This chapter outlines the motivation for the work. It is argued that, acknowledging the remarkable progress of science, it is essential to dissect the modern world view from the aspects of physics. The physicist may be the outsider here, but he may also bring new light on a confusing situation. In order to combine the thinking in physics with that of philosophy, the lives and achievements of Bohr and Wittgenstein have been chosen and are discussed in some detail. The analysis is based on personal experiences; it thus remains a fiction: The Myth of Physics and the World.
This chapter outlines the motivation for the work. It is argued that, acknowledging the remarkable progress of science, it is essential to dissect the modern world view from the aspects of physics. The physicist may be the outsider here, but he may also bring new light on a confusing situation. In order to combine the thinking in physics with that of philosophy, the lives and achievements of Bohr and Wittgenstein have been chosen and are discussed in some detail. The analysis is based on personal experiences; it thus remains a fiction: The Myth of Physics and the World.
The content of this book is essentially one argument. The aim of this book is to consider the breakdown of a certain world view during the twentieth century. This is mirrored in the treatment of both science and philosophy. As these form the foundation for the human position in the world, a major reorganization of the body of knowledge had to take place. Bohr and Wittgenstein have been chosen as the main actors to represent this revision. Each one had to replace apparent order and certainty by an understanding based on limited concepts in constant flux. The conclusion is that the modern synthesis is far from satisfactory. By leaving the story unfinished in its present state, the book hopes to provoke a renewal of the discussion and the eventual emergence of a reformed clarity and understanding. Reality is to be left as it is, but the human mind is also to be left as it is. The problem is to find a way to effect a harmonious combination of these.
I am very grateful to the Master and Fellows of Trinity College for inviting me to give the Tarner Lectures. What I want to do in this book, stated boldly and baldly, is to consider the relevance of developments in modern theoretical physics to metaphysical questions about the ultimate nature of reality. By metaphysical questions I mean the very general sorts of questions that arise out of a critical examination of the principles, concepts and fundamental presuppositions that lie behind modern physics. How should we interpret the claims that physicists seem to be making about the world? Are they intended to be understood as literally true, for example, and exactly what are those claims, given that the pages of theoretical physics monographs are largely filled with abstract mathematical formalism? In the first chapter, I shall be looking at a range of philosophical points of view in the framework of which such questions can be addressed, and attempt the difficult task of adjudicating between the different approaches. At the end of the day I shall be arguing for a pretty straightforward metaphysical realism, that the external world exists independently of our knowledge of it. In the second chapter I shall look at arguments from various branches of modern physics that are sometimes claimed to bring in an essential role for subjectivity in physics, bringing the observer into a central role, creating his own reality.
We have now concluded our summary of the findings of modern physics, and may turn to consider how these findings affect the practical problems of philosophy and of everyday life. But let us first recapitulate the conclusions we have reached in our scientific discussion. Recapitulation Because we are human beings and not mere animals, we try to discover as much as we can about the world in which our lives are cast. We have seen that there is only one method of gaining such knowledge—the method of science, which consists in a direct questioning of nature by observation and experiment. The first thing we learn from such questioning is that the world is rational; its happenings are not determined by caprice but by law. There exists what we have called a ‘pattern of events’, and the primary aim of physical science is the discovery of this pattern. This, as we have seen, will be capable of description only in mathematical terms. The new quantum theory explained in the preceding chapter has provided a mathematical description of the pattern of events which is believed to be complete and perfect. For it enables us—in principle at least—to predict every possible phenomenon of physics, and not one of its predictions has so far proved to be wrong. In a sense, then, we might say that theoretical physics has achieved the main purpose of its being, and that nothing remains but to work out the details.
