An Individual and Its Possibilities: The State Space The first question in any scientific research is its subject matter: What are we studying? The most general answer is a certain kind of system. A system, no matter how complex, is an individual , which is logically a particular, a unit with characters describable in general terms and a unique identity that enables us to single it out and refer to it unambiguously without invoking its characters. We must delineate the system before we delve into its properties. Thus the first general concept in the formulation of a theory is that of an individual. Individuals are represented in scientific theories by the state spaces , which form the keystone of the theories by defining their topics. The notion of a composite system as an integral individual with its own state space is the synthetic conceptual framework of many-body theories. The general concept of a concrete individual in the real world is much more complicated than that of an abstract individual, which may be merely an unanalyzable x over which predicate variables range. The complication is most apparent in many-body theories, where both the composite system and its constituents are explicitly treated as individuals. An individual is isolated if it is not encumbered by any relation and not guaranteed to be relatable; situated, if it is an interactive part of a system; composite, if analyzable into parts; simple, if not.
An Individual and Its Possibilities: The State Space The first question in any scientific research is its subject matter: What are we studying? The most general answer is a certain kind of system. A system, no matter how complex, is an individual , which is logically a particular, a unit with characters describable in general terms and a unique identity that enables us to single it out and refer to it unambiguously without invoking its characters. We must delineate the system before we delve into its properties. Thus the first general concept in the formulation of a theory is that of an individual. Individuals are represented in scientific theories by the state spaces , which form the keystone of the theories by defining their topics. The notion of a composite system as an integral individual with its own state space is the synthetic conceptual framework of many-body theories. The general concept of a concrete individual in the real world is much more complicated than that of an abstract individual, which may be merely an unanalyzable x over which predicate variables range. The complication is most apparent in many-body theories, where both the composite system and its constituents are explicitly treated as individuals. An individual is isolated if it is not encumbered by any relation and not guaranteed to be relatable; situated, if it is an interactive part of a system; composite, if analyzable into parts; simple, if not.
The notion of an individual and the related issues on individuation are topics that appear in the philosophical discussion ever since the antiquity. The idea of an individual thing is intuitively clear: an individual is something of a specific kind that is a unity, having its own identity, and being so that it is possible at least in principle to discern it from any other individual, even of similar species. But when we try to leave the intuitive realm and push this idea to a logical analysis, we find a cluster of problems that are difficult to overcome within standard logico-mathematical contexts. In this work, we shall be concerned with some aspects of this intuitive concept of an individual and on some related facts about individuation taken from recent discussions that arose ever since the inception of quantum theory, pushing the discussion to a “logical” view, which in our opinion is still lacking in the usual debates on such issues. In the final part of the paper, we propose a metaphysics where the notion of identity is substituted, for some objects, by a weaker notion of indiscernibility, and we try to justify such a move. In most of the uses of the expression “quantum theory”, we shall not make explicit the distinction between the non-relativistic and the relativistic approaches, although they of course are quite different, for we think that the problems as we shall present them appear in both versions. But, as the text goes, the context will distinguish between them and these questions will become clear to the reader.
Most of the predictions of quantum mechanics are of a statistical nature and therefore make sense only for ensembles. The axiomatics based on the quantum calculus of propositions might open the way toward a general definition of the quantum state of an individual system. It was soon recognized that this leads to separability and thereby to violation of some of the quantum-mechanical predictions. In contemporary literature, the concept of state is not wholly unambiguous. Some authors associate it with the notion of an individual system and say, for instance that a given system is in a given state. Others associate it exclusively with ensembles. The situation is complicated by the fact that for some theorists the concept of state refers only to ensembles that can be described by some state vector. For other authors it refers just as well to ensembles that cannot be associated with any state vector and for which only a density matrix description is therefore acceptable.
General properties of many-body systems Definition of individual system So far we have studied the properties of single-body systems in prescribed external potentials. An individual physical system comprises a wave and a particle, both evolving in three-dimensional Euclidean space. Of course, isolating a system and representing the influence of other matter by an ‘external potential’ is an approximation to the real state of affairs in that we neglect the source of the potential. As a fundamental theory of matter quantum mechanics should apply to a closed many-body system (and ultimately to the universe as a whole) and reduce to a theory of systems of a few degrees of freedom as a special case under conditions where it is legitimate to neglect the ‘rest of the universe’. The extension of the quantum theory of motion to many-body systems is straightforward, although it displays some striking features not evident in the one-body case. To begin with, we define an individual n-body system as comprising: ( a ) A wavefunction ψ = ψ( x 1 , …, x n , t ) defined in a 3 n -dimensional configuration space in which x l , …, x n provide a set of rectangular Cartesian coordinates. ( b ) A set of n point particles pursuing trajectories x i ( t ) i = 1, …, n , in three-dimensional Euclidean space. A single configuration space trajectory is equivalent to n particle trajectories in Euclidean space. When we speak of a ‘many-body system’ we mean then a single wavefunction together with a set of particles.
