Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

NATO science for peace and security series. D, Information and communication security

Eavesdropping on the LM05 secure communication protocol

W oacute jcik Antoni, Hausmann Krystian

Published Jan 1, 2010• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Security of the two-way quantum communication protocol proposed by Lucamarini and Mancini (Phys. Rev. Lett. 94 (2005) 140501) can be impaired in the case of considerable quantum channel noise. We present scheme which considers the opportunity of eavesdropping due to a separation of two procedures, namely, the verification procedure and the communication procedure.

DOI
10.3233/978-1-60750-547-1-108

Related papers

Eavesdropping on the “Ping-Pong” Quantum Communication Protocol

Antoni Wójcik

Security of the "ping-pong" quantum communication protocol recently proposed by Boström and Felbinger [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002)]] is analyzed in the case of considerable quantum channel losses. The eavesdropping scheme is presented, which reveals that the ping-pong protocol is not secure for transmission efficiencies lower than 60%. Our scheme induces 50% losses, which, however, can be hidden in the channel losses if one replaces the original lossy channel with a less lossy one. Finally, a possible improvement of the ping-pong protocol security is proposed.

arXiv:quant-ph/0211199•Physical Review Letters•Apr 15, 2003•336 citations

Eavesdropping on Quantum Secure Direct Communication with W State in Noisy Channel

Yuan Hao, Liu Yin-Min, Zhang Wen +1 more

Security of the quantum secure direct communication protocol (i.e., the C-S QSDC protocol) recently proposed by Cao and Song [Chin. Phys. Lett. 23 (2006) 290] is analyzed in the case of considerable quantum channel noise. The eavesdropping scheme is presented, which reveals that the C-S QSDC protocol is not secure if the quantum bit error rate (QBER) caused by quantum channel noise is higher than 4.17%. Our eavesdropping scheme induces about 4.17% QBER for those check qubits. However, such QBER can be hidden in the counterpart induced by the noisy quantum channel if the eavesdropper Eve replaces the original noisy channel by an ideal one. Furthermore, if the QBER induced by quantum channel noise is lower than 4.17%, then in the eavesdropping scheme Eve still can eavesdrop part of the secret messages by safely attacking a fraction of the transmitted qubits. Finally, an improvement on the C-S QSDC protocol is put forward.

Communications in Theoretical Physics•Jan 1, 2008•13 citations

Individual incoherent eavesdropping on a two-way quantum communication protocol

Giovanni Di Giuseppe, Marco Lucamarini, Alessandro Ceré +1 more

One-way quantum channels play a fundamental role in the security of the communication between two distant parties, in particular within the frame of "quantum key distribution". Nevertheless quite recently it has been introduced the possibility of using two-way quantum channels for the same purpose. Although the first attempts in this direction did not feature any particular advantage with respect to the one-way counterpart some recent results obtained by our group suggest that this new class of protocols provides higher thresholds of security.

Proceedings of SPIE, the International Society for Optical Engineering/Proceedings of SPIE•Aug 31, 2006•0 citations

Verification of Quantum Protocols with a Probabilistic Model-Checker

Amir M. Tavala, Soroosh Nazem, Ali Akbar Babaei-Brojeny

Channel modeling is crucial for studying the behavior of quantum channels in order to build an efficient error correction scheme in addition to security verification of different protocols. While most current analyses of quantum protocols use a traditional mathematical approach, we employ a simpler probabilistic model checking which is more compatible with classical implementations to investigate the dependency of the security on the quantum channel noise. We also compare a couple of eavesdropping strategies from the security point of view.

Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science•Feb 1, 2011•3 citations

Two-way Secure Communication Using Quantum Illumination

Maria Tengner, Tian Zhong, Franco N. C. Wong +1 more

A two-way entanglement-based communication protocol resilient to high loss and noise is implemented. Even though the entanglement is lost during transmission, efficient communication that is secure against passive eavesdropping is possible.

Conference on Lasers and Electro-Optics•Jan 1, 2011•0 citations

Deterministic quantum communication in presence of controlled noise: An experimantal test

Giovanni Di Giuseppe, Alessandro Ceré, Marco Lucamarini +1 more

An individual incoherent eavesdropping on a two-way quantum protocol for deterministic communication without entanglement is stimulated. The results show that the protocol remains secure regardless of the noise caused by the eavesdropper.

Conference on Lasers and Electro-Optics•May 1, 2006•0 citations
Security of the two-way quantum communication protocol proposed by Lucamarini and Mancini (Phys. Rev. Lett. 94 (2005) 140501) can be impaired in the case of considerable quantum channel noise. We present scheme which considers the opportunity of eavesdropping due to a separation of two procedures, namely, the verification procedure and the communication procedure.
Security of the "ping-pong" quantum communication protocol recently proposed by Boström and Felbinger [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002)]] is analyzed in the case of considerable quantum channel losses. The eavesdropping scheme is presented, which reveals that the ping-pong protocol is not secure for transmission efficiencies lower than 60%. Our scheme induces 50% losses, which, however, can be hidden in the channel losses if one replaces the original lossy channel with a less lossy one. Finally, a possible improvement of the ping-pong protocol security is proposed.
Security of the quantum secure direct communication protocol (i.e., the C-S QSDC protocol) recently proposed by Cao and Song [Chin. Phys. Lett. 23 (2006) 290] is analyzed in the case of considerable quantum channel noise. The eavesdropping scheme is presented, which reveals that the C-S QSDC protocol is not secure if the quantum bit error rate (QBER) caused by quantum channel noise is higher than 4.17%. Our eavesdropping scheme induces about 4.17% QBER for those check qubits. However, such QBER can be hidden in the counterpart induced by the noisy quantum channel if the eavesdropper Eve replaces the original noisy channel by an ideal one. Furthermore, if the QBER induced by quantum channel noise is lower than 4.17%, then in the eavesdropping scheme Eve still can eavesdrop part of the secret messages by safely attacking a fraction of the transmitted qubits. Finally, an improvement on the C-S QSDC protocol is put forward.
One-way quantum channels play a fundamental role in the security of the communication between two distant parties, in particular within the frame of "quantum key distribution". Nevertheless quite recently it has been introduced the possibility of using two-way quantum channels for the same purpose. Although the first attempts in this direction did not feature any particular advantage with respect to the one-way counterpart some recent results obtained by our group suggest that this new class of protocols provides higher thresholds of security.
Channel modeling is crucial for studying the behavior of quantum channels in order to build an efficient error correction scheme in addition to security verification of different protocols. While most current analyses of quantum protocols use a traditional mathematical approach, we employ a simpler probabilistic model checking which is more compatible with classical implementations to investigate the dependency of the security on the quantum channel noise. We also compare a couple of eavesdropping strategies from the security point of view.