The relation between Physics and Philosophy brings to mind the proverbial marriage of high drama; the parties do not approve of each other, but separated they cannot live. Philosophers find physicists shallow, and many physicists claim that they find philosophic speculations useless or worse. Mostly both display a lack of knowledge and understanding of the methods and goals of the other. A few researchers have tried to bridge this gap and explore the worlds of both parties. Michael Redhead has worked in this borderland, and when he retired from his chair in Cambridge, a symposium was arranged to honour him. The talks presented on this occasion are now published in a volume presenting much food for thought to both philosophers and physicists. The essays in this publication do not offer easy reading; not too many readers will have the preparation to penetrate the technical arguments offered. The authors are well acquainted with both philosophical argumentation and mathematical formalism, and, following the lead of Professor Redhead, they combine these in intricate and suggestive ways. Only a close reading can offer understanding of the points of view taken by the various authors. Browsing and mere reading defines the scenery, exploring it demands much more. Many of the nine essays included investigate the meaning of terms used loosely in physics contexts: locality, beables, symmetries and time in relativity. All essays utilize the mathematical structures of physics, but the approach is mainly philosophical; concepts like reality and metaphysics are applied. Some writings are more physical in their treatment of technical questions relating to modern quantum theory. Bohmian mechanics, localized quantum states and gauge symmetries are discussed in detail. It is, however, found that these present interpretational problems that are usually glossed over in purely physical treatments. For an old sceptic like myself, it is quite refreshing to find that many assertions, taken for granted in our textbooks, are indeed doubtful and offer conceptual or technical difficulties. This insight is what a philosophical analysis can offer the working physicist; future progress may well arise from such realizations. However, the results offered by philosophical analysis are usually found unsatisfactory; the hope that philosophy can suggest novel directions for the theory remains unfounded. Philosophers can learn that modern physics rests on a very shaky conceptual foundation. The theory has evolved by a combination of serendipity and opportunism. The beast that finally has emerged is neither well founded nor internally consistent. Its only merit is that it works. That offers the ultimate philosophical problem of modern physics. If the present book can help the philosopher to behold this challenging but overwhelming wilderness, then it serves a useful purpose indeed. But the prospective researcher has to learn to master the difficult language used by the natives, who are not always friendly. I enjoyed reading the book immensely, but the technical difficulty of the text made my understanding remain mostly superficial. I hope to have the time to return some of the essays, and look into the references and issues involved. The work is genuinely what it promises: a guide From Physics to Philosophy .
In both science and philosophy, the twentieth century saw a radical breakdown of certainty in the human worldview, as quantum uncertainty and linguistic ambiguity destroyed the comfortable certitudes of the past. As these disciplines form the foundation for a human position in the world, a major epistemological reorganization had to take place. In this book, quantum theorist Stig Stenholm presents Bohr and Wittgenstein, in physics and in philosophy, as central figures representing this revision. Each of them took up the challenge of replacing apparent order and certainty with a provisional understanding based on limited concepts in constant flux. Stenholm concludes that the modern synthesis created by their heirs is far from satisfactory, and the story is so far an unfinished one. The book will appeal to any researcher in either discipline curious about the foundation of modern science, and works to provoke a renewal of discussion, and the eventual emergence of a reformed clarity and understanding.
1. This is a belated review of a highly interesting and thought provoking book. Although dealing with some difficulties of a very specialized modern theory, the quantum theory, it should yet be of interest to the many non-physicists who want to know about the world we live in as well as about the ideas which are at present being developed for understanding this world. It is often assumed – and the basic philosophy of many contemporary physicists supports this assumption – that within the sciences speculation and ingenuity cannot play a very great role as physical theories are more or less uniquely determined by the facts. It is of course also assumed that our present knowledge about the microcosm is determined in exactly this way and is therefore irrevocable, at least in its main features. The book shows that this is not correct, it shows that today there exists a clash of ideas about some very fundamental things, that the imposing and perhaps a little terrifying picture of science as an unalterable and steadily increasing collection of facts is nothing but a myth, and that ingenuity and speculation play in physics as great a role as anywhere else. It also shows that even now it is possible to present difficult matters in an interesting and understandable way. It shows thereby that the separation, so often deplored, between the sciences and the humanities is due to a false picture, if not a caricature of science.