Einstein’s Realism and His Critique of Quantum Mechanics

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Dirk John Pons, Arion Douglas Pons, Aiden Jasper Pons

Problem- Many attempts have been made, starting from Quantum mechanics (QM), to prove the non-viability of hidden-variable (HV) solutions, and to justify the unnaturalness of QM explanations over physical realism. In particular, Colbeck & Renner (C&R) (2011) claimed to prove that no extension of quantum theory can exist with better predictive power than quantum mechanics itself. This implies that QM is an ideal theory, and that physical realism should be abandoned. Purpose- This paper critiques this proof. Approach- Logical considerations are used to examine the premises in the proof. Findings- The C&R proof is show to be capable of entirely the opposite interpretation that its authors intended, namely that a new deeper physics may exist based on physical realism, but that it will definitely not be quantum theory or even an extension thereof. Also, the proof is falsified by presenting a viable theory of internal structures (hidden-variable solution) with demonstrably better ontological explanatory power than QM. Implications- QM is interpreted as an approximate stochastic representation of a deeper dynamic behaviour at the finer scale. Originality- This work predicts that physical realism still applies, and that hidden-variable solutions still have vitality as the way forward for fundamental physics.

Hans Primas

James Ladyman, Lorenzo Lorenzetti

Three accounts of effective realism (ER) have been advanced to solve three problems for scientific realism: Fraser and Vickers (forthcoming) develop a version of ER about non-relativistic quantum mechanics that they argue is compatible with all the main realist versions (‘interpretations’) of quantum mechanics avoiding the problem of underdetermination among them; Williams (2019) and Fraser (2020b) propose ER about quantum field theory as a response to the problems facing realist interpretations; Robertson and Wilson (forthcoming) propose ER to deal with the dubious ontological status of the entities belonging to superseded theories. This paper argues for the unification of these proposals based on realism about modal structure and the idea of scale relativity of ontology developed by ontic structural realists. This solves problems some or all the accounts of ER face, especially that of making explicit in what way they are realist. Furthermore, we respond to a recent critique that has been raised against the ontic structural realist account of quantum mechanics that we employ.

Igor Evgenievich Pris

A critique of phenomenological interpretation of quantum Bayesianism (QBism) is offered, in particular, the position of M. Bitbol and L. de La Tremblay, which removes remnants of scientific realism from QBism and adopts a radically phenomenological first person point of view. It is shown that phenomenological view of quantum mechanics cannot explain cognition of quantum reality and behavior of real quantum systems, because the ultimate reality for phenomenology is autonomous phenomena, which, in fact, do not exist. Our proposed contextual quantum realism (CQR) does not invert, as the mentioned authors do, but rejects, the traditional relation between experience and reality. By reinterpreting QBism, our CQR removes remnants of phenomenology from it, but in such a way as not to fall into the other extreme – metaphysical realism.

G. C. Ghirardi