenomenon of a classical world as well as the apparent occurrence of quantum jumps or stochastic “events” – see Sect. 20.4 or [3] for a historical overview of the conceptual development of quantum theory. So I had never felt any motivation to think of “hidden variables” or any other physics behind the successful wave function. Therefore, I was very surprised on my arrival in Varenna to hear everybody discuss Bell's inequality. It had been published a few years before the conference, but I had either not noticed it or not regarded it as particularly remarkable until then. As this inequality demonstrates that the predictions of quantum theory would require any conceivable reality possibly underlying the nonlocal wave function to be nonlocal itself, I simply found my conviction that the latter describes individual reality confirmed. For example, I had often discussed the conservation of total spin or angular momentum in an individual decay process, which requires nonlocal entanglement between the fragments at any distance in a form that was later called a “Bell state”.
This chapter provides a fully comprehensive overview of the Bohmian formulation of quantum phenomena. It deals with a historical review of the difficulties found by Louis de Broglie, David Bohm and John Bell to convince the scientific community about the validity and utility of Bohmian mechanics. The chapter presents a formal explanation of Bohmian mechanics for nonrelativistic single-particle quantum systems. It explains a didactic introduction of the Bohmian formalism and a self-contained summary for any newcomer interested in using Bohmian mechanics in their daily research activity. The quantum theory revolves around the notions of particles and waves. Einstein died in 1955, convinced that a correct reformulation of quantum theory would preserve local causality. Aerodynamics and hydrodynamics are examples of such continuous material systems. The initial formulation of quantum mechanics with Bohmian trajectories developed by de Broglie and Bohm was performed for dynamical systems with associated velocities much slower than the speed of light.
The dominance of the Copenhagen interpretation is the result of a historical accident (Cushing, 1994). At the Solvay conference in 1927, Louis de Broglie put forward the deterministic pilot wave theory, described later. Never slow to criticize, Pauli jumped up and demolished de Broglie’s proposal, and de Broglie was so discouraged by this that he did not develop his interpretation any further. The Copenhagen interpretation was then developed by Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli and many others, as described in the previous chapter. It was strongly supported by von Neumann’s proof of the impossibility of hidden variables. Years later, in 1952, Bohm published a deterministic hidden variable theory, showing that there must be something wrong with von Neumann’s proof. The error was found by John Bell in 1966, as described in the last chapter, and he also showed how Pauli’s objections to de Broglie’s original idea can be answered. If this had been done at the conference in 1927, quantum mechanics could have been interpreted deterministically from the beginning. The essential mistake in the Copenhagen interpretation is to treat it as a complete account of the behaviour of each individual system. It is frequently claimed that it enables us to calculate, at least in principle, everything that can be measured. Thus Hooft (1997, p. 11) said that ‘The laws of quantum mechanics have been formulated very accurately. We know exactly how to compute anything we would like to know.’ Also Peierls (1997, p. 25) has said that quantum mechanics ‘had become a complete and consistent scheme capable of giving a unique answer to any questions relating to actual or possible observations’. Even if this were true, it would not imply that it is the final complete theory, for it is always possible that some new phenomenon might be found that cannot be calculated quantum-mechanically. However, it is not true: there are many phenomena such as the time of decay of a radioactive nucleus, or the direction a particle is scattered by a nucleus, that cannot be calculated, even in principle. Quantum mechanics is therefore an incomplete theory. We can only calculate the statistical properties of these systems, such as the half-life of a radioactive decay or the differential scattering cross-section that gives the probabilities that a particle is scattered through various angles. All measurements of quantum systems are of this statistical character. It might be thought that the possibility of making measurements on a single electron provides an exception to this. However, even in such cases the electron is continually bathed in a fluctuating background radiation from nearby atoms. Since this is variable, that electron is a member of an ensemble of electrons subject to different fluctuations. All these examples clearly demonstrate the statistical character of quantum mechanics. ‘I am rather firmly convinced’, Einstein (in Schilpp, 1949, pp. 666, 671) remarked, ‘that the essentially statistical character of contemporary quantum theory is solely to be ascribed to fact that this theory operates with an incomplete description of physical systems’. As a result, ‘the c-function is to be understood as the description not of a single system but of an ensemble of systems’. So, ‘if the statistical quantum theory does not pretend to describe the individual system completely, it appears unavoidable to look elsewhere for a complete description of the individual systems’. Thus ‘the difficulties of theoretical interpretation disappear, if one views the quantum-mechanical description as a description of an ensemble of systems’. If this is achieved, ‘the statistical theory would, within the framework of future physics, take an approximately analogous position to statistical mechanics within the framework of classical mechanics’. ‘Thus, essentially, nothing has changed since Galileo or Newton or Faraday concerning the status of the ‘‘observer’’ or our ‘‘consciousness’’ or of our ‘‘information’’ in physics’ (Popper, 1982, p. 46). Once this is accepted, the quantum paradoxes that plagued the Copenhagen interpretation are easily resolved, as described below. In any textbook of quantum mechanics problems such as the calculation of the energy levels of the hydrogen atom are solved as if that hydrogen atom is alone in the universe. As Feynman (1972) remarked, ‘when we solve a quantum-mechanical problem, what we really do is to divide the universe into two parts – the system in which we are interested and the rest of the universe. We then usually act as if the system in which we are interested comprised the whole universe.’ In fact, however, every hydrogen atom on which measurements are made is surrounded by other atoms and exposed to their radiations. Quantum mechanics somehow takes this into account and gives the average behaviour of an ensemble of hydrogen atoms. A more detailed theory takes these influences into account. One attempt to do this is stochastic electrodynamics, described in a later section.