January 1999, “The (Un-)Detached Observer” Yesterday I ran across your paper “On the Interpretation and Philosophical Foundation of Quantum Mechanics” posted on the web, and was very much impressed with its depth. Most importantly, however, I am sad to say, it reminded me that I still owe you some papers. I have remedied that now by sending you a pile of things that I have written on the relation between information gain and quantum state disturbance. These are relevant to your request above, and, I think, even more relevant to the thoughts in your paper. I am in great agreement with the idea that there may be a deeper foundation to quantum mechanics, one along the lines that Pauli and Wheeler attempted to sketch. Quantum mechanics, it seems to me, is an expression of the best we can say in a world where the observer is not detached (to use Pauli's phrase). Recognizing and appreciating that lack of detachedness is the most exacting tool we have for peering into the greater future of quantum theory. This I think is the ultimate role of quantum information theory. (For the opposite point of view, however, you may be interested in having a look at John Preskill's paper “Quantum Information: Its Future Impact on Physics” at http://theory.caltech.edu/~preskill/.) I hope you will enjoy the things I have sent you; it is always my attempt to be as clear as I possibly can be when I write.
January 1999, “The (Un-)Detached Observer” Yesterday I ran across your paper “On the Interpretation and Philosophical Foundation of Quantum Mechanics” posted on the web, and was very much impressed with its depth. Most importantly, however, I am sad to say, it reminded me that I still owe you some papers. I have remedied that now by sending you a pile of things that I have written on the relation between information gain and quantum state disturbance. These are relevant to your request above, and, I think, even more relevant to the thoughts in your paper. I am in great agreement with the idea that there may be a deeper foundation to quantum mechanics, one along the lines that Pauli and Wheeler attempted to sketch. Quantum mechanics, it seems to me, is an expression of the best we can say in a world where the observer is not detached (to use Pauli's phrase). Recognizing and appreciating that lack of detachedness is the most exacting tool we have for peering into the greater future of quantum theory. This I think is the ultimate role of quantum information theory. (For the opposite point of view, however, you may be interested in having a look at John Preskill's paper “Quantum Information: Its Future Impact on Physics” at http://theory.caltech.edu/~preskill/.) I hope you will enjoy the things I have sent you; it is always my attempt to be as clear as I possibly can be when I write.
12 June 1999, “Interest in Pauli” I have come across a reference to a paper of yours that I have not been able to obtain. May I ask of you to send me a reprint of it? The paper is: C. P. Enz, “Wolfgang Pauli and the Role of the Observer in Modern Physics,” in Philosophy of the Natural Sciences: Proceedings of the 13th International Wittgenstein Symposium , edited by P. Weingartner and G. Schurz (Verlag Holder–Pichler–Temsky, Vienna, 1989), pp. 110–119. I have read several of your other papers on Pauli's thought and have been uniformly pleased with each. I am especially interested in his ideas concerning the demise of the “detached-observer” notion within quantum theory. (I would also be interested in any of your other works on the subject that may have been written since your 1992 article, “Wolfgang Pauli between Quantum Reality and the Royal Path of Dreams.” This is the latest one that I am aware of.) About myself, I am a theoretical physicist at Caltech who specializes in quantum information theory and quantum computing. I am well acquainted with your colleague Nicolas Gisin at the University of Geneva. 21 August 1999, “One More Article?” Upon my return from Cambridge a couple of weeks ago, I found in my mailbox your package full of wonderful papers! Thank you so much.
22 August 1999, “Your Article” I am writing to let you know that I enjoyed your article quant-ph/9812050, “Why Quantum Mechanics is Hard to Understand,” very much. I was in particular very pleased with your Section IV “Dynamics vs. History.” It may interest you to know that Markus Fierz expressed a similar point of view in his article: “Does a physical theory comprehend an ‘objective, real, single process’?” in Observation and Interpretation in the Philosophy of Physics , edited by S. Körner (Dover, NY, 1957), pp. 93–96. I will append the full text below for your enjoyment. [See note to Rüdiger Schack, dated 29 August 1999.] Most importantly, I would like to ask you for the final coordinates of your paper. Was it published somewhere? I would like to cite it in an upcoming paper. 28 August 1999, “Not Much” I don't have a good idea about where to send your paper. I think chances are that AJP will be tougher than FP . In any case, it had an impact on me. My old advisor used to say of our joint papers, “If three people read this paper, we'll be doing OK!” If you know of two others with yours, you're probably doing OK. I like this focus on the concept of “object.” I look forward to anything you might have to say about it. I have some slides that I use as a rallying cry to the idea that quantum information theory may have some impact on quantum foundations. The first is a list of axioms for quantum mechanics.
November 1997, “The Radical Eye” Let me send you some prep work…while I'm procrastinating from things I really need to be doing. I'll convey the information in my favorite way: quoting/forwarding old emails! The first, an old – kind of poorly written – note “Dreams of a More Ethereal Quantum,” concerns one aspect of the below-the-water stuff: the idea about distilling the MaxEntlooking part out of quantum theory. It doesn't say much more than I said in the proposal…but you can't expect too much, it's still just a vague program for a program. That stuff is at the bottom of the note; the early part of the note says a few – even more sketchy – things about Mermin and Quantum Probabilities…so I thought I would include it for that reason. The only other readable thing (I think) I've written on this aspect of the below-the-water stuff is on pages 22–26 of my paper with Caves, “Quantum Information: How Much Information in a State Vector” (it's on quant-ph). These same pages also contain an extended discussion on probability. The second note, “Rainy Mondays and Consistent Histories,” is a note I wrote Bob Griffiths concerning what I think of his Consistent History stuff. I think it says quite plainly and clearly what I think about probability in quantum mechanics. It's pretty self-contained (i.e., not referring to old conversations, etc.), so you might find it useful reading.
