09 April 1996, “Randomness” I don't know if you remember me, but we met at the Santa Fe Institute Workshop on the Physics of Information two summers ago. I spoke to you about your old papers on randomness and quantum mechanics. In any case, I am very much interested in them again. (Presently, in particular, the ones titled “Finite and Infinite Measurement Sequences in Quantum Mechanics and Randomness: The Everett Interpretation” JMP 18 (1977) 2289, and “A Note on the Everett Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics” Found. Phys . 8 (1978) 709.) Carl Caves and I are writing a book on Quantum Information and are trying to get a feel for how far these sorts of considerations really go toward deriving the standard probability expression of quantum theory. Last night I reread the latter of the two papers mentioned above. The main question on my mind now is about Section 4 “The Asymptotic Description.” At the end you state, “Thus it is an open question whether or not there is any possible state description of the asymptotic situation that includes component states each corresponding to a possible universe as perceived by an observer with memory trace ν.” Has there been any progress in this direction since then?? If there has, could you please send me a reference or outline the solution?
09 April 1996, “Randomness” I don't know if you remember me, but we met at the Santa Fe Institute Workshop on the Physics of Information two summers ago. I spoke to you about your old papers on randomness and quantum mechanics. In any case, I am very much interested in them again. (Presently, in particular, the ones titled “Finite and Infinite Measurement Sequences in Quantum Mechanics and Randomness: The Everett Interpretation” JMP 18 (1977) 2289, and “A Note on the Everett Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics” Found. Phys . 8 (1978) 709.) Carl Caves and I are writing a book on Quantum Information and are trying to get a feel for how far these sorts of considerations really go toward deriving the standard probability expression of quantum theory. Last night I reread the latter of the two papers mentioned above. The main question on my mind now is about Section 4 “The Asymptotic Description.” At the end you state, “Thus it is an open question whether or not there is any possible state description of the asymptotic situation that includes component states each corresponding to a possible universe as perceived by an observer with memory trace ν.” Has there been any progress in this direction since then?? If there has, could you please send me a reference or outline the solution?
The quantum mechanical description of both a finite and infinite number of measurement repetitions, as interactions between copies of an object system and a record system, are considered here. States describing the asymptotic situation of an infinite number of repetitions are seen to have some interesting properties. The main construction of the paper is the association of states to sequential tests for randomness. To each such test T and each positive integer m one can associate states ΘnTm and Θ∞Tm corresponding respectively to those length-n and finite outcome sequences which pass test T at the significance level 2−m. Following the methods of Martin Löf, a universal sequential test V, which includes an infinity of sequential statistical tests for randomness, is given and the corresponding states ΘnVm and Θ∞Vm are discussed. Finally, a possible use of these states in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics is discussed.
Few, if any, issues in physics have engendered as much discussion as the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. It is generally agreed that the `normal' dynamical evolution of the state vector in quantum mechanics is given by a unitary map. The linearity of this map implies that the state vector will, in general, be found in a superposition of eigenstates of a given observable (or, similarly, that the density matrix describing a subsystem will not correspond to a definite value of this observable). However, when we make a measurement of an observable, we always obtain a define value—although it is impossible to predict with certainty which value will be obtained. The traditional response to this issue is to postulate that when a measurement is made, the wavefunction `collapses' to an eigenstate of the observable being measured, perhaps due to the inherent classicality of the measuring apparatus (Bohr), or to the consciousness of the observer (Wigner), or possibly to some modification of quantum dynamics that occurs even when observations are not being made. The main motivation for the Everett (`many worlds') interpretation is to avoid introducing any such collapse postulate. This volume commemorates the 50th anniversary of the publication of Everett's paper in 1957 and contains 20 original articles as well as the transcripts of several discussions that took place at meetings devoted to the Everett interpretation at Oxford University and the Perimeter Institute. The attractiveness of the Everett interpretation is very succinctly summarized by a sentence from Vaidman's contribution (p 582): `The collapse, with its randomness, non-locality and the lack of a well-defined moment of occurrence, is such an ugly scar on quantum theory, that I, along with many others, am ready to follow Everett and deny its existence.' But the main drawback of the interpretation is then equally succinctly stated in the next sentence: `The price is the many worlds interpretation, i.e., the existence of numerous parallel worlds.' In other words, if the state vector evolves to have a non-zero amplitude for two different values of an observable that I `measure' (i.e., interact with in an appropriate way), each of these alternatives remains equally `real', i.e., there is a `branch' of the wavefunction in which the observable takes the first value and I believe that it has this first value and a branch of the wavefunction where it takes the second value and I believe that it has this second value. Each of these `me's' sees a definite value for the observable, thus nicely accounting for what I believe I experience without invoking collapse. But then, it seems that I have to believe that there are many other `me's' around—even if they are very difficult for this particular me to access—and no way I can predict which `me' I will be in the