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Cambridge University Press eBooks

Letters to David Mermin

Christopher A. Fuchs

Published Jan 6, 2011• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

September 1996, “Theorem II” I encountered your “Ithaca Interpretation” paper this morning on the quant-ph archive … and, I must say, I've been walking around with a nice feeling since. There are some things in it that I like very much! Your Theorem II (or a very slight variation of it) has indeed been proven before, by Bill Wootters. I'll attach the citations below along with part of a note Bill once sent me. (Interestingly, one can also make a cut between real, complex, and quaternionic Hilbert spaces based on such a theorem.) About your Theorem I, if I am not mistaken, it also has a history that predates the references you gave. I believe Richard Jozsa once told me that a fellow named Hadjisavvas found it well before HJW and Gisin. If you are interested you can contact Richard directly; his e-mail address is.… As I say, I enjoyed your paper very much! (Presently) I think my only point of departure in what you say is about the issue of “objective probability.” Carl Caves and I (in still another paper cited below which can be found on quant-ph, pp. 22–26 in particular) have advocated the view that even the probabilities of quantum theory should be interpreted in a Bayesian or subjective way. We prefer to say that it is the “indeterminism” of quantum mechanics that is “objective,” and not the probabilities themselves.

DOI
10.1017/cbo9780511762789.022

Related papers

Foreword

N. David Mermin

On 18 September 1996 I received email that began Dear Dr. Mermin, I encountered your “Ithaca Interpretation” paper this morning on the quant-ph archive … and, I must say, I've been walking around with a nice feeling since. There are some things in it that I like very much! Although I didn't really know my correspondent, it was clear from what followed that he had thought hard – probably harder than I had – about many of the matters I was trying to address. His scholarship and intelligence were so evident that I started walking around with a nice feeling myself at having received unsolicited praise from so thoughtful a source. Little did I know that those heartwarming words of appreciation were just bait to lure me into a long critical exchange which, to my pleasure and enlightenment, has been going on ever since. A part of my subsequent education (there have also been several invariably instructive and delightful real-life meetings) can be found in Chapter 18 below. If Chris Fuchs (rhymes with “books”) did not exist then God would have been remiss in not inventing him. Foundations of quantum mechanics is a unique blend of poetry and analysis. Without the poetic vision the analysis tends to chase its own tail into more and more convoluted realms of intricate triviality. Without the analysis the poetry easily degenerates into self-indulgent doggerel.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Jan 6, 2011•0 citations

Letters to Joseph Renes

Christopher A. Fuchs

June 2000, “References for Gleason” Some relevant references. The important ones are Gleason's paper, Cooke et al .'s paper, and Pitowsky's paper. R. Cooke, M. Keane, and W. Moran, “An Elementary Proof of Gleason's Theorem,” Math. Proc. Camb. Phil. Soc. 98 , 117–128 (1981). A. M. Gleason, “Measures on the Closed Subspaces of a Hilbert Space,” J. Math. Mech. 6 , 885–894 (1957). I. Pitowsky, “George Boole's ‘Conditions of Possible Experience’ and the Quantum Puzzle,” Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 45 , 95–125 (1994). I. Pitowsky, “Infinite and Finite Gleason's Theorems and the Logic of Indeterminacy,” J. Math. Phys. 39 , 218–228 (1998). F. Richman and D. Bridges, “A Constructive Proof of Gleason's Theorem,” J. Func. Anal. 162 , 287–312 (1999). December 2000, “New Ideas and Old Men” Thanks for the new ideas. Let me try to make a few comments. I'm in a smoky hotel bar right now; I wonder how this is affecting my laptop's health? I know it's wreaking havoc on mine. I'm still in Vienna, by the way. I leave Tuesday morning. Unfortunately I haven't gotten an ounce written of what I had hoped to. Renesism 1: This got me thinking about this stuff, and it seems that in some sense what we're gathering information about, when we make measurements, is the ability to predict future measurements . You haven't read my paper with Kurt Jacobs yet, have you? [See quant-ph/0009101.] Come on, at least read the Introduction and Footnote 27.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Jan 6, 2011•0 citations

