Facing the Ontological Challenges of Quantum Mechanics

Olímpia Lombardi

Published Feb 19, 2026• 0 citations

Abstract

Abstract In the previous chapter, the structure of the ontology proposed by the MHI was introduced. In this ontology, properties are the fundamental items and quantum systems are non-objectual bundles of properties. However, as is well known, metaphysics is underdetermined by physics; in particular, quantum mechanics is compatible with different ontological pictures. Thus, arguing in favor of a certain quantum ontology over others requires showing how fruitful it is in the task of offering reasonable solutions to interpretative problems. This chapter is devoted to show the advantages of the proposed picture for dealing with the ontological challenges of quantum mechanics: contextuality, non-separability, and indistinguishability. Finally, the top-down approach presented in Chapter 8 is revisited, showing how it acquires an ontological significance from the perspective of the ontology of properties proposed by the MHI.

DOI: 10.1093/9780198951407.003.0011

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