Abstract The proposed interpretation, if it is to count as realism, must say more about the evolution of the state while the argument that more about its dynamics oughtn't to be said (given the no-broadcasting principle) is suggested to be unsound. Nor are the alleged dogmas of quantum mechanics dogmas — on the contrary, the fact that measurements cannot count as primitives is a consequence of realism, not a presupposition of it. And the parallel with special relativity cuts both ways: the dynamical explanations for the length contractions and time dilations demanded by Lorentz in special relativity must indeed be forthcoming, as Einstein later acknowledged. Finally, there is little in the proposed interpretation that is specifically information-theoretic.
Abstract The proposed interpretation, if it is to count as realism, must say more about the evolution of the state while the argument that more about its dynamics oughtn't to be said (given the no-broadcasting principle) is suggested to be unsound. Nor are the alleged dogmas of quantum mechanics dogmas — on the contrary, the fact that measurements cannot count as primitives is a consequence of realism, not a presupposition of it. And the parallel with special relativity cuts both ways: the dynamical explanations for the length contractions and time dilations demanded by Lorentz in special relativity must indeed be forthcoming, as Einstein later acknowledged. Finally, there is little in the proposed interpretation that is specifically information-theoretic.
Abstract Until recently Jeffrey Bub and Itamar Pitowsky, in the framework of an information-theoretic view of quantum mechanics, claimed first that to the measurement problem in its ordinary formulation there correspond in effect two measurement problems (simply called the big and the small measurement problems), with a different degree of relevance and, second, that the analysis of a quantum measurement is a problem only if other assumptions – taken by Pitowsky and Bub to be unnecessary ‘dogmas’ – are assumed. Here I critically discuss this unconventional stance on the measurement problem and argue that the Bub-Pitowsky arguments are inconclusive, mainly because they rely on an unwarranted extension to the quantum realm of a distinction concerning the foundations of special relativity which is in itself rather controversial.
Abstract This chapter argues that the intractable part of the measurement problem — the ‘big’ measurement problem — is a pseudo-problem that depends for its legitimacy on the acceptance of two dogmas. The first dogma is John Bell's assertion that measurement should never be introduced as a primitive process in a fundamental mechanical theory like classical or quantum mechanics, but should always be open to a complete analysis, in principle, of how the individual outcomes come about dynamically. The second dogma is the view that the quantum state has an ontological significance analogous to the significance of the classical state as the ‘truthmaker’ for propositions about the occurrence and non-occurrence of events, i.e., that the quantum state is a representation of physical reality. The chapter shows how both dogmas can be rejected in a realist information-theoretic interpretation of quantum mechanics as an alternative to the Everett interpretation. The Everettian, too, regards the ‘big’ measurement problem as a pseudo-problem, because the Everettian rejects the assumption that measurements have definite outcomes, in the sense that one particular outcome, as opposed to other possible outcomes, actually occurs in a quantum measurement process. By contrast with the Everettians, the chapter accepts that measurements have definite outcomes. By contrast with the Bohmians and the GRW ‘collapse’ theorists who add structure to the theory and propose dynamical solutions to the ‘big’ measurement problem, we take the problem to arise from the failure to see the significance of Hilbert space as a new kinematic framework for the physics of an indeterministic universe, in the sense that Hilbert space imposes kinematic (i.e., pre-dynamic) objective probabilistic constraints on correlations between events.
About ten years ago, Itamar Pitowsky and I wrote a paper, 'Two dogmas about quantum mechanics,' in which we outlined an information-theoretic interpretation of quantum mechanics as an alternative to the Everett interpretation. Here I revisit the paper and, following Frauchiger and Renner, I show that the Everett interpretation leads to modal contradictions in 'Wigner's-Friend'-type scenarios that involve 'encapsulated' measurements, where a super-observer (which could be a quantum automaton), with unrestricted ability to measure any arbitrary observable of a complex quantum system, measures the memory of an observer system (also possibly a quantum automaton) after that system measures the spin of a qubit. In this sense, the Everett interpretation is inconsistent.