More on the quantum measurement problem

Sean M. Carroll

I appreciate David Mermin’s letter. There is, of course, an ongoing debate in the philosophy of probability about whether probability is best thought of as objective or subjective. Experts continue to disagree, which suggests that we might want to acknowledge a “problem” in that wider-than-quantum context, even if we think we have the right answer.Whatever our stance is toward probability, we can still wonder about reality (ontology). People disagree about that too, and there are respectable but mutually incompatible possibilities—which represents another problem.In particular, one can be a subjectivist about probability (as I am myself!) within different approaches to the quantum measurement problem. Both Everettian and Bohmian quantum theories invoke subjective probabilities, concerning which branch of the wavefunction you are on (Everettian) or the values of the hidden variables (Bohmian), although they treat quantum measurements differently. Taking a subjective stance toward probability does not by itself resolve the measurement problem.Objective-collapse models, by contrast, sit more comfortably in (as the name suggests) an objective picture of probability. To the extent that such models are empirically viable, it seems wrong to deny the existence of the quantum measurement problem, since, again, they address it very differently than other models.I am optimistic that the quantum measurement problem is solvable and will be solved, but I am wary about prematurely declaring victory. Section:ChooseTop of page <<© 2022 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Nov 1, 2022•0 citations

More on the quantum measurement problem

Gregory N. Derry

Although I have neither an objection to nor an endorsement of David Mermin’s major premise in his Quick Study, “There is no quantum measurement problem” (Physics Today, June 2022, page 62), I would like to make several contextual points.Mermin’s argument has an extensive history, along with a comparable history of rebuttal. Five decades ago Max Jammer wrote that “measurements in quantum mechanics are no more or less problematic than in classical physics, for the Hilbert space vector is only a purely formal device for relating the statistics associated with these arrangements to the physics of observations in classical physics.” That seems like a condensed version of the argument Mermin presents. On the following page, however, Jammer notes that a “problematic aspect whose serious implications were only gradually understood was the fact that as long as a quantum mechanical one-body or many-body system does not interact with macroscopic objects, as long as its motion is described by the deterministic Schrödinger time-dependent equation, no events could be considered to take place in the system.”11. M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: The Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in Historical Perspective, Wiley (1974), pp. 473, 474.Niels Bohr giving a lecture in Copenhagen in April 1929. (Photograph by Samuel Goudsmit, courtesy of the AIP Emilio Segrè Visual Archives, Goudsmit Collection.)PPT|High resolutionRegarding the quotations from Niels Bohr, Mermin’s point is entirely valid and represents Bohr’s position accurately, but Bohr’s thought is always subtle and difficult to capture completely. Another quotation from Bohr, which is consistent with everything else he wrote, is, “The decisive point is that in neither case does the appropriate widening of our conceptual framework imply any appeal to the observing subject, which would hinder unambiguous communication of experience.”22. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. That quotation seems inconsistent with Mermin’s paragraph that includes the passage “Why should I insist that my interpretation of science, which I use to make sense of the world that I experience, should never make any mention of me?” Bohr always insisted that his framework was a rational “generalization” of classical objectivity.The last and most conceptually important point concerns the ontological status of probability. I don’t necessarily disagree with Mermin and Bruno de Finetti, but it is by no means obvious that they are correct either. David Hawkins, for example, begins 50 pages of rigorous analysis with a brief statement of a major premise.The obvious and natural interpretation of probability in this context is that it introduces, not something that has to do with the nature of the physical system, but something that has to do with the incompleteness of our knowledge….But this opinion turns out to be false. Ignorance of dynamical regularity may be a motive for resorting to probabilities, but it does not explain the probabilities to which we resort.33. D. Hawkins, The Language of Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science, W. H. Freeman (1964), p. 135.Another example can be found in Jammer’s well-known historical account of quantum theory: “For Einstein the notion of probability … was the traditional conception of classical physics, a mathematical objectivization of the human deficiency of complete or exact knowledge but ultimately a creation of the human mind…. For Born probability, as far as it was related to the wave function, was not merely a mathematical fiction but something endowed with physical reality.”44. M. Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill (1966), p. 286.Of course, such examples don’t mean that Mermin’s position is incorrect, but I do think that they demand a better argument than a comparison to “Fairies and Witches.” I am confident that Mermin has such an argument, and I look forward to reading it as I continue working toward a coherent position on the unresolved interpretational issues of quantum theory.ReferencesSection:ChooseTop of pageReferences <<CITING ARTICLES1. M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: The Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in Historical Perspective, Wiley (1974), pp. 473, 474. Google Scholar2. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. Google Scholar3. D. Hawkins, The Language of Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science, W. H. Freeman (1964), p. 135. Google Scholar4. M. Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill (1966), p. 286. Google Scholar© 2022 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Nov 1, 2022•2 citations