future. Indeed, Saunders writes on p 192, `If Alice is a person (of course she is) then we must say, even prior to branching at tj that there are many Alices present, atom for atom duplicates...Alice should be uncertain after all— each Alice should be uncertain—for each as of tj does not (and as a matter of principle, cannot) know which of these branching persons she is.' Thus, if taken seriously, the Everett viewpoint leads directly to questions like `What determines which ``me'' I am now and/or will feel that I am in the future?' The response `You are all of them' somehow doesn't seem satisfying, and further pursuit of these issues would seem to lead to questions as fruitless as questions like `Why am I ``me'' and not ``you''?' I believe that this accounts for why the Everett interpretation does not have universal appeal. But enough of `me' for now (more later); let's discuss the book. Unlike many edited volumes and conference proceedings in physics—which often consist of hastily slapped-together re-hashes of previous papers—this volume meets very high standards in the choice of topics and authors and in the quality of the writing. Although each of the articles is closely tied in with the Everett interpretation, there are many articles of considerable value and interest in their own right, such as the discussion of quasiclassical realms by Hartle and and the discussion of the de Broglie–Bohm interpretation by Valentini. There is also an excellent introduction by Saunders to the quantum measurement problem and the main issues that arise in the Everett interpretation. A central issue in the Everett interpretation is the status of the `Born rule', which asserts that, for state ψ, the probability of obtaining a particular outcome of a measurement is ||Pψ||2, where P is the projection operator onto the eigensubspace associated with the measurement outcome. In traditional interpretations, the Born rule is simply postulated as part of the collapse hypothesis. In the Everett interpretation, it is far from obvious that the Born rule even has any meaning—if all outcomes occur, how can one talk about the probability of a particular outcome? Given the importance of this issue, it is highly appropriate that four chapters of the book (by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold) are devoted to addressing probability and the Born rule from the Everett viewpoint, and three chapters (by Kent, Albert, and Price) are devoted to criticising these views. As indicated by the above quote from Saunders' article, uncertainty and probability can enter the Everett interpretation via each Alice being uncertain as to which Alice she is or will be. However, in view of the difficulties to which this kind of argumentation will lead, it is perhaps not surprising that in the 123 pages of combined discussion by Saunders, Papineau, Wallace, and Greaves and Myrvold, there are only fleeting references to the use of probability along these lines. Rather, the approach taken is reminiscent of that of adept politicians: if you can't answer a question, then answer a different question, and answer it with conviction and detail. Instead of considering probabilities of outcomes—a highly problematical notion when all of the possible outcomes actually occur—consider only decision theory issues. In particular, Wallace gives a precise and detailed mathematical proof that, under certain hypotheses, the only rational strategy that a quantum observer can follow in making decisions is to weight the possible outcomes by Born rule probabilities. To illustrate this more graphically, suppose tomorrow's weather were determined by some quantum mechanical, Stern–Gerlach-like process. I would like to know whether it is likely to rain tomorrow. However, when I ask an Everett follower (who knows the state vector and has done the Born rule calculation), all she will tell me in direct response to my question is that `it will rain and it won't rain.' Nevertheless, she is willing tell me whether or not it is rational for me to take an umbrella. I suppose that if she tells me that it would be highly irrational for me to take an umbrella, I can take the hint and deduce that it is very unlikely to rain. However, there does seem something wrong with the fact that she is not allowed to say this directly. In any case, if the conclusion of a mathematically correct argument is that rational decision strategies require the Born rule, then there must be quite a bit lying in the assumptions. The articles by Kent, Albert, and Price do a good job of fleshing out these assumptions and pointing out the weaknesses and flaws in the probability and decision theory discussions within the Everett framework. I hope it is clear from what I have written above that this is an outstanding volume, which should be of great interest to anyone interested in the foundations of quantum theory. Indeed, I feel quite fortunate to be the particular `me' that happens to exist in the same branch of the wavefunction of the universe in which this book was published.
April 1996, to Michiel van Lambalgen, “Thesis” About myself (in case you are wondering) I am a physicist. My research specialty is “quantum information theory,” a field that concerns a hodgepodge of things including quantum cryptography, quantum computing, and statistical inference problems having to do with quantum mechanical systems. You may have heard of some of these things through Paul Vitanyi or André Berthiaume (Vitanyi's postdoc). I am presently a postdoc working for Gilles Brassard and Claude Crépeau in Montréal; starting October, I will have a three year position at Caltech. I was once interested in the mathematics of randomness because, though I am Bayesian through and through for all other uses of probability, I believed that probabilities for quantum mechanical measurement outcomes were something different…in fact something more akin to the frequentist conception. Thus I put a lot of effort into studying von Mises, Church, Kolmogorov, Martin-Löf, Chaitin, etc. (I didn't find your papers until I had pretty much abandoned this belief, though I'm not sure that I am completely over it!) I had hoped that there might be some mathematical connection between the structures found in quantum theory (vector spaces, positive-operator valued measures, etc.) and the structures required to formalize the notion of random sequences…at least that was my motivation.
