Certificateless non-interactive key exchange protocol without pairings

Yun Wei, Fushan Wei, Chuangui Ma

Published Aug 1, 2014• 2 citations

Abstract

Non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) allows two parties to establish a shared key without communications. In ID-based non-interactive key exchange (ID-NIKE) protocols, private key generator (PKG) knows user's private key, so it can calculate the shared key between two participants, and most constructions of ID-NIKE need expensive pairing operation. To overcome these disadvantages, a security model of certificateless non-interactive key exchange (CL-NIKE) is proposed in this paper. And a scheme without pairings is also given. The proposed protocol is proved secure in the Random Oracle Model (ROM) based on the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) and computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem. In the new protocol, key generation center (KGC) only knows user's partial key and is not able to calculate the shared key. Moreover, the new protocol is more efficient than the existing ID-NIKE schemes because it is pairing-free.

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