Consistent treatments of quantum mechanics

Yakir Aharonov, Sandu Popescu, Jeff Tollaksen

Aharonov, Popescu, and Tollaksen reply: We are grateful to David Mermin for stating loud and clear, in his unmistakable style, that “the authors are correct.” As for the rest of his letter, a lesson on clear writing from a great master of the subject is always welcome. We did strive for clarity in our article, but there is always space for improvement, and Freudian slips of Newspeak often creep in—that’s their very nature.However, as Mermin certainly knows, analyzing sentences in isolation without the many clues found in context doesn’t do them justice. The initial setup is indeed elementary, and we put in all the details, so it is hard to see how it could be misinterpreted. The situation becomes far more interesting and surprising, though, when weak measurements are taken into account; to ignore them, as Michael Nauenberg and Art Hobson did, is to completely miss the point. We believe that no true understanding of quantum mechanics can be obtained without taking weak measurements seriously.The letter by Robert Griffiths is mainly concerned with the merits of the consistent histories approach to quantum mechanics. It is an interesting subject but one that has very little to do with our article. We presented a number of quantum effects that arise in the context of pre- and postselection, first and foremost the effects that appear when weak measurements are involved. And no, there is no error in reasoning when we claim that in a situation like that described in our article, spin measurements may, in a consistent way, indicate that spin-1⁄2 particles have value 100; that is a statement of fact about results of measurements, which incidentally have been confirmed experimentally. One is free to disagree with the meaning we attach to those facts but cannot deny the facts themselves. Of course, since our effects are purely quantum mechanical, they can be analyzed using any interpretation of quantum mechanics, including consistent histories. However, before having such a discussion, it helps if the effects are first discovered! Their existence is our main message.© 2011 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Oct 1, 2011•6 citations

