The nature of the problem The quantum world is inexplicable in classical terms. The predictions pertaining to the interaction of matter and light embodied in Newton's laws for the motion of particles and Maxwell's equations governing the propagation of electromagnetic fields are in flat contradiction with the experimental facts at the microscopic scale. A key feature of quantum effects is their apparent indeterminism, that individual atomic events are unpredictable, uncontrollable and literally seem to have no cause. Regularities emerge only when one considers a large ensemble of such events. This indeed is generally considered to constitute the heart of the conceptual problem posed by quantum phenomena, necessitating a fundamental revision of the deterministic classical world view. Some of the principal phenomena, among those discussed in this book, are as follows: ( a ) Self-interference: a beam of electrons sent one at a time through a barrier containing two apertures builds up through a series of localized detection events on a screen an interference pattern characteristic of waves (cf. the frontispiece and §5.1). ( b ) Tunnelling: an α-particle trapped in a nucleus can pass through a potential barrier in a manner forbidden to a classical particle (§5.3). ( c ) The stability of matter: atoms and molecules are found to exist only in certain discrete, or ‘stationary’, energy states. For this reason they do not ‘collapse’, the result predicted by classical electrodynamics. During transitions between stationary states (quantum jumps) an atom exchanges a discrete quantity of energy with the electromagnetic field (§§4.5, 7.6). […]
The nature of the problem The quantum world is inexplicable in classical terms. The predictions pertaining to the interaction of matter and light embodied in Newton's laws for the motion of particles and Maxwell's equations governing the propagation of electromagnetic fields are in flat contradiction with the experimental facts at the microscopic scale. A key feature of quantum effects is their apparent indeterminism, that individual atomic events are unpredictable, uncontrollable and literally seem to have no cause. Regularities emerge only when one considers a large ensemble of such events. This indeed is generally considered to constitute the heart of the conceptual problem posed by quantum phenomena, necessitating a fundamental revision of the deterministic classical world view. Some of the principal phenomena, among those discussed in this book, are as follows: ( a ) Self-interference: a beam of electrons sent one at a time through a barrier containing two apertures builds up through a series of localized detection events on a screen an interference pattern characteristic of waves (cf. the frontispiece and §5.1). ( b ) Tunnelling: an α-particle trapped in a nucleus can pass through a potential barrier in a manner forbidden to a classical particle (§5.3). ( c ) The stability of matter: atoms and molecules are found to exist only in certain discrete, or ‘stationary’, energy states. For this reason they do not ‘collapse’, the result predicted by classical electrodynamics. During transitions between stationary states (quantum jumps) an atom exchanges a discrete quantity of energy with the electromagnetic field (§§4.5, 7.6). […]
Despite its successes, quantum mechanics (QM) has remained mysterious to all who have encountered it. Starting with Bohr and progressing into the present, the departure from intuitive, physical reality has widened. The connection between QM and reality is more than just a “philosophical” issue. It reveals that QM is not a correct or complete theory of the physical world and that inescapable internal inconsistencies and incongruities arise when attempts are made to treat it as physical as opposed to a purely mathematical “tool.” Some of these issues are discussed in a review by F. Laloe [Am. J. Phys. 69, 655 (2001)]. In an attempt to provide some physical insight into atomic problems and starting with the same essential physics as Bohr of e moving in the Coulombic field of the proton and the wave equation as modified by Schrodinger, a classical approach is explored that yields a remarkably accurate model and provides insight into physics on the atomic level. The proverbial view, deeply seated in the wave-particle duality notion, that there is no large-scale physical counterpart to the nature of the electron may not be correct. Physical laws and intuition may be restored when dealing with the wave equation and quantummechanical problems. Specifically, a theory of classical quantum mechanics (CQM) is derived from first principles that successfully applies physical laws on all scales. Rather than using the postulated Schrodinger boundary condition “Ψ → 0 as r → ∞,” which leads to a purely mathematical model of the electron, the constraint is based on experimental observation. Using Maxwell’s equations, the classical wave equation is solved with the constraint that the bound (n = 1)state electron cannot radiate energy. By further application of Maxwell’s equations to electromagnetic and gravitational fields at particle production, the Schwarzschild metric is derived from the classical wave equation, which modifies general relativity to include conservation of spacetime in addition to momentum and matter/energy. The result gives a natural relationship among Maxwell’s equations, special relativity, and general relativity. CQM holds over a scale of spacetime of 85 orders of magnitude — it correctly predicts the nature of the universe from the scale of the quarks to that of the cosmos. A review is given by G. Landvogt [Internat. J. Hydrogen Energy 28, 1155 (2003)].
When we are presented with apparently bizarre properties of microsystems governed by quantum mechanics (as in our discussion of the double-slit experiment in the previous chapter), we naturally ask whether it might be possible to find another theory, or at least another story to go with the equations, that would make more sense to us. We might seek a theory and a view of fundamental physical processes that would accord more with our classically based, everyday common sense. This typically takes the form of the question of the possibility of the existence of a more detailed description of atomic processes than that afforded by the wave function (that is, by the Copenhagen interpretation of the previous chapter). In this chapter we discuss some of the central interpretive problems of the Copenhagen version of quantum mechanics. Then, in the next two chapters, we look at the severe, general restrictions that are placed on any such completion of quantum mechanics and at one particular extension of quantum mechanics. First, though, we begin here with the struggle that ensued over the status of causality in quantum theory. THE COMPLETENESS OF QUANTUM MECHANICS Although the Heisenberg uncertainty principle (Section 20.4) and the lack of absolute predictive power are an inherent feature of quantum mechanics, there have been attempts to preserve an in principle completely deterministic structure for physics. Even classically, in a macroscopic sample of gas there are so many molecules that it would be hopeless, as a practical matter, to predict the future locations of all these molecules from Newton's laws of motion.
