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OWL: Experiences and Directions

An OWL Ontology for Quantum Mechanics.

Marcin Skulimowski

Published Jan 1, 2010• 2 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Abstract. An OWL ontology for quantum mechanics is presented in short. The motivation for its development, structure and characteristic features are depicted. In particular, some essential concepts from the ontology are described. Finally, some problems encountered during the development of the ontology are discussed. 1

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Abstract In Chapter 4, the MHI was introduced in terms of interpretative postulates that define the ontological reference of each physical term of quantum mechanics in its standard formulation. On the basis of that presentation, an ontology of properties, framed in the algebraic formalism of quantum mechanics, was proposed. The aim of this chapter is to set out in detail the structure of the ontology proposed by the MHI, now with the technical metaphysical resources developed in the previous chapter. In particular, the nature of the properties that constitute the fundamental ontological items is discussed, and it is argued that quantum systems are not objects at all, but mere collections of properties that do not retain their identity either synchronically or diachronically. More precisely, quantum systems turn out to be non-objectual bundles of properties.
We present and discuss selected issues related to the problem of representing in a machine-readable way data and knowledge about the quantum level of reality. In particular, we propose a method of creating an ontology for the quantum world. The method uses a mathematical structure of quantum mechanics. We apply the method to obtain a toy ontology corresponding to the Hilbert space formulation of quantum mechanics. We use the terms from the ontology to describe a simple quantum system. We also show how we can use the ontology to create semantic enhancements of scientific publications on quantum mechanics.
Abstract In the previous chapter, the structure of the ontology proposed by the MHI was introduced. In this ontology, properties are the fundamental items and quantum systems are non-objectual bundles of properties. However, as is well known, metaphysics is underdetermined by physics; in particular, quantum mechanics is compatible with different ontological pictures. Thus, arguing in favor of a certain quantum ontology over others requires showing how fruitful it is in the task of offering reasonable solutions to interpretative problems. This chapter is devoted to show the advantages of the proposed picture for dealing with the ontological challenges of quantum mechanics: contextuality, non-separability, and indistinguishability. Finally, the top-down approach presented in Chapter 8 is revisited, showing how it acquires an ontological significance from the perspective of the ontology of properties proposed by the MHI.
What ontology does realism about the quantum state suggest? The main extant view in contemporary philosophy of physics is wave-function realism. We elaborate the sense in which wave-function realism does provide an ontological picture, and defend it from certain objections that have been raised against it. However, there are good reasons to be dissatisfied with wave-function realism, as we go on to elaborate. This motivates the development of an opposing picture: what we call spacetime state realism, a view which takes the states associated to spacetime regions as fundamental. This approach enjoys a number of beneficial features, although, unlike wave-function realism, it involves non-separability at the level of fundamental ontology. We investigate the pros and cons of this non-separability, arguing that it is a quite acceptable feature, even one which proves fruitful in the context of relativistic covariance. A companion paper discusses the prospects for combining a spacetime-based ontology with separability, along lines suggested by Deutsch and Hayden. 1 Introduction2 Prolegomena3 Wave-function Realism4 Problems with Wave-function Realism5 Spacetime State Realism6 Locality7 Non-unitary Dynamics on the Spacetime Ontology8 Relativity and Poincaré Covariance9 Finding the Appearances10 Conclusion
What is a physical object according to the theory of quantum mechanics? The first answer to be considered is that given by Bohr in terms of the concept of complementarity. This interpretation is illustrated by way of an example, the two slit experiment, which highlights some of the associated problems of ontology. One such problem is the so-called problem of measurement or observation. Various interpretations of measurement in Quantum Theory, including those of Heisenberg, von Neumann, Everett and Bohr, are compared and contrasted. A second problem concerns whether or not QT can be considered complete and therefore satisfactory as a basis for physics. Various attempts to complete QT by means of the addition of ‘hidden variables’ to the quantum mechanical state function are considered and their aims and achievements assessed. Finally, we investigate some of the characteristic ontological problems for the orthodox interpretation of Relativistic Quantum Theory.