Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

A computable formulation of quantum theory

Mike Stannett

Published Jan 1, 2009• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

According to the Church-Turing Thesis (CTT), effective formal behaviours can be simulated by Turing machines; this has naturally led to speculation that physical sys- tems can also be simulated computationally. But is this wider claim true, or do behaviours exist which are strictly hypercomputational? Several idealised computational models are known which suggest the possibility of hypercomputation, some Newtonian, some based on cosmology, some on quantum theory. While these models' physicality is debatable, they nonetheless throw into question the validity of extending CTT to include all physical systems. We consider the physicality of hypercomputational behaviour from first princi- ples, by showing that quantum theory can be reformulated in a way that explains why physical behaviours can be regarded as 'computing something' in the standard compu- tational state-machine sense. While this does not rule out the physicality of hypercomputation, it strongly limits the forms it can take. Our model also has physical consequences; in particular, the continuity of motion and arrow of time become theorems within the basic model.

Related papers

The Computational Status of Physics: A Computable Formulation of Quantum Theory

Mike Stannett

According to the Church-Turing Thesis (CTT), effective formal behaviours can be simulated by Turing machines; this has naturally led to speculation that physical systems can also be simulated computationally. But is this wider claim true, or do behaviours exist which are strictly hypercomputational? Several idealised computational models are known which suggest the possibility of hypercomputation, some Newtonian, some based on cosmology, some on quantum theory. While these models' physicality is debatable, they nonetheless throw into question the validity of extending CTT to include all physical systems. We consider the physicality of hypercomputational behaviour from first principles, by showing that quantum theory can be reformulated in a way that explains why physical behaviours can be regarded as 'computing something' in the standard computational state-machine sense. While this does not rule out the physicality of hypercomputation, it strongly limits the forms it can take. Our model also has physical consequences; in particular, the continuity of motion and arrow of time become theorems within the basic model.

arXiv:0805.1443•May 10, 2008•1 citation

Hypercomputation: Towards an extension of the classical notion of Computability?

Gentian Kasa

The purpose of this thesis is to make an analysis of the concept of Hypercomputation and of some hypermachines. This thesis is separated in three main parts. We start in the first chapter with an analysis of the concept of Classical Computability with the Turing Machine and the Church-Turing thesis as a main reference and afterwards, in the second chapter, we continue with an analysis of hypercomputation and some hypermachines. Attention is given to the possible physical realization of these machines and their usefulness. In the third chapter a superficial introduction to Quantum Computing is made and a brief analysis to a quantum hypercomputational model, Tien D. Kieu's Adiabatic Quantum Computing.

arXiv:1210.7171•Oct 26, 2012•0 citations

Effective Physical Processes and Active Information in Quantum Computing

Ignazio Francesco Licata

The recent debate on hypercomputation has arisen new questions both on the computational abilities of quantum systems and the Church-Turing Thesis role in Physics. We propose here the idea of "effective physical process" as the essentially physical notion of computation. By using the Bohm and Hiley active information concept we analyze the differences between the standard form (quantum gates) and the non-standard one (adiabatic and morphogenetic) of Quantum Computing, and we point out how its Super-Turing potentialities derive from an incomputable information source in accordance with Bell's constraints. On condition that we give up the formal concept of "universality", the possibility to realize quantum oracles is reachable. In this way computation is led back to the logic of physical world.

arXiv:0705.1173•May 8, 2007•12 citations

Quantum theory, the Church–Turing principle and the universal quantum computer

David Deutsch

Abstract It is argued that underlying the Church–Turing hypothesis there is an implicit physical assertion. Here, this assertion is presented explicitly as a physical principle: ‘every finitely realizible physical system can be perfectly simulated by a universal model computing machine operating by finite means’. Classical physics and the universal Turing machine, because the former is continuous and the latter discrete, do not obey the principle, at least in the strong form above. A class of model computing machines that is the quantum generalization of the class of Turing machines is described, and it is shown that quantum theory and the 'universal quantum computer’ are compatible with the principle. Computing machines resembling the universal quantum computer could, in principle, be built and would have many remarkable properties not reproducible by any Turing machine. These do not include the computation of non-recursive functions, but they do include ‘quantum parallelism’, a method by which certain probabilistic tasks can be performed faster by a universal quantum computer than by any classical restriction of it. The intuitive explanation of these properties places an intolerable strain on all interpretations of quantum theory other than Everett’s. Some of the numerous connections between the quantum theory of computation and the rest of physics are explored. Quantum complexity theory allows a physically more reasonable definition of the ‘complexity’ or ‘knowledge’ in a physical system than does classical complexity theory.

Proceedings of the Royal Society of London A Mathematical and Physical Sciences•Jul 8, 1985•4,597 citations

Quantum computing and quantum complexity theory

Umesh V. Vazirani

There is strong evidence that computers based upon the principles of quantum physics represent an inherently new and more powerful model of computation. Such computers violate the modern form of the Church-Turing thesis (which lies at the foundations of computer science). This thesis can be informally summarized as follows: all physical implementations of computing devices can be described by the same abstract model of computation-the probabilistic Turing Machine or the equivalent random access machine. In this paper, we will describe two formal models for quantum computers: quantum circuits and quantum Turing Machines, introduced by Deutsch [1985].

IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems proceedings•Jan 1, 2000•0 citations

Quantum Computation and the Church–Turing Hypothesis

Christopher G. Timpson

Some of the philosophical questions raised by the theory of quantum computation are discussed. First it is considered whether the possibility of exponential speed-up in quantum computation provides an argument for a more substantive notion of quantum information than so far allowed. It is concluded that this is not so. Then some questions regarding the status of the Church-Turing hypothesis in the light of quantum computation are considered. In particular, Deutsch’s claim that a physical principle, the Turing Principle, underlies the Church-Turing hypothesis is rebutted. Finally, the question of whether the Church-Turing hypothesis might serve as a constraint on the laws of physics is briefly considered.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Apr 25, 2013•0 citations
According to the Church-Turing Thesis (CTT), effective formal behaviours can be simulated by Turing machines; this has naturally led to speculation that physical sys- tems can also be simulated computationally. But is this wider claim true, or do behaviours exist which are strictly hypercomputational? Several idealised computational models are known which suggest the possibility of hypercomputation, some Newtonian, some based on cosmology, some on quantum theory. While these models' physicality is debatable, they nonetheless throw into question the validity of extending CTT to include all physical systems. We consider the physicality of hypercomputational behaviour from first princi- ples, by showing that quantum theory can be reformulated in a way that explains why physical behaviours can be regarded as 'computing something' in the standard compu- tational state-machine sense. While this does not rule out the physicality of hypercomputation, it strongly limits the forms it can take. Our model also has physical consequences; in particular, the continuity of motion and arrow of time become theorems within the basic model.
According to the Church-Turing Thesis (CTT), effective formal behaviours can be simulated by Turing machines; this has naturally led to speculation that physical systems can also be simulated computationally. But is this wider claim true, or do behaviours exist which are strictly hypercomputational? Several idealised computational models are known which suggest the possibility of hypercomputation, some Newtonian, some based on cosmology, some on quantum theory. While these models' physicality is debatable, they nonetheless throw into question the validity of extending CTT to include all physical systems. We consider the physicality of hypercomputational behaviour from first principles, by showing that quantum theory can be reformulated in a way that explains why physical behaviours can be regarded as 'computing something' in the standard computational state-machine sense. While this does not rule out the physicality of hypercomputation, it strongly limits the forms it can take. Our model also has physical consequences; in particular, the continuity of motion and arrow of time become theorems within the basic model.
The purpose of this thesis is to make an analysis of the concept of Hypercomputation and of some hypermachines. This thesis is separated in three main parts. We start in the first chapter with an analysis of the concept of Classical Computability with the Turing Machine and the Church-Turing thesis as a main reference and afterwards, in the second chapter, we continue with an analysis of hypercomputation and some hypermachines. Attention is given to the possible physical realization of these machines and their usefulness. In the third chapter a superficial introduction to Quantum Computing is made and a brief analysis to a quantum hypercomputational model, Tien D. Kieu's Adiabatic Quantum Computing.
The recent debate on hypercomputation has arisen new questions both on the computational abilities of quantum systems and the Church-Turing Thesis role in Physics. We propose here the idea of "effective physical process" as the essentially physical notion of computation. By using the Bohm and Hiley active information concept we analyze the differences between the standard form (quantum gates) and the non-standard one (adiabatic and morphogenetic) of Quantum Computing, and we point out how its Super-Turing potentialities derive from an incomputable information source in accordance with Bell's constraints. On condition that we give up the formal concept of "universality", the possibility to realize quantum oracles is reachable. In this way computation is led back to the logic of physical world.
Abstract It is argued that underlying the Church–Turing hypothesis there is an implicit physical assertion. Here, this assertion is presented explicitly as a physical principle: ‘every finitely realizible physical system can be perfectly simulated by a universal model computing machine operating by finite means’. Classical physics and the universal Turing machine, because the former is continuous and the latter discrete, do not obey the principle, at least in the strong form above. A class of model computing machines that is the quantum generalization of the class of Turing machines is described, and it is shown that quantum theory and the 'universal quantum computer’ are compatible with the principle. Computing machines resembling the universal quantum computer could, in principle, be built and would have many remarkable properties not reproducible by any Turing machine. These do not include the computation of non-recursive functions, but they do include ‘quantum parallelism’, a method by which certain probabilistic tasks can be performed faster by a universal quantum computer than by any classical restriction of it. The intuitive explanation of these properties places an intolerable strain on all interpretations of quantum theory other than Everett’s. Some of the numerous connections between the quantum theory of computation and the rest of physics are explored. Quantum complexity theory allows a physically more reasonable definition of the ‘complexity’ or ‘knowledge’ in a physical system than does classical complexity theory.
There is strong evidence that computers based upon the principles of quantum physics represent an inherently new and more powerful model of computation. Such computers violate the modern form of the Church-Turing thesis (which lies at the foundations of computer science). This thesis can be informally summarized as follows: all physical implementations of computing devices can be described by the same abstract model of computation-the probabilistic Turing Machine or the equivalent random access machine. In this paper, we will describe two formal models for quantum computers: quantum circuits and quantum Turing Machines, introduced by Deutsch [1985].
Some of the philosophical questions raised by the theory of quantum computation are discussed. First it is considered whether the possibility of exponential speed-up in quantum computation provides an argument for a more substantive notion of quantum information than so far allowed. It is concluded that this is not so. Then some questions regarding the status of the Church-Turing hypothesis in the light of quantum computation are considered. In particular, Deutsch’s claim that a physical principle, the Turing Principle, underlies the Church-Turing hypothesis is rebutted. Finally, the question of whether the Church-Turing hypothesis might serve as a constraint on the laws of physics is briefly considered.