The behavior of classical macroscopic particles – from baseballs to planets – is governed by Newtonian mechanics as we have described in the first chapters of this book. The behavior of very small particles, on the other hand, is governed by an entirely different collection of equations and rules that go under the name of “quantum mechanics” and these particles are referred to as quantum particles. These rules have analogies to classical mechanics, but are fundamentally different and somewhat mysterious as we discussed in Chapter 8. The fundamental principles of quantum mechanics cannot be proven to be correct. They were developed based on the results of experimental observation, by analogy with classical mechanics, and through the consideration of logical implications of the formalisms used. There is no way to derive the fundamental elements of quantum mechanics, any more than one could predict from first principles that Newtonian forces should add as vectors. On the other hand, quantum mechanics is among the most rigorously tested theories in science, and the predictions of quantum mechanics have, so far, always been in agreement with experiment. In this chapter, we will present quantum mechanics as a series of postulates and examine their implications in application to simple one-dimensional systems. In the next chapter we will examine quantum effects in real systems including atoms, molecules, crystals, and artificially engineered nano-structures. Postulates of quantum mechanics QM Postulate 1: A quantum particle is described by a wave function Ψ( x , y , z , t ) which is a function of spatial coordinates and time. All physically determinable quantities can be derived from the wave function Ψ( x , y , z , t ) ; quantities which cannot be found from the wave function are not physically meaningful. Note that some things that one could ask about a quantum particle, for example the exact position and simultaneous exact momentum of a particle, are not derivable from the wave function and are therefore considered indeterminate (or uncertain ). These are things which cannot ever be known about a particle, and, as such, they are meaningless to contemplate.
The basic postulates The statistical interpretation of the wavefunction is in accord with experimental facts. An interference pattern on a screen is built up by a series of apparently random events, and the wavefunction correctly predicts where the particle is most likely to land over an ensemble of trials (cf. the frontispiece ). Yet the interpretation of the wavefunction which ascribes to it a purely statistical significance is not forced on us by the experimental results – the latter show only that it is consistent to regard the wavefunction as containing information on probability; they do not exclude the possibility that it may possess other properties. On the contrary, one may take the view that the characteristic distribution of spots on a screen which build up an interference pattern is evidence that the wavefunction indeed has a more potent physical role than a mere repository of information on probabilities, for how are the particles guided so that statistically they fall into such a pattern? Such a question is naturally ruled out by the purely probabilistic interpretation. But the latter is appropriate only if we wish to reduce physics to a kind of algorithm which is efficient at correlating the statistical results of experiments. If we wish to do more, and attempt to understand the experimental results as the outcome of a causally connected series of individual processes, then we are free to enquire as to the possible further significance of the wavefunction (beyond its probabilistic aspect), and to introduce other concepts in addition to the wavefunction.
Quantum interference is traditionally interpreted as evidence of intrinsic wave–particle duality, invoking self-interference and wavefunction superposition. Here, we propose an alternative causal framework in which interference arises from interactions between a classical electron and a quantized electromagnetic field. In this picture, electrons follow definite, localized trajectories and produce discrete detection events, while the observed interference pattern emerges statistically from stochastic, nonlocal momentum transfers mediated by quantized field modes. Numerical simulations of the double-slit experiment show that dot-like interference fringes arise without invoking wavefunction collapse or intrinsic matter waves. Doubling the electron mass narrows the fringe spacing in agreement with de Broglie scaling, indicating that the effective wavelength emerges dynamically from particle–field coupling rather than representing an inherent property of the particle. The formulation is based on a rigorously defined Hamiltonian and derived equations describing electromagnetic coupling between particles and the slit environment. Although neutral particles such as neutrons or atoms carry no net charge monopoles, they possess electric or magnetic dipole and higher multipole moments that enable electromagnetic interactions with the slit apparatus, allowing discrete momentum transfer through the quantized field. Our simulations show that interference fringes arise from intermittent singleparticle detection events caused by stochastic momentum impulses from quantized electromagnetic modes. These results suggest a reinterpretation of wave–particle duality: the apparent wave-like behavior of matter may arise from interaction with the inherently wave-like quantized electromagnetic field—whose quanta are photons, the massless U(1)-gauge bosons—rather than from an intrinsic wave nature of the particles themselves. Our analysis is rigorous and is not speculative, because the proposed Hamiltonian for this system is physical. Within this nonlocal hidden-variable framework, the dot-like interference pattern observed in the double-slit experiment emerges from individual electrons traversing one slit at a time while receiving discrete momentum impulses from stochastic, spatially extended quantized electromagnetic fields.
Introduction Quantum mechanics is based on the intuition that the essential difference between atomic physics and classical physics is the occurrence of discontinuities (see in particular [1,4,58–63]). Quantum mechanics should thus be considered a direct continuation of the quantum theory founded by Planck, Einstein and Bohr. Bohr in particular stressed repeatedly, already before the birth of quantum mechanics, that the discontinuities must lead to the introduction of new kinematical and mechanical concepts, so that indeed classical mechanics and its corresponding conceptual scheme should be abandoned [1,4]. Quantum mechanics tries to introduce the new concepts through a precise analysis of what is ‘observable in principle’. In fact, this does not mean setting up the principle that a sharp division between ‘observable’ and ‘unobservable’ quantities is possible and necessary. As soon as a conceptual scheme is given, one can infer from the observations to other facts that are actually not observable directly, and the boundary between ‘observable’ and ‘unobservable’ quantities becomes altogether indeterminate. But if the conceptual scheme itself is still unknown, it will be expedient to enquire only about the observations themselves, without drawing conclusions from them, because otherwise wrong concepts and prejudices taken over from before will block the way to recognising the physical relationships [Zusammenhänge].