When investigating various interpretations of quantum mechanics one notices that each interpretation contains an element which escapes a complete and full description. This element is always associated with the stochasticity of the individual event in the quantum measurement process. It appears that the implications of this limit to any description of the world has not been sufficiently appreciated with notable exceptions of, for example, Heisenberg, Pauli and Wheeler. If we assume that a deeper foundation of quantum mechanics is possible, the question arises which features such a philosophical foundation might have. It is suggested that the objective randomness of the individual quantum event is a necessity of a description of the world in view of the significant influence the observer in quantum mechanics has. It is also suggested that the austerity of the Copenhagen interpretation should serve as a guiding principle in a search for deeper understanding. In recent years, a significant increase of interest in the foundations of quantum mechanics can be observed. This increase is certainly related to the immense progress made during the last two decades in experiments with individual quantum systems. This technological progress has made it possible to really perform more and more of the famous gedanken experiments which were so important in the early days of the theory. Not only did these experiments confirm the theory in every detail, they also opened up avenues for new experimental directions which might even lead some day to new technology. While such applications are certainly still far away, areas like quantum cryptography[1], quantum computation[2] and interaction-free measurement[3], just to name a few examples, certainly deserve the attention they receive. All this activity has also drawn more attention to the problems of understanding and interpreting quantum mechanics. It seems that there, a definitive consensus has not yet been reached. As witnesses quote authorities like Feynman as saying[4]: I think can safely say that nobody today understands quantum mechanics, whereby he apparently included himself, or like Roger Penrose[5], who describes his opinion remarking that while the theory agrees incredibly well with experiment and while it is of profound mathematical beauty, it makes absolutely no sense. Why did even physicists who have contributed so significantly to quantum theory Feynman was even rewarded the Nobel Prize for one of its mathematical formulations choose such emphatic and strong formulations? Why is it that the average physicist hears very little about such problems during his/her education? Why is the comprehension of the theory very often focused on formalism while questions that probe for deeper meaning are usually not tackled? To take a closer look at the situation, let us turn to a brief analysis of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. We note that there are at least two levels of interpreting a formalism, a physical theory. The first, basic, level supplies the rules that determine which element of the formalism corresponds to which measurable quantity or to which observable fact in a concrete experimental situation. Theses rules are a large, mostly not explicated but only implicit, set of instructions. These instructions concern the manner of working with the statements of the theory in order to obtain predictions for future experiments or events, and they concern the instructions on how to proceed in experiment in order to demonstrate or test a theoretical
September 1996, “Theorem II” I encountered your “Ithaca Interpretation” paper this morning on the quant-ph archive … and, I must say, I've been walking around with a nice feeling since. There are some things in it that I like very much! Your Theorem II (or a very slight variation of it) has indeed been proven before, by Bill Wootters. I'll attach the citations below along with part of a note Bill once sent me. (Interestingly, one can also make a cut between real, complex, and quaternionic Hilbert spaces based on such a theorem.) About your Theorem I, if I am not mistaken, it also has a history that predates the references you gave. I believe Richard Jozsa once told me that a fellow named Hadjisavvas found it well before HJW and Gisin. If you are interested you can contact Richard directly; his e-mail address is.… As I say, I enjoyed your paper very much! (Presently) I think my only point of departure in what you say is about the issue of “objective probability.” Carl Caves and I (in still another paper cited below which can be found on quant-ph, pp. 22–26 in particular) have advocated the view that even the probabilities of quantum theory should be interpreted in a Bayesian or subjective way. We prefer to say that it is the “indeterminism” of quantum mechanics that is “objective,” and not the probabilities themselves.
We shall draw an affirmative answer to the question posed in the title.The key point will be a quantum description of physical reality.Once fixed at ontic level two basic elements, namely the laws of physics and the matter, we argue that the underlying physical reality emerges from the interconnection between these two elements.We consider any physical process, including measurement, modeled by unitary evolution.In this context, we will deduce quantum randomness as a consequence of inclusion of the observer into the quantum system.The global picture of the universe is in a sense deterministic, but from our own local perspective (as part of the system) we perceive quantum mechanical randomness.Then, the notion of "information" turns out to be a derivative concept.I've spent much more time thinking about the photon problem [i.e., about quantum theory] than about relativity. A. Einstein