We understand emergent quantum mechanics in the sense that quantum mechanics describes processes of physical emergence relating an assumed sub-quantum physics to macroscopic boundary conditions. The latter can be shown to entail top-down causation, in addition to usual bottom-up scenarios. With this example it is demonstrated that definitions of "realism" in the literature are simply too restrictive. A prevailing manner to define realism in quantum mechanics is in terms of pre-determination independent of the measurement. With our counter-example, which actually is ubiquitous in emergent, or self-organizing, systems, we argue for realism without pre-determination . We refer to earlier results of our group showing how the guiding equation of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation can be derived from a theory with classical ingredients only. Essentially, this corresponds to a "quantum mechanics without wave functions" in ordinary 3-space, albeit with nonlocal correlations. This, then, leads to the central question of how to deal with the nonlocality problem in a relativistic setting. We here show that a basic argument discussing the allegedly paradox time ordering of events in EPR-type two-particle experiments falls short of taking into account the contextuality of the experimental setup. Consequently, we then discuss under which circumstances (i.e. physical premises) superluminal information transfer (but not signaling) may be compatible with a Lorentz-invariant theory. Finally, we argue that the impossibility of superluminal signaling - despite the presence of superluminal information transfer - is not the result of some sort of conspiracy (á la "Nature likes to hide"), but the consequence of the impossibility to exactly reproduce in repeated experimental runs a state's preparation, or of the no-cloning theorem, respectively.
While quantum mechanics (QM) is covered at length in introductory physics textbooks, the concept of quantum entanglement is typically not covered at all, despite its importance in the rapidly growing area of quantum information science and its extensive experimental confirmation. Thus, physics educators are left to their own devices as to how to introduce this important concept. Regardless of how a physics educator chooses to introduce quantum entanglement, they face a trilemma involving its mysterious Bell-inequality-violating correlations. They can compromise on the the completeness of their introduction and simply choose not to share that fact, totally ignoring the 2022 Nobel Prize in Physics. They can frustrate their more curious students by introducing the mystery and simply telling them that the QM formalism with its associated (equally mysterious) conservation law maps beautifully to the experiments, so there is nothing else that needs to be said. Or, they can compromise the rigor of their presentation and attempt to resolve the mystery by venturing into the metaphysical quagmire of competing QM interpretations. Herein, we resolve this trilemma in precisely the same way that Einstein resolved the mysteries of time dilation and length contraction that existed in the late nineteenth century. That is, we resort to "principle" explanation based on the mathematical consequences of "empirically discovered" facts. Indeed, our principle account of quantum entanglement is even based on the same principle Einstein used, i.e., the relativity principle or "no preferred reference frame." Thus, this principle resolution of the trilemma is as complete, satisfying, analytically rigorous, and accessible as the standard introduction of special relativity for first-year physics students.
One of the concepts of Relativity theory that challenges conventional intuition the most is time dilation and length contraction. Usual approaches for describing relativistic effects in quantum systems merely postulate the consequences of these effects as physical constraints. Here, we propose to rebuild Special Relativity from quantum mechanical considerations. This is done by dropping one of its fundamental postulates: the universality of the speed of light. Lorentz transformations are obtained by a quantum mechanism. We use the fact that quantum states depend on the Galilean reference frame where they are defined. In other words, quantum states outside an observer's Galilean reference frame are distorted. Then, we show in a theorem the existence of time-dependent observables that are sensible to this distortion in such a way that their expectation value is a Lorentz-covariant function of time. We then postulate this mechanism as the source of the phenomena of Special Relativity. As a corollary of the main theorem, we show the existence of a Lorentz covariant momentum and mass operators which yield the relativistic momentum and mass. In this theory, the fundamental limit of the speed of light imposes a transparency condition for faster-than-light particles: they are allowed but they are not observable. The transparency effect could explain dark matter in a more general theory following this quantum formalism.