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arXiv:1102.1612 · International Journal of Foundations of Computer Science

THE PHYSICAL CHURCH-TURING THESIS AND THE PRINCIPLES OF QUANTUM THEORY

Pablo J. Arrighi, Gilles Dowek B

Published Aug 1, 2012• 30 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

As was emphasized by Deutsch, quantum computation shatters complexity theory, but is innocuous to computability theory. Yet Nielsen and others have shown how quantum theory as it stands could breach the physical Church-Turing thesis. We draw a clear line as to when this is the case, in a way that is inspired by Gandy. Gandy formulates postulates about physics, such as homogeneity of space and time, bounded density and velocity of information — and proves that the physical Church-Turing thesis is a consequence of these postulates. We provide a quantum version of the theorem. Thus this approach exhibits a formal non-trivial interplay between theoretical physics symmetries and computability assumptions.

DOI
10.1142/s0129054112500153

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As was emphasized by Deutsch, quantum computation shatters complexity theory, but is innocuous to computability theory. Yet Nielsen and others have shown how quantum theory as it stands could breach the physical Church-Turing thesis. We draw a clear line as to when this is the case, in a way that is inspired by Gandy. Gandy formulates postulates about physics, such as homogeneity of space and time, bounded density and velocity of information — and proves that the physical Church-Turing thesis is a consequence of these postulates. We provide a quantum version of the theorem. Thus this approach exhibits a formal non-trivial interplay between theoretical physics symmetries and computability assumptions.
In the paper we interpret the Church Turing thesis of Computation Algorithm and how it differs from the strong Church Turing thesis in the field of computation. Church Turing thesis can be classified as Strong Church Turing thesis and Normal Church Turing thesis. Church Turing hypothesis says “that a computing problem can be solved in any computer if and only if it can be solved on a very simple ‘machine’, named TURING MACHINE”. We introspect the difference in the model of computers that are developed on these two competitive algorithms. We will also be studying the physical realization of bits in a quantum computer with special mention to the commercial quantum computer systems offered at the moment. Our objective is to find out the relation of a quantum bit and the Strong Church Turing Thesis converging the gap between theoretical model and physical structure.
There is strong evidence that computers based upon the principles of quantum physics represent an inherently new and more powerful model of computation. Such computers violate the modern form of the Church-Turing thesis (which lies at the foundations of computer science). This thesis can be informally summarized as follows: all physical implementations of computing devices can be described by the same abstract model of computation-the probabilistic Turing Machine or the equivalent random access machine. In this paper, we will describe two formal models for quantum computers: quantum circuits and quantum Turing Machines, introduced by Deutsch [1985].
According to the Church-Turing Thesis (CTT), effective formal behaviours can be simulated by Turing machines; this has naturally led to speculation that physical sys- tems can also be simulated computationally. But is this wider claim true, or do behaviours exist which are strictly hypercomputational? Several idealised computational models are known which suggest the possibility of hypercomputation, some Newtonian, some based on cosmology, some on quantum theory. While these models' physicality is debatable, they nonetheless throw into question the validity of extending CTT to include all physical systems. We consider the physicality of hypercomputational behaviour from first princi- ples, by showing that quantum theory can be reformulated in a way that explains why physical behaviours can be regarded as 'computing something' in the standard compu- tational state-machine sense. While this does not rule out the physicality of hypercomputation, it strongly limits the forms it can take. Our model also has physical consequences; in particular, the continuity of motion and arrow of time become theorems within the basic model.
According to the Church-Turing Thesis (CTT), effective formal behaviours can be simulated by Turing machines; this has naturally led to speculation that physical systems can also be simulated computationally. But is this wider claim true, or do behaviours exist which are strictly hypercomputational? Several idealised computational models are known which suggest the possibility of hypercomputation, some Newtonian, some based on cosmology, some on quantum theory. While these models' physicality is debatable, they nonetheless throw into question the validity of extending CTT to include all physical systems. We consider the physicality of hypercomputational behaviour from first principles, by showing that quantum theory can be reformulated in a way that explains why physical behaviours can be regarded as 'computing something' in the standard computational state-machine sense. While this does not rule out the physicality of hypercomputation, it strongly limits the forms it can take. Our model also has physical consequences; in particular, the continuity of motion and arrow of time become theorems within the basic model.
In the search for a precise definition of the notion of effective calculability, Turing’s computability has proven to be more convincing than other definitions proposed almost simultaneously. Turing does not define a particular class of “calculable functions”, but which processes can be carried out in computing. His conceptual analysis brings about an intimate and inescapable link between computability and “measurability”, hence between mechanical procedures and physical processes. The full significance of this link is captured in Deutsch’s physical version of the Church-Turing thesis, namely, his claim that every physical system can be simulated by a universal quantum Turing machine. Quantum physics supports more efficient forms of computation, even though quantum computation remains within Turing’s limits. Why? This chapter explores how logical principles and physical processes coalesce into the notion of computation.
Some of the philosophical questions raised by the theory of quantum computation are discussed. First it is considered whether the possibility of exponential speed-up in quantum computation provides an argument for a more substantive notion of quantum information than so far allowed. It is concluded that this is not so. Then some questions regarding the status of the Church-Turing hypothesis in the light of quantum computation are considered. In particular, Deutsch’s claim that a physical principle, the Turing Principle, underlies the Church-Turing hypothesis is rebutted. Finally, the question of whether the Church-Turing hypothesis might serve as a constraint on the laws of physics is briefly considered.