When investigating various interpretations of quantum mechanics one notices that each interpretation contains an element which escapes a complete and full description. This element is always associated with the stochasticity of the individual event in the quantum measurement process. It appears that the implications of this limit to any description of the world has not been sufficiently appreciated with notable exceptions of, for example, Heisenberg, Pauli and Wheeler. If we assume that a deeper foundation of quantum mechanics is possible, the question arises which features such a philosophical foundation might have. It is suggested that the objective randomness of the individual quantum event is a necessity of a description of the world in view of the significant influence the observer in quantum mechanics has. It is also suggested that the austerity of the Copenhagen interpretation should serve as a guiding principle in a search for deeper understanding. In recent years, a significant increase of interest in the foundations of quantum mechanics can be observed. This increase is certainly related to the immense progress made during the last two decades in experiments with individual quantum systems. This technological progress has made it possible to really perform more and more of the famous gedanken experiments which were so important in the early days of the theory. Not only did these experiments confirm the theory in every detail, they also opened up avenues for new experimental directions which might even lead some day to new technology. While such applications are certainly still far away, areas like quantum cryptography[1], quantum computation[2] and interaction-free measurement[3], just to name a few examples, certainly deserve the attention they receive. All this activity has also drawn more attention to the problems of understanding and interpreting quantum mechanics. It seems that there, a definitive consensus has not yet been reached. As witnesses quote authorities like Feynman as saying[4]: I think can safely say that nobody today understands quantum mechanics, whereby he apparently included himself, or like Roger Penrose[5], who describes his opinion remarking that while the theory agrees incredibly well with experiment and while it is of profound mathematical beauty, it makes absolutely no sense. Why did even physicists who have contributed so significantly to quantum theory Feynman was even rewarded the Nobel Prize for one of its mathematical formulations choose such emphatic and strong formulations? Why is it that the average physicist hears very little about such problems during his/her education? Why is the comprehension of the theory very often focused on formalism while questions that probe for deeper meaning are usually not tackled? To take a closer look at the situation, let us turn to a brief analysis of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. We note that there are at least two levels of interpreting a formalism, a physical theory. The first, basic, level supplies the rules that determine which element of the formalism corresponds to which measurable quantity or to which observable fact in a concrete experimental situation. Theses rules are a large, mostly not explicated but only implicit, set of instructions. These instructions concern the manner of working with the statements of the theory in order to obtain predictions for future experiments or events, and they concern the instructions on how to proceed in experiment in order to demonstrate or test a theoretical
June 1997, “Painting My Stripes” I am just returning from the library, where – completely by accident – I ran into and read an entertaining little article: A Peres, “Einstein, Gödel, Bohr,” Foundations of Physics 15 (2), 1985, 201–205. I was especially entertained by your closing line, “Any attempt to inject realism in physical theory is bound to lead to inconsistencies.” Do you have any other writings (beside the AJP paper with Zurek) where you expand upon the ideas presented in this? In connection to this, I have another question. If I recall correctly, you once told me that you finally came to grips (“interpretationally,” that is) with quantum mechanics in 1986. (Perhaps I have the year wrong, but that's part of the question.) Would you be willing to expand upon that point? In particular, was your arrived-at comfort founded upon the line I quote above? I suppose I ask these questions for several reasons, perhaps the strongest of which is a renewed dilettante interest in the foundations of quantum theory. Among other things, I am trying to plan (or dream up!) a talk for the Hull conference in September to be titled something like: “Quantum Information Theory's Implications for the Foundations of the Quantum as a Whole.” My own pet “idea for an idea” (as Wheeler would say) is that the quantum theoretical description – along with its Hilbert-space structure – is forced upon us when the information we have about a physical situation/system is of a certain variety.
17 January 2001, “First Contact” I am writing this letter to find out if you are interested in attending a conference in Växjö, Sweden this summer titled “Quantum Theory: Reconsideration of Foundations.” I do this because I have read a few of your papers and parts of your book on Bohr, and I have been extremely impressed. By trade, I am a practitioner of the new field of quantum information theory and computing – and indeed the main session I am organizing at the Växjö meeting will be about quantum foundations reconsidered in that light – but your description of Bohr's thought meshes so well with what I'm seeking in physics that I'd like to get you there too. PLEASE NOTE that this is not exactly a real invitation yet: I am still lobbying for a more philosophical contingent at the meeting. But, I would very much like to hear your reaction just as soon as possible. If things work out, and you would like to come, I will recontact you very soon with further details. The main reason I want you at our meeting is that I have this “madly optimistic” (Mermin called it) feeling that Bohrian–Paulian ideas will lead us to the next stage of physics. That is, that thinking about quantum foundations from their point of view will be the beginning of a new path, not the end of an old one.