Phenomenology and Experiments

Iver Brevik

Some typical Gedanken experiments in quantum mechanics are discussed in a modified form involving phenomenological electrodynamics for their explanation. The examples discussed are: (i) a two-slit experiment with photons, the difference from the standard situation being that two dielectric rods are assumed as photon detectors, (ii) a weighing experiment of a light pulse contained within a dielectric medium (a modified version of the Einstein-Bohr experiment) and (iii) a two-slit experiment in a dielectric environment.

Jerry B. Marion, J. L. Fowler

Gennadirvich Andrey Ryabokon

This work proposes a phenomenological formulation of a decoherence principle that relates the degree of suppression of quantum coherence to the integral of the squared effective environmental field in the physical systems and experimental configurations analyzed in this paper. The environment is treated as a set of effective physical influences relevant to a specific experimental or physical configuration and acting on the system. The applicability of the proposed principle is analyzed using seventeen experiments and observations spanning microscopic, mesoscopic, macroscopic, and cosmological scales. Seven key experiments are analyzed quantitatively and in detail, while the remaining ones are presented as supporting the broad applicability of the proposed phenomenological approach. This publication is part of a broader conceptual program aimed at providing a unified phenomenological description of decoherence and attenuation processes. The framework is fully consistent with standard quantum mechanics and should be viewed as an organizing perspective rather than a proposal of new dynamics.

A. G. Buckley, Christopher White, Martin J. White

Igor Evgenievich Pris

A critique of phenomenological interpretation of quantum Bayesianism (QBism) is offered, in particular, the position of M. Bitbol and L. de La Tremblay, which removes remnants of scientific realism from QBism and adopts a radically phenomenological first person point of view. It is shown that phenomenological view of quantum mechanics cannot explain cognition of quantum reality and behavior of real quantum systems, because the ultimate reality for phenomenology is autonomous phenomena, which, in fact, do not exist. Our proposed contextual quantum realism (CQR) does not invert, as the mentioned authors do, but rejects, the traditional relation between experience and reality. By reinterpreting QBism, our CQR removes remnants of phenomenology from it, but in such a way as not to fall into the other extreme – metaphysical realism.

Phyllis Chiasson