Measured responses to quantum Bayesianism

Art Hobson

Because it’s important that physicists discuss the problems of quantum foundations, I was delighted to see David Mermin’s commentary on “fixing the shifty split.” But I must disagree with my friend’s view.There are multiple ways of interpreting probabilities.11. A. Hobson, Concepts in Statistical Mechanics, Gordon and Breach, New York (1971), p. 27. In quantum physics, the Bayesian “degree of belief” interpretation can be appropriate for mixed states, but only the frequentist or “ensemble” interpretation applies to the pure states that Mermin discusses.A recent paper by Matthew Pusey and coauthors22. M. F. Pusey, J. Barrett, T. Rudolph, http://arxiv.org/abs/1111.3328v1. concludes that if two different pure quantum states are assigned to a single physical situation, one of the states is objectively wrong. The proof’s main assumption is that any quantum system has some set of real physical properties, labeled λ. Pusey and coauthors show that two different pure states cannot represent the same λ. So, although their paper implies but does not assume that quantum states are physically real, it does assume that each specific physical situation has behind it some kind of physical reality. Chris Fuchs, quoted favorably by Mermin, might dispute the notion that some kind of physical reality actually exists, but most physicists are probably sufficiently realist to grant that notion. Without such a notion, science lies somewhere between solipsism and superstition.Whenever I hear subjective interpretations of quantum physics, I wonder about such questions as the one Mermin quotes from Albert Einstein: Can a mouse collapse a wavefunction? Mermin’s Bayesian response, that a mouse cannot but a physics student can, doesn’t reassure me. Were wavefunctions not collapsing before there were physicists?The “Wigner’s friend” paradox, as described in Mermin’s commentary, doesn’t need a subjective interpretation to find a solution. In fact, Eugene Wigner abandoned his interpretation around 1970 once he became aware of the ideas underlying quantum decoherence.33. M. Schlosshauer, Decoherence and the Quantum-to-Classical Transition, Springer, Berlin (2007), p. 364. Suppose Wigner’s friend makes a measurement, the outcome of which is known to the friend but not to Wigner. Regardless of whether the outcome is known, and in fact regardless of the presence of the friend, the measurement device must decohere the quantum system that’s being measured, putting the system into a mixed state of the either/or form, with no interferences, just like a coin that’s been flipped. A definite outcome has thus occurred, and Wigner and his friend will both agree on this. Neither the friend nor Wigner affects the outcome. She has simply “looked” and now knows the outcome, while Wigner doesn’t know. That is not paradoxical and does not require a revision of our understanding of pure quantum states.There’s no reason to give up on a realist interpretation of quantum physics, much less a realist interpretation of nature itself.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. A. Hobson, Concepts in Statistical Mechanics, Gordon and Breach, New York (1971), p. 27. Google Scholar2. M. F. Pusey, J. Barrett, T. Rudolph, http://arxiv.org/abs/1111.3328v1. Google Scholar3. M. Schlosshauer, Decoherence and the Quantum-to-Classical Transition, Springer, Berlin (2007), p. 364. Google Scholar© 2012 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Nov 30, 2012•1 citation
September 1996, “Theorem II” I encountered your “Ithaca Interpretation” paper this morning on the quant-ph archive … and, I must say, I've been walking around with a nice feeling since. There are some things in it that I like very much! Your Theorem II (or a very slight variation of it) has indeed been proven before, by Bill Wootters. I'll attach the citations below along with part of a note Bill once sent me. (Interestingly, one can also make a cut between real, complex, and quaternionic Hilbert spaces based on such a theorem.) About your Theorem I, if I am not mistaken, it also has a history that predates the references you gave. I believe Richard Jozsa once told me that a fellow named Hadjisavvas found it well before HJW and Gisin. If you are interested you can contact Richard directly; his e-mail address is.… As I say, I enjoyed your paper very much! (Presently) I think my only point of departure in what you say is about the issue of “objective probability.” Carl Caves and I (in still another paper cited below which can be found on quant-ph, pp. 22–26 in particular) have advocated the view that even the probabilities of quantum theory should be interpreted in a Bayesian or subjective way. We prefer to say that it is the “indeterminism” of quantum mechanics that is “objective,” and not the probabilities themselves.
On 18 September 1996 I received email that began Dear Dr. Mermin, I encountered your “Ithaca Interpretation” paper this morning on the quant-ph archive … and, I must say, I've been walking around with a nice feeling since. There are some things in it that I like very much! Although I didn't really know my correspondent, it was clear from what followed that he had thought hard – probably harder than I had – about many of the matters I was trying to address. His scholarship and intelligence were so evident that I started walking around with a nice feeling myself at having received unsolicited praise from so thoughtful a source. Little did I know that those heartwarming words of appreciation were just bait to lure me into a long critical exchange which, to my pleasure and enlightenment, has been going on ever since. A part of my subsequent education (there have also been several invariably instructive and delightful real-life meetings) can be found in Chapter 18 below. If Chris Fuchs (rhymes with “books”) did not exist then God would have been remiss in not inventing him. Foundations of quantum mechanics is a unique blend of poetry and analysis. Without the poetic vision the analysis tends to chase its own tail into more and more convoluted realms of intricate triviality. Without the analysis the poetry easily degenerates into self-indulgent doggerel.
