Are there quantum objects? What are they if they are neither given nor resemble anything familiar? To answer these questions we have to abstract from the substantive features of familiar things, delineate the pure logical forms by which we acknowledge objects and show how the forms are fulfilled in quantum theories. We have to explicate, in general terms and without resorting to the given, what we mean by objects. The clear criteria will enable us to affirm the objectivity of quantum theories. Auyang 1995, p. 5 Introduction Cantor, famously, defined a set as ‘… collections into a whole of definite, distinct objects of our intuition or of our thought’ (Cantor 1955, p. 85, our emphasis). On this basis the standard formulations of set theory, and consequently much of contemporary mathematics, are erected. Reflecting upon this definition, and the underlying ontological presuppositions, the question immediately arises, how are we to treat, mathematically, collections of objects which are not distinct individuals? This question becomes particularly acute in the quantum mechanical context, of course. As Yu. I. Manin noted at the 1974 American Mathematical Society Congress on the Hilbert Problems, We should consider possibilities of developing a totally new language to speak about infinity [that is, axioms for set theory]. Classical critics of Cantor (Brouwer et al. ) argue that, say, the general choice is an illicit extrapolation of the finite case.
Are there quantum objects? What are they if they are neither given nor resemble anything familiar? To answer these questions we have to abstract from the substantive features of familiar things, delineate the pure logical forms by which we acknowledge objects and show how the forms are fulfilled in quantum theories. We have to explicate, in general terms and without resorting to the given, what we mean by objects. The clear criteria will enable us to affirm the objectivity of quantum theories. Auyang 1995, p. 5 Introduction Cantor, famously, defined a set as ‘… collections into a whole of definite, distinct objects of our intuition or of our thought’ (Cantor 1955, p. 85, our emphasis). On this basis the standard formulations of set theory, and consequently much of contemporary mathematics, are erected. Reflecting upon this definition, and the underlying ontological presuppositions, the question immediately arises, how are we to treat, mathematically, collections of objects which are not distinct individuals? This question becomes particularly acute in the quantum mechanical context, of course. As Yu. I. Manin noted at the 1974 American Mathematical Society Congress on the Hilbert Problems, We should consider possibilities of developing a totally new language to speak about infinity [that is, axioms for set theory]. Classical critics of Cantor (Brouwer et al. ) argue that, say, the general choice is an illicit extrapolation of the finite case.
Quantum theory is the soul of contemporary physics. It was discovered in an adventurous way, under the urge to solve the puzzles posed by atomic spectra and blackbody radiation. But after its invention, it immediately became clear that it was not just a theory of specific physical systems: it was rather a new language of universal applicability. Already in 1928, the theory had received solid mathematical foundations by Hilbert, von Neumann, and Nordheim, and this work was brought to completion in the monumental work of von Neumann, in the form that we still study nowadays. The theory is extraordinarily successful, and its predictions have been confirmed to an astonishing level of precision in a large spectrum of experiments. However, almost 90 years after von Neumann's book, quantum theory remains mysterious. Its mathematical formulation – based on Hilbert spaces and self-adjoint operators – is far from having an intuitive interpretation. The association of physical systems to Hilbert spaces whose unit vectors represent pure states, the representation of transformations by unitary operators and of observables by self-adjoint operators – all such postulates look artificial and ad hoc . A slightly more operational approach is provided by the C * -algebraic formulation of quantum theory – still, this formulation relies on the assumption that observables form an algebra , where the physical meanings of the multiplication and the sum are far from clear. In short, the postulates of quantum theory impose mathematical structures without providing any simple reason for this choice: the mathematics of Hilbert spaces is adopted as a magic blackbox that “works well” at producing experimental predictions. However, in a satisfactory axiomatization of a physical theory the mathematical structures should emerge as a consequence of postulates that have a direct physical interpretation. By this we mean postulates referring, e.g., to primitive notions like physical system, measurement, or process, rather than notions like, e.g., Hilbert space, C * -algebra, unit vector, or selfadjoint operator. The crucial question thus remains unanswered: why quantum theory? Which are the principles at the basis of the theory? A case that is often invoked in contrast is that of Special Relativity theory, which directly follows from the simple understandable principle of relativity.