Are there quantum objects? What are they if they are neither given nor resemble anything familiar? To answer these questions we have to abstract from the substantive features of familiar things, delineate the pure logical forms by which we acknowledge objects and show how the forms are fulfilled in quantum theories. We have to explicate, in general terms and without resorting to the given, what we mean by objects. The clear criteria will enable us to affirm the objectivity of quantum theories. Auyang 1995, p. 5 Introduction Cantor, famously, defined a set as ‘… collections into a whole of definite, distinct objects of our intuition or of our thought’ (Cantor 1955, p. 85, our emphasis). On this basis the standard formulations of set theory, and consequently much of contemporary mathematics, are erected. Reflecting upon this definition, and the underlying ontological presuppositions, the question immediately arises, how are we to treat, mathematically, collections of objects which are not distinct individuals? This question becomes particularly acute in the quantum mechanical context, of course. As Yu. I. Manin noted at the 1974 American Mathematical Society Congress on the Hilbert Problems, We should consider possibilities of developing a totally new language to speak about infinity [that is, axioms for set theory]. Classical critics of Cantor (Brouwer et al. ) argue that, say, the general choice is an illicit extrapolation of the finite case.
The preparation procedure, an undefined notion in quantum theory, has not had the relevance that it deserves in the interpretation of quantum mechanical formalism.Here we utilize the concepts of identical and similar preparation procedures to show the conceptual differences between the statistical and the conventional interpretation of quantum formalism.Although the statistical understanding, and its final logical consequence, hidden variables theories (this connexion being explained in the text), have a great intuitive appeal due to its fewer ontological difficulties, both recent experimental results and theoretical developments seem to support an epistemic alternative closer to the conventional one.Nevertheless, we must not rule out the possibility that new theorems or new explanatory principles may modify the reigning supremacy of this interpretation. 1.-Introduction.Although the conventional interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism (CIQM), very close to the Copenhagen interpretation, is still dominant (is used in almost all textbooks), there are physical situations that ask for an interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism (QMF) in terms of the Statistical Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (SIQM) or even for hidden variables theories (HVT).The SIQM and HVT are different research programs, but they are closely related, as we will see further below.To introduce properly the distinctions between the three previous acronyms we will ask an old and apparently simple question.Is the wave function associated to an individual system or to a statistical ensemble?A first tentative answer could be formulated as follows.QMF introduces probabilities, and probabilities are related to statistical ensembles.Otherwise, the same concept of probability would lose its meaning.In QM, if it is said that you would get some concrete result with 0,63 probability it means that if the experiment is carried out 100 times, that concrete result would appear approximately 63 times.Hence, the obvious answer will be that the wave function should be related with statistical ensembles.However, despite its intuitiveness this idea does not capture completely what we want to express.The real problem to analyze could be best introduced with the following example.Imagine that we prepare identically two radioactive atoms with half-life of 30 minutes.By preparation we understand all those theoretical methods and physical procedures necessary to fully characterize the state of the system.It is, thus, a macroscopic reproducible act that lefts the system, without destroying it, in a concrete state after the procedure.In quantum theory, this preparation is represented by a vector state (or a density matrix).Identically in this context will mean identity of procedures, that is that the experimenter has repeated all previous operations, so that there is no difference whatsoever between them.Note, however, that identical preparations are not necessarily followed by identical results, so there is
This thesis examines the concepts of identity and individuality via scientifically-informed philosophical analysis. It has two parts. The first part deals with metaphysical claims that turn out to be, in effect, very general empirical claims extracted from our (supposed, but rationally-accredited) knowledge of the world. I here compare two approaches: a) the Leibniz-Quine view of identity as a derivative relation, and, relatedly, of individuality as dependent on the qualities of things; and b) the view that identity is a non-analysable primitive, and, relatedly, that the individuality of things is not reducible to anything else. The former position, based on the Principle of the Identity of the Indiscernibles as a criterion of individuation, might appear prima facie more plausible. However, I argue that it runs into difficulties both at the level of a priori analysis and in terms of 'fit' with the evidence described by our best science. It is, in fact, not even as compelling from the empiricist point of view as is commonly believed. I therefore argue that the position that identity and individuality are primitive may be preferred. In the second part of the thesis - under the assumption that the proper role of metaphysics is to characterise the best solutions to issues that are left open by current science - I deal with the question regarding whether and how the ultimate constituents of reality can actually be conceived of as primitive individuals. I argue in favour of an ontology of tropes, develop the view in detail and defend it against various criticisms. The fundamental tropes that constitute the basic 'building blocks' of reality are identified with the state-independent properties of elementary particles. The way in which these constitute complex particulars is described, and certain peculiarities having to do with quantum statistics are accounted for. I conclude by suggesting possible avenues for further research.