Chinese Physics Letters

Attack on Optical Double Random Phase Encryption Based on the Principle of Ptychographical Imaging

Tuo Li, Yishi Shi

Published Jan 1, 2016• 7 citations

Abstract

The principle of ptychography is applied in known plain text attack on the double random phase encoding (DRPE) system. We find that with several pairs of plain texts and cipher texts, the model of attack on DRPE can be converted to the model of ptychographical imaging. Owing to the inherent merits of the ptychographical imaging, the DRPE system can be breached totally in a fast and nearly perfect way, which is unavailable for currently existing attack methods. Further, since the decryption keys can be seen as an object to be imaged from the perspective of imaging, the ptychographical technique may be a kind of new direction to further analysis of the security of other encryption systems based on double random keys.

DOI: 10.1088/0256-307x/33/1/014206

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