The difficulties of the old quantum theory were largely dispelled by the development of quantum mechanics in the 1920s. First Heisenberg (1925) developed the rather abstract matrix mechanics and soon after Schro¨dinger (1926; see also Eckart, 1926) developed the physically more appealing wave mechanics. Subsequently he showed them to be mathematically equivalent. The physicists were greatly relieved; now they had once again a mathematical formalism that enabled the results of experiments to be calculated. It was possible to move forward. It is certainly a very elegant and indeed beautiful formalism, and does enable the results of many physical measurements to be calculated with great accuracy. It is used daily by atomic and nuclear physicists; there is no other way to make calculations. From the earliest days there has been intense debate about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and it shows no signs of being settled; if anything it is becoming more intense over the years. As Penrose has remarked, no one understands quantum mechanics. Feynman (1967; see also Sykes, 1994) also admitted that ‘nobody understands quantum mechanics’, and Einstein once remarked: ‘I have thought a hundred times as much about the quantum problems as I have about general relativity theory’ (Pais, 1994, p. 57). It should therefore be evident that the most that can be done here is to try to show where the real difficulties lie, and how the failure to recognize that quantum mechanics is an essentially statistical theory has led to a series of confusing quantum paradoxes. It is just these paradoxes that have often been used to support theological speculations. It is useful to ask what ‘understanding quantum mechanics’ actually means. Certainly it means being able to calculate the results of many measurements. The same applies to Newton’s theory of gravitation, which we understand in the sense that we can use it as a basis of calculation, although we do not really understand the gravitational force itself. Very often, especially in modern physics, the mathematical formalism does not give us the sort of intuitive physical feeling for what is going on that we often obtain from classical mechanics. Perhaps we can never achieve more than this for quantum mechanics. In classical mechanics we can assume that a property that is measured objectively exists prior to the interaction of the measuring apparatus with the observed system. Quantum mechanics, however, ‘is incompatible with the proposition that measurement discovers some unknown but pre-existing property’ (Peres, 1997, p. 14). There is an important distinction between mysteries and absurdities. We may be forced to live with mysteries, but there is no reason why we should put up with absurdities such as the wave-particle duality, tunnelling through potential barriers, acausal events and the collapse of the wave function. These are the quantum paradoxes that will be discussed later on. They arise within the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and are solved by other interpretations. These alternative interpretations enable us to make conjectures about what is going on, even though we cannot understand it in detail. This is acceptable and a stimulus to further research. It is certainly difficult enough to understand quantum mechanics, but there is no need to try to visualize logical absurdities in the effort to do so. Quantum mechanics is a mathematical formalism that makes it possible to calculate the results of some experiments. Anything more than this, such as questions about the interpretation of what is measured and whether it tells us what is actually going on in the system being studied, belongs to philosophy. Thus we are concerned here with what is essentially a philosophical debate; if it were just a matter of physics the debate would have been settled long ago. One of the difficulties is that it invokes the results of experiments and uses the language of quantum mechanics. Inevitably this language uses philosophical terms and then it is easy to give the impression that the philosophical propositions are in some way entailed by the physical results. These in turn can influence theological thinking. In order to be quite clear which arguments are justified and which are not, it is essential to separate the three levels of discourse: physical, philosophical and theological. Our task is to relate these together, and this immediately raises the traditional problems of the philosophy of science, including the relation of experiment to theory, and of theory to explanation. We begin by discussing experiments, distinguishing between those that are real and those that are imaginary.
In this magisterial work, Roland Omnès takes us from the academies of ancient Greece to the laboratories of modern science as he seeks to do no less than rebuild the foundations of the philosophy of knowledge. One of the world's leading quantum physicists, Omnès reviews the history and recent development of mathematics, logic, and the physical sciences to show that current work in quantum theory offers new answers to questions that have puzzled philosophers for centuries: Is the world ultimately intelligible? Are all events caused? Do objects have definitive locations? Omnès addresses these profound questions with vigorous arguments and clear, colorful writing, aiming not just to advance scholarship but to enlighten readers with no background in science or philosophy. The book opens with an insightful and sweeping account of the main developments in science and the philosophy of knowledge from the pre-Socratic era to the nineteenth century. Omnès then traces the emergence in modern thought of a fracture between our intuitive, commonsense views of the world and the abstract and--for most people--incomprehensible world portrayed by advanced physics, math, and logic. He argues that the fracture appeared because the insights of Einstein and Bohr, the logical advances of Frege, Russell, and Gödel, and the necessary mathematics of infinity of Cantor and Hilbert cannot be fully expressed by words or images only. Quantum mechanics played an important role in this development, as it seemed to undermine intuitive notions of intelligibility, locality, and causality. However, Omnès argues that common sense and quantum mechanics are not as incompatible as many have thought. In fact, he makes the provocative argument that the "consistent-histories" approach to quantum mechanics, developed over the past fifteen years, places common sense (slightly reappraised and circumscribed) on a firm scientific and philosophical footing for the first time. In doing so, it provides what philosophers have sought through the ages: a sure foundation for human knowledge. Quantum Philosophy is a profound work of contemporary science and philosophy and an eloquent history of the long struggle to understand the nature of the world and of knowledge itself.
What does not satisfy me in that theory [quantum mechanics], from the standpoint of principle, is its attitude towards that which appears to me to be the programmatic aim of all physics: the complete description of any (individual) real situation (as it supposedly exists irrespective of any act of observation or substantiation). Albert Einstein, Reply to Criticisms [This] implies the impossibility of any sharp separation between the behaviour of atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring instruments which serve to define the conditions under which the phenomena appear . In fact, the individuality of the typical quantum effects finds its proper expression in the circumstance that any attempt of subdividing the phenomena will demand a change in the experimental arrangement introducing new possibilities of interaction between objects and measuring instruments which in principle cannot be controlled. Consequently, evidence obtained under different experimental conditions cannot be comprehended within a single picture, but must be regarded as complementary in the sense that only the totality of the phenomena exhausts the possible information about the objects. Indeed the finite interaction between object and measuring agencies conditioned by the very existence of the quantum of action entails – because of the impossibility of controlling the reaction of the object on the measuring instruments, if these are to serve their purpose – the necessity of a final renunciation of the classical idea of causality and a radical revision of our attitude towards the problem of physical reality. […]
The purpose of this dissertation is to construct a radically new type of mathematics whose underlying logic differs from the ordinary classical logic used in standard mathematics, and which we feel may be more natural for applications in quantum mechanics. Specifically, we begin by constructing a first order quantum logic, the development of which closely parallels that of ordinary (classical) first order logic --- the essential differences are in the nature of the logical axioms, which, in our construction, are motivated by quantum theory. After showing that the axiomatic first order logic we develop is sound and complete (with respect to a particular class of models), this logic is then used as a foundation on which to build (axiomatic) mathematical systems --- and we refer to the resulting new mathematics as "quantum mathematics." As noted above, the hope is that this form of mathematics is more natural than classical mathematics for the description of quantum systems, and will enable us to address some foundational aspects of quantum theory which are still troublesome --- e.g. the measurement problem --- as well as possibly even inform our thinking about quantum gravity.\n\nAfter constructing the underlying logic, we investigate properties of several mathematical systems --- e.g. axiom systems for abstract algebras, group theory, linear algebra, etc. --- in the presence of this quantum logic. In the process, we demonstrate that the resulting quantum mathematical systems have some strange, but very interesting features, which indicates a richness in the structure of mathematics that is classically inaccessible. Moreover, some of these features do indeed suggest possible applications to foundational questions in quantum theory. \n\nWe continue our investigation of quantum mathematics by constructing an axiomatic quantum set theory, which we show satisfies certain desirable criteria. Ultimately, we hope that such a set theory will lead to a foundation for quantum mathematics in a sense which parallels the foundational role of classical set theory in classical mathematics. One immediate application of the quantum set theory we develop is to provide a foundation on which to construct quantum natural numbers, which are the quantum analog of the classical counting numbers. It turns out that in a special class of models, there exists a 1-1 correspondence between the quantum natural numbers and bounded observables in quantum theory whose eigenvalues are (ordinary) natural numbers. This 1-1 correspondence is remarkably satisfying, and not only gives us great confidence in our quantum set theory, but indicates the naturalness of such models for quantum theory itself. We go on to develop a Peano-like arithmetic for these new "numbers," as well as consider some of its consequences. Finally, we conclude by summarizing our results, and discussing directions for future work.