June 2000, “References for Gleason” Some relevant references. The important ones are Gleason's paper, Cooke et al .'s paper, and Pitowsky's paper. R. Cooke, M. Keane, and W. Moran, “An Elementary Proof of Gleason's Theorem,” Math. Proc. Camb. Phil. Soc. 98 , 117–128 (1981). A. M. Gleason, “Measures on the Closed Subspaces of a Hilbert Space,” J. Math. Mech. 6 , 885–894 (1957). I. Pitowsky, “George Boole's ‘Conditions of Possible Experience’ and the Quantum Puzzle,” Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 45 , 95–125 (1994). I. Pitowsky, “Infinite and Finite Gleason's Theorems and the Logic of Indeterminacy,” J. Math. Phys. 39 , 218–228 (1998). F. Richman and D. Bridges, “A Constructive Proof of Gleason's Theorem,” J. Func. Anal. 162 , 287–312 (1999). December 2000, “New Ideas and Old Men” Thanks for the new ideas. Let me try to make a few comments. I'm in a smoky hotel bar right now; I wonder how this is affecting my laptop's health? I know it's wreaking havoc on mine. I'm still in Vienna, by the way. I leave Tuesday morning. Unfortunately I haven't gotten an ounce written of what I had hoped to. Renesism 1: This got me thinking about this stuff, and it seems that in some sense what we're gathering information about, when we make measurements, is the ability to predict future measurements . You haven't read my paper with Kurt Jacobs yet, have you? [See quant-ph/0009101.] Come on, at least read the Introduction and Footnote 27.
I appreciate David Mermin’s letter. There is, of course, an ongoing debate in the philosophy of probability about whether probability is best thought of as objective or subjective. Experts continue to disagree, which suggests that we might want to acknowledge a “problem” in that wider-than-quantum context, even if we think we have the right answer.Whatever our stance is toward probability, we can still wonder about reality (ontology). People disagree about that too, and there are respectable but mutually incompatible possibilities—which represents another problem.In particular, one can be a subjectivist about probability (as I am myself!) within different approaches to the quantum measurement problem. Both Everettian and Bohmian quantum theories invoke subjective probabilities, concerning which branch of the wavefunction you are on (Everettian) or the values of the hidden variables (Bohmian), although they treat quantum measurements differently. Taking a subjective stance toward probability does not by itself resolve the measurement problem.Objective-collapse models, by contrast, sit more comfortably in (as the name suggests) an objective picture of probability. To the extent that such models are empirically viable, it seems wrong to deny the existence of the quantum measurement problem, since, again, they address it very differently than other models.I am optimistic that the quantum measurement problem is solvable and will be solved, but I am wary about prematurely declaring victory. Section:ChooseTop of page <<© 2022 American Institute of Physics.
Although I have neither an objection to nor an endorsement of David Mermin’s major premise in his Quick Study, “There is no quantum measurement problem” (Physics Today, June 2022, page 62), I would like to make several contextual points.Mermin’s argument has an extensive history, along with a comparable history of rebuttal. Five decades ago Max Jammer wrote that “measurements in quantum mechanics are no more or less problematic than in classical physics, for the Hilbert space vector is only a purely formal device for relating the statistics associated with these arrangements to the physics of observations in classical physics.” That seems like a condensed version of the argument Mermin presents. On the following page, however, Jammer notes that a “problematic aspect whose serious implications were only gradually understood was the fact that as long as a quantum mechanical one-body or many-body system does not interact with macroscopic objects, as long as its motion is described by the deterministic Schrödinger time-dependent equation, no events could be considered to take place in the system.”11. M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: The Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in Historical Perspective, Wiley (1974), pp. 473, 474.Niels Bohr giving a lecture in Copenhagen in April 1929. (Photograph by Samuel Goudsmit, courtesy of the AIP Emilio Segrè Visual Archives, Goudsmit Collection.)PPT|High resolutionRegarding the quotations from Niels Bohr, Mermin’s point is entirely valid and represents Bohr’s position accurately, but Bohr’s thought is always subtle and difficult to capture completely. Another quotation from Bohr, which is consistent with everything else he wrote, is, “The decisive point is that in neither case does the appropriate widening of our conceptual framework imply any appeal to the observing subject, which would hinder unambiguous communication of experience.”22. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. That quotation seems inconsistent with Mermin’s paragraph that includes the passage “Why should I insist that my interpretation of science, which I use to make sense of the world that I experience, should never make any mention of me?” Bohr always insisted that his framework was a rational “generalization” of classical objectivity.The last and most conceptually important point concerns the ontological status of probability. I don’t necessarily disagree with Mermin and Bruno de Finetti, but it is by no means obvious that they are correct either. David Hawkins, for example, begins 50 pages of rigorous analysis with a brief statement of a major premise.The obvious and natural interpretation of probability in this context is that it introduces, not something that has to do with the nature of the physical system, but something that has to do with the incompleteness of our knowledge….But this opinion turns out to be false. Ignorance of dynamical regularity may be a motive for resorting to probabilities, but it does not explain the probabilities to which we resort.33. D. Hawkins, The Language of Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science, W. H. Freeman (1964), p. 135.Another example can be found in Jammer’s well-known historical account of quantum theory: “For Einstein the notion of probability … was the traditional conception of classical physics, a mathematical objectivization of the human deficiency of complete or exact knowledge but ultimately a creation of the human mind…. For Born probability, as far as it was related to the wave function, was not merely a mathematical fiction but something endowed with physical reality.”44. M. Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill (1966), p. 286.Of course, such examples don’t mean that Mermin’s position is incorrect, but I do think that they demand a better argument than a comparison to “Fairies and Witches.” I am confident that Mermin has such an argument, and I look forward to reading it as I continue working toward a coherent position on the unresolved interpretational issues of quantum theory.ReferencesSection:ChooseTop of pageReferences <<CITING ARTICLES1. M. Jammer, The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics: The Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics in Historical Perspective, Wiley (1974), pp. 473, 474. Google Scholar2. N. Bohr, Essays 1958–1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, Ox Bow Press (1987), p. 7. Google Scholar3. D. Hawkins, The Language of Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science, W. H. Freeman (1964), p. 135. Google Scholar4. M. Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, McGraw-Hill (1966), p. 286. Google Scholar© 2022 American Institute of Physics.
Aharonov, Popescu, and Tollaksen reply: We are grateful to David Mermin for stating loud and clear, in his unmistakable style, that “the authors are correct.” As for the rest of his letter, a lesson on clear writing from a great master of the subject is always welcome. We did strive for clarity in our article, but there is always space for improvement, and Freudian slips of Newspeak often creep in—that’s their very nature.However, as Mermin certainly knows, analyzing sentences in isolation without the many clues found in context doesn’t do them justice. The initial setup is indeed elementary, and we put in all the details, so it is hard to see how it could be misinterpreted. The situation becomes far more interesting and surprising, though, when weak measurements are taken into account; to ignore them, as Michael Nauenberg and Art Hobson did, is to completely miss the point. We believe that no true understanding of quantum mechanics can be obtained without taking weak measurements seriously.The letter by Robert Griffiths is mainly concerned with the merits of the consistent histories approach to quantum mechanics. It is an interesting subject but one that has very little to do with our article. We presented a number of quantum effects that arise in the context of pre- and postselection, first and foremost the effects that appear when weak measurements are involved. And no, there is no error in reasoning when we claim that in a situation like that described in our article, spin measurements may, in a consistent way, indicate that spin-1⁄2 particles have value 100; that is a statement of fact about results of measurements, which incidentally have been confirmed experimentally. One is free to disagree with the meaning we attach to those facts but cannot deny the facts themselves. Of course, since our effects are purely quantum mechanical, they can be analyzed using any interpretation of quantum mechanics, including consistent histories. However, before having such a discussion, it helps if the effects are first discovered! Their existence is our main message.© 2011 American Institute of Physics.
Because it’s important that physicists discuss the problems of quantum foundations, I was delighted to see David Mermin’s commentary on “fixing the shifty split.” But I must disagree with my friend’s view.There are multiple ways of interpreting probabilities.11. A. Hobson, Concepts in Statistical Mechanics, Gordon and Breach, New York (1971), p. 27. In quantum physics, the Bayesian “degree of belief” interpretation can be appropriate for mixed states, but only the frequentist or “ensemble” interpretation applies to the pure states that Mermin discusses.A recent paper by Matthew Pusey and coauthors22. M. F. Pusey, J. Barrett, T. Rudolph, http://arxiv.org/abs/1111.3328v1. concludes that if two different pure quantum states are assigned to a single physical situation, one of the states is objectively wrong. The proof’s main assumption is that any quantum system has some set of real physical properties, labeled λ. Pusey and coauthors show that two different pure states cannot represent the same λ. So, although their paper implies but does not assume that quantum states are physically real, it does assume that each specific physical situation has behind it some kind of physical reality. Chris Fuchs, quoted favorably by Mermin, might dispute the notion that some kind of physical reality actually exists, but most physicists are probably sufficiently realist to grant that notion. Without such a notion, science lies somewhere between solipsism and superstition.Whenever I hear subjective interpretations of quantum physics, I wonder about such questions as the one Mermin quotes from Albert Einstein: Can a mouse collapse a wavefunction? Mermin’s Bayesian response, that a mouse cannot but a physics student can, doesn’t reassure me. Were wavefunctions not collapsing before there were physicists?The “Wigner’s friend” paradox, as described in Mermin’s commentary, doesn’t need a subjective interpretation to find a solution. In fact, Eugene Wigner abandoned his interpretation around 1970 once he became aware of the ideas underlying quantum decoherence.33. M. Schlosshauer, Decoherence and the Quantum-to-Classical Transition, Springer, Berlin (2007), p. 364. Suppose Wigner’s friend makes a measurement, the outcome of which is known to the friend but not to Wigner. Regardless of whether the outcome is known, and in fact regardless of the presence of the friend, the measurement device must decohere the quantum system that’s being measured, putting the system into a mixed state of the either/or form, with no interferences, just like a coin that’s been flipped. A definite outcome has thus occurred, and Wigner and his friend will both agree on this. Neither the friend nor Wigner affects the outcome. She has simply “looked” and now knows the outcome, while Wigner doesn’t know. That is not paradoxical and does not require a revision of our understanding of pure quantum states.There’s no reason to give up on a realist interpretation of quantum physics, much less a realist interpretation of nature itself.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. A. Hobson, Concepts in Statistical Mechanics, Gordon and Breach, New York (1971), p. 27. Google Scholar2. M. F. Pusey, J. Barrett, T. Rudolph, http://arxiv.org/abs/1111.3328v1. Google Scholar3. M. Schlosshauer, Decoherence and the Quantum-to-Classical Transition, Springer, Berlin (2007), p. 364. Google Scholar© 2012 